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FOREWORD 
 
The present dissertation is the attempt to give a thematic account of Niels Bohr’s 
scientific and philosophical thought. Starting from epistemological considerations as 
regards Imre Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, it was my aim to 
go back to the origin of the heuristic underlying Bohr’s research program. Therefore, I 
came to integrate Lakatos’ view on methodology with Gerald Holton’s idea of thematic 
origin of scientific thought. Following these premises, I came to a thesis, perhaps 
surprising, that Bohr’s basic methodological principle was the condition of continuity 
rather than discontinuity. Moreover, almost as a consequence of the thematic analysis, it 
became a priority of this work to establish connections between so-called external 
factors and the “rational” development of the program. However, the dissertation’s aim 
could not be confined to understand how the social, cultural and historical background 
may shape scientific discoveries. Therefore I refused to restrict the thesis to the quarrel 
on the importance’s degree of the cultural relationships between Niels Bohr and his 
mentor and professor of philosophy, Harald Høffding. On the contrary, step by step, by 
focusing on the study of the historical origin of the hypothesized themata (unity, 
totality, harmony, continuity) to a certain extent, I became aware of what Mara Beller 
termed the fundamental unity or harmony between the possibilities of definition and 
observation, this is to say the place where the above mentioned heuristic becomes 
physical. As it will be shown later on, continuity is the condition of such a unity – or, as 
it is more appropriate to call it, asymptotic unity. In this view, the indispensability of the 
concepts of classical physics finds its role with respect to quantum reality in a new 
perspective, i.e. the continuous interaction between those two terms. It is here that the 
concept of complementarity unfolds its more profound meaning. And it is here that such 
x 
a view appears to match with a Romantic interpretation of the rational generalization 
thesis, where the quantum of action, with its atomicity, empirical unity, indivisibility, is 
elevated to an a priori concept that must be re-comprehended. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 An Outlook on the Cultural Background of Non-classical 
Interpretation of Physics in the Early Twentieth Century 
Since the early 1960s, history of quantum physics’ main topics were brought to the 
forefront of the debate of the history of science. Even in this subject we meet with a 
controversy between an internalistic and an externalistic view. The internalistic 
approach focuses on the study of the development of a discipline by analysing the 
relations among theories within the discipline itself. For example, with regard to the 
history of quantum physics, one should explain Niels Bohr’s first atomic theory of 1913 
in terms of what can follow from theories and data in the physics of the previous times. 
The externalistic view regards scientific theories as not only influenced by the previous 
“technical history” of the discipline, but also by sociological and cultural circumstances 
beyond the domain of the discipline itself. Considering the example of Niels Bohr’s first 
atomic theory, we should supplement the merely scientific account with Bohr’s cultural 
and philosophical background.  
It means that such an explanation should be related also to the study of social, cultural, 
and political context. Sometimes the externalists forget to deal with the purely scientific 
accounts and emphasize only the sociological and psychological factors in the 
development of science. Some others, the internalists fail to admit the existence of 
2 
certain methodological decisions, which render scientific research so unique an 
enterprise. They are based on presuppositions not backed by unquestionable results, as 
they arise from un-verifiable and un-falsifiable statements.  
Nevertheless, such a debate is no more an up-to-date one, as it presupposes a well 
identifiable line of demarcation between internal and external factors that according to 
some philosopher of science would correspond to the boundary between rational and 
irrational historical reconstruction respectively. It is my aim to propose a new mode of 
considering the relations between internal and external factors in the history of science 
through the modification of Imre Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs 
for explaining Niels Bohr’s rational generalization thesis.  
In my opinion, only a profound revision of the approach to the history of science might 
allow the historian of science to shed light on such a riddle within Bohr’s scientific 
program. So far neither adopting the internal nor the external approach was sufficient to 
give account of how such continuity thesis may coexist with Niels Bohr’s cultural 
background that historians of science have regarded as influenced by the concept of 
discontinuity. 
One of the least-discussed and least-understood parts of Bohr’s interpretation is his 
thesis that quantum theory is a rational generalization of classical mechanics. Bohr 
himself wrote:  
«The endeavours to formulate general laws for these possibilities and probabilities by suitably limited 
application of the concepts of the classical theories have led recently, after a series of phases in its 
development, to the creation of a rational quantum mechanics by means of which we are able to describe 
 3 
a very wide range of experience, and which may be regarded in every respect as a generalization of the 
classical physical theories»1.  
This thesis is necessary for understanding Bohr’s approach to quantum physics: his 
view on complementarity, the correspondence principle, and the indispensability of 
classical concepts. Although Bohr considered Planck’s quantum of action as leading to 
the need for a revision in physics, he was more a continuity theorist than a 
revolutionary. Bohr was a continuity theorist in the sense that he tried to maintain and 
emphasize those features of the predecessor theory that were preserved in the transition 
to the successor theory. It was his fundamental belief in this continuity that he was 
trying to call attention to by describing quantum theory as a rational generalization of 
classical mechanics2. It is my aim to explain the origin of Bohr’s fundamental belief in 
continuity and harmony through an historical analysis of his cultural and scientific 
background in the light of a post Lakatosian methodology of scientific research 
program. As we shall see, such a methodological revision will match with Gerald 
Holton’s thematic approach. 
Historians and philosophers of science of the kind of Max Jammer and Gerald Holton 
carried on remarkable studies and reflections on the influence of the philosophical 
climate on scientific works, in particular on the philosophical background of quantum 
mechanics. Jammer pointed out that physicists usually refuse of declaring themselves as 
subscribing to a particular school of philosophical thought, even if they are aware of 
                                                 
1
 NIELS BOHR, “Introductory Survey”, in Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [1929], 1934), 1-24, p. 4. Reprinted in JØRGEN KALCKAR (ed.), Niels Bohr 
Collected Works [NBCW], Vol. 6: Foundations of Quantum Physics I, 1926-1932 (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1985), 279-302, p. 282. 
2
 Cf. PETER BOKULICH, ALISA BOKULICH, “Niels Bohr’s Generalization of Classical Mechanics”, 
Foundations of Physics, 2005, 35: 347-369, p. 349. 
4 
belonging to it3. Gerald Holton subscribed this point and affirmed that scientists, 
consciously or not, use thematic presuppositions in the nascent “private” period of their 
works. He noted that behind the process of theory formation stands a set of individual 
presuppositions, about which the scientist may not be very conscious because they are 
part of the “private” science4. Jammer added that philosophical considerations influence 
the physicist’s mind and they act “more like an undercurrent beneath the surface than 
like a patent well-defined guiding line”5. Both Holton and Jammer agree that it is the 
nature of science to suppress these motivating preconceptions, but it is the historian of 
science’s duty to recover them under the superstructure of the scientific edifice. 
Correspondence, autobiographical remarks minutes and letters can supply information 
that is not detectable in scientific publications. 
Namely, Jammer sustained that the documentary material may show that certain 
philosophical ideas of the late nineteenth century helped the formation of the new 
conceptions of the modern quantum theory. He dwelled on the importance of writers 
such as Renouvier, Boutroux, Kierkegaard, Møller, Peirce, James and Høffding.  
In particular, Jammer held that Søren Kierkegaard inspired Niels Bohr. According to 
Jammer, Harald Høffding, the other great Danish philosopher and Bohr’s professor of 
philosophy at the university, mediated the influence. Bohr attended Høffding’s lectures 
at the University of Copenhagen and read Høffding’s works in which Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy occupied a prominent place. Since Høffding visited William James in 1904 
in the United States and later on lectured on his psychology, Jammer took it for granted 
                                                 
3
 Cf. MAX JAMMER, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1966), p. 166. 
4
 Cf. GERALD J. HOLTON, Victory and Vexation in Science: Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and others 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 140. 
5
 JAMMER, The Conceptual Development (cit. note 3), p. 166. 
 5 
that James too inspired Bohr. For the sake of clearness, we have to remind ourselves 
that Jammer proposed an analogy between Kierkegaard’s “leap” when speaking of 
attitudes to life and Bohr’s “leap” when speaking of a transition from one stationary 
state to another. An interesting reference to James can be found in Klaus M. Meyer-
Abich, Korrespondenz, Individualität und Komplementarität, from 1965. He considered 
James’ influence on Bohr as possible without drawing any conclusions. 
In his article “The Roots of Complementarity” from 1970, Gerald Holton emphasized 
Kierkegaard and James’ influence on Bohr. Also in Silvano Tagliagambe, “Il concetto 
di realtà fisica e il principio di complementarità”, 1972, and in Evandro Agazzi, Temi e 
problemi di filosofia della fisica, 1974, we find a partial acceptance of Jammer’s ideas. 
Just like Lewis S. Feuer did in his Einstein and the Generations of Science, 1974. 
Enrico Bellone and Nadia Robotti gave an interesting account on the relevance of the 
Bohr-Høffding relationship on: “Alcuni aspetti dello sviluppo dei primi modelli sulla 
costituzione dell’atomo”, Contributi alla storia della Meccanica Quantistica, 1976. The 
authors emphasized the importance of Bohr’s philosophical background – in particular, 
some philosophical issues of Høffding’s thought, namely the qualitative dialectic – for 
explaining Bohr’s method of searching for coherence in the new ideas after he had 
stressed the conflict between the classical theory and his model.  
Also Klaus Stolzenburg contributed to the debate with his, Die Entwicklung des 
Bohrschen Komplementaritätsgedankens in den Jahren 1924 bis 1929, from 1977. 
Furthermore Kurt Hübner saw an analogy between Kierkegaard and Bohr in his 
Critique of Scientific Reason, 1983.  
6 
According to John Hendry’s The Creation of Quantum Mechanics and the Bohr-Pauli 
Dialogue, 1984, there are striking parallels between Bohr’s atomic model and some 
aspects of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  
Dugald Murdoch in his Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 1987, sustained that 
Høffding influenced Bohr’s pragmatism. Sandro Petruccioli in Atoms, Metaphors, and 
Paradoxes: Niels Bohr and the Construction of a New Physics, from 1988, focused on 
the role played by the atomic model in constructing the theory. Professor Petruccioli’s 
study re-evaluated the role of metaphor in science by regarding them as an irreplaceable 
component of the linguistic mechanism of scientific theories. In particular, “electrons” 
and “elliptic orbits” served to make explicit the content of a metaphorical expression 
that Bohr applied to the new quantum theoretical concept of stationary state, which had 
enabled the theory to explain the spectroscopic laws and a radioactive behaviour of 
atoms.  
Petruccioli suggested that this initial metaphor carried out a precise heuristic function in 
originating a research program that made it possible to utilize every aspect of the 
classical theories in the systematic construction of quantum theory6.  
Jan Faye in Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy, 1991, maintained that there was a 
close connection between Niels Bohr’s approach to the study of the atom and the 
philosophical influences, which shaped his outlook from childhood and youth onwards. 
On the contrary, David Favrholdt’s thesis in Niels Bohr’s Philosophical Background, 
1992, is that Bohr’s works in physics should be explained in terms of an internalistic 
rather than an externalistic view on the history of science. Favrholdt was the scholar 
                                                 
6
 Cf. SANDRO PETRUCCIOLI, Atomi, Metafore, Paradossi. Niels Bohr e la costruzione di una nuova fisica 
(Roma: Theoria, 1988), English translation by Ian McGilvray: Atoms, Metaphors, and Paradoxes: Niels 
Bohr and the Construction of a New Physics (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 91. 
 7 
who inaugurated the “Danish debate” on Niels Bohr’s philosophical background with 
the article “Niels Bohr and Danish Philosophy” issued on the Danish Yearbook of 
Philosophy in 1976. In 1979 Jan Faye published on the same review his “The Influence 
of Harald Høffding’s Philosophy on Niels Bohr’s Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics”. Favrholdt’s promptly reply was issued on the same number of the Danish 
Yearbook.  
Since his first article Favrholdt sought to refute the theses about the inspiration Bohr 
presumably received from Danish philosophy. On the contrary, Faye’s aim was to 
demonstrate the close connection that existed between Niels Bohr’s attitude to the 
atomic world and the philosophical influence he was under already from childhood and 
youth. 
Paraphrasing Léon Rosenfeld, there cannot be much doubt that Niels Bohr like 
everyone was influenced by his own cultural and social context. That does not mean 
that Bohr was not an independent thinker. One way may be dispensed with: that Bohr 
developed the first atomic theory because he was a genius, and, since geniuses do not 
belong to mundane history like most people, it is not noteworthy to ask about the 
cultural or philosophical conditioning of his theory.  
There is general consensus among historians of science that talk of genius does not so 
much explain scientific innovation as re-describe it.  
Therefore, it would be misleading trying to demonstrate whether either Bohr developed 
his epistemological ideas single-handed or, if not, how he was able to do it with no-
more philosophical preparation than Høffding’s elementary course of lectures7. It 
                                                 
7
 Cf. LÉON ROSENFELD, “Book Review. Max Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum 
Mechanics”, Nuclear Physics, 1969, A 126: 696.  
8 
should be rather a priority to ascertain in which way the cultural background may 
inspire the development of a scientific discipline. 
Jammer and Holton held of something central when they stress the importance of those 
motivating preconceptions underlying scientific research, but, as I see it, they did not 
show how these presuppositions interact with proper scientific reflection to such an 
extent that they could exert heuristic functions within the research program. 
Now it is worth taking a brief detour from the most relevant studies carried on in the 
history of science for illustrating what is reputed to be the philosophical background of 
non-classical interpretation of quantum theory. Moreover, I shall give account of the 
insufficiencies of most of the historical proposals so far carried on. As we have seen, 
Max Jammer was one of the contributors to the historical tradition better known as 
externalism.  
Jammer remarked that the interpretation of optical phenomena required the use of 
“mutually exclusive notions”, which were foreign to the traditional conceptions. A 
critical examination and epistemological analysis of the foundations of the theory was 
hence considered necessary.  
He commenced by presenting Renouvier’s rejection of actual infinity that was for him 
“a logical self-contradiction and an empirical falsehood”8. Renouvier rejected continuity 
because continuity presupposes an actual infinity of gradations. Renouvier refused the 
concept of causality both as an idealistic category of the understanding in the Kantian 
sense, and as a realistic principle of order in the cosmos. 
As Jammer specified: 
                                                 
8
 CHARLES RENOUVIER, Les Principes de la Nature (Paris: Colin, 1864), p. 37: «Je dis que si toute la 
suite des nombres entiers était actuellement donnée il y aurait deux nombres égaux dont l’un serait plus 
grand que l’autre, ce qui est une contradiction formelle, in terminis […]». 
 9 
«Renouvier proposed a phenomenalism according to which all that we immediately know is but a 
particular phenomenon or “representation”. Every representation has a two-fold character: it is a 
“representing” and a “represented” (“representatif” and “représenté”); it is an experience of something 
and it is something experienced»9. 
Later on, Jammer attributed similar ideas to Boutroux: in particular, a philosophy of 
nature based on contingency: 
«Analysing the notion of natural law, as seen in the sciences themselves, I found that this law is not a first 
principle but rather a result; that life, feeling, and liberty are true and profound realities, whereas the 
relatively invariable and general forms apprehended by science are but the inadequate manifestations of 
these realities. […]. All experimental finding is reduced, in the end, to confining within as close limits as 
possible the value of the measurable phenomena. We never reach the exact points at which the 
phenomenon really begins and ends. Moreover, we cannot affirm that such points exist, except, perhaps, 
in indivisible instants; a hypothesis which, in all probability, is contrary to the nature of time itself. Thus 
we see, as it were, only the containers of things, not the things themselves. We do not know if things 
occupy, in their containers, an assignable place. Supposing that phenomena were indeterminate, though 
only in a certain measure insuperably transcending the range of our rough methods of reckoning, 
appearances would none the less be exactly as we see them. Thus, we attribute to things a purely 
hypothetical if not unintelligible determination when we interpret literally the principle by which any 
particular phenomenon is connected with any other particular phenomenon»10. 
Charles Sanders Peirce formulated the theory of tychism (chance), according to which 
“chance is a factor in the universe”11 and hence concluded that deterministic mechanics 
                                                 
9
 JAMMER, The Conceptual Development (cit. note 3), p. 167. 
10
 EMILE BOUTROUX, De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature (Paris: Baillière, 1874), translated into 
English by F. ROTHWELL, The Contingency of the Laws of Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 
1920), p. 28. Cf. also O. BOELITZ, Die Lehre vom Zufall bei Emile Boutroux (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 
1907). 
11
 DOROTHY C. HARTSHORNE, PAUL WEISS (eds.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, VI 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), p. 137. 
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with its necessarily reversible laws cannot account for the undeniable existence of 
growth and evolution in nature12. 
The deterministic philosophy, according to Peirce, is alone unable to explain reality. 
Furthermore, Peirce regarded determinism as incapable to prove its position 
empirically. The essence of its position was “that certain continuous quantities have 
certain exact values […]” but observation cannot determine the value of such a quantity 
“with a probable error absolutely nihil”13. Through the analysis of the process of 
experimental observation he concluded that absolute chance is an irreducible factor in 
physical process. 
«Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more 
certain they will be to show regular departure from the law. We are accustomed to ascribe these, and I do 
not say wrongly to errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for such errors in any 
antecedently probable way. Trace their causes back far enough and you will be forced to admit they are 
always due to arbitrary determination, or chance»14. 
Another original interpretation before the advent of modern quantum mechanics was 
that of the Viennese physicist Exner, who applied a statistical interpretation to 
macroscopic bodies, which apparently showed a deterministic behaviour. In 1919, in 
one of his “Lectures on the Physical Foundations of Science”, Franz S. Exner asserted: 
«From a multitude of events […] laws can be inferred which are valid for the average state of this 
multitude (macrocosm) whereas the individual event (microcosm) may remain undermined. In this sense 
the principle of causality holds for all macroscopic occurrences without be necessarily valid for the 
microcosm. It also follows that the laws of the macrocosm are not absolute laws but rather laws of 
                                                 
12
 JAMMER, The Conceptual Development (cit. note 3), p. 168. 
13
 HARTSHORNE,  WEISS (eds.), Collected Papers (cit. note 11), p. 46. 
14
 Ibidem. 
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probability; whether they hold always and everywhere remains to be questioned […]. Every single, 
however, specialized, physical measurement produces only an average value resulting from billions of 
individual motions […] but to predict in physics the outcome of an individual process is impossible»15. 
Professor Jammer regarded the philosophical schools of contingentism, existentialism, 
pragmatism, and logical empiricism as risen in reaction to traditional rationalism. 
Therefore, he saw their affirmation as the rejection of an abstract intellectualism that 
culminated in the doctrine of free will and the denial of mechanical determinism or the 
principle of causality. As a consequence – Jammer affirmed – these “currents of 
thoughts” contributed to build the philosophical background for modern quantum 
mechanics. Jammer also had entertained the idea that the above thinkers might have 
influenced Bohr. But Bohr never mentioned them, albeit it is very likely that he had 
heard of them as representatives of the modern philosophy of discontinuity. At the most 
Bohr might have regarded these ideas as “indicative of the winds of doctrine of the 
time”, to borrow Henry Folse’s expression, and hence they prepared his mind for what 
was to come.  
However, most part of the scholars usually mentions four main figures as supposed 
sources of inspiration for Bohr’s theories: the Danish Philosopher and theologist Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the American philosopher and psychologist William James 
(1842-1910), the Danish writer Poul Martin Møller (1794-1838) and the Danish 
philosopher Harald Høffding (1843-1931). Nevertheless, there are conflicting views on 
what is the crucial element in Bohr’s background. I will seek to discuss and illustrate 
                                                 
15
 FRANZ S. EXNER, Vorlesungen über die Physikalischen Grundlangen der Naturwissenschaften 
(Vienna: Deuticke, 1919; 2nd ed. 1922), pp. 705-6. 
12 
the following hypotheses one by one in order to propose a possible solution to such an 
historical puzzle.  
1.2 The Kierkegaard-Hypothesis 
Max Jammer stressed the importance of both the historical origin and philosophical 
background of certain epistemological ideas, which culminated in the so-called 
“Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum physics. Jammer sustained that the Danish 
precursor of modern existentialism and neo-orthodox theology, Søren Kierkegaard, 
through his influence on Bohr, affected also the course of modern physics. The 
historical proofs – according to Jammer – are “certain references and allusions in Bohr’s 
philosophical writings”16. Moreover, he also regarded Harald Høffding as a pupil and a 
follower of Kierkegaard’s thought. 
With regard to the so-called “allusions in Bohr’s writing”, unfortunately, Jammer 
“forgot” to mention them, therefore they do not stand for a proof of Bohr’s 
philosophical orientation towards Kierkegaard. Harald Høffding was influenced by 
Kierkegaard although he didn’t fully embraced Kierkegaard’s thought. In fact, Høffding 
was critical of his theory of the stages, i.e. the idea that the possible ways of living are 
mutually exclusive. Høffding was a philosopher of continuity and he shared with 
Kierkegaard the rejection of “a system of life” in the Hegelian sense. It is worth 
noticing that Kierkegaard criticized Hegel of building up a philosophical system that did 
not leave any room for individual existence. However, not as a follower but as a 
scholar, Høffding wrote Kierkegaard som filosof, published in 1892. This book was the 
best monography of Kierkegaard’s thought at the time. Whenever in his youth Niels 
                                                 
16
 JAMMER, The Conceptual Development (cit. note 3), p. 172. 
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Bohr had become interested in Kierkegaard, he could probably have started reading 
Høffding’s book. Nonetheless, Bohr had many other occasions to deepen his 
philosophical interests such as there were other ways in which Høffding could exert his 
cultural influence on his students, as we shall see later on.  
Whatever role Høffding might have played in spreading Kierkegaard’s philosophy, in 
my opinion, Jammer seems to make an unjustifiable use of analogies between the ideas, 
which characterized the cultural climate in which Bohr lived, and the concepts at the 
basis of quantum physics in a way that might suggest an undue direct influence of the 
cultural background on scientific entrepreneurship.  
As a matter of fact, Jammer held that Kierkegaard’s philosophy of life and religion, his 
so-called “qualitative dialectic”, his antithesis between thought and reality, his 
contradictory conception of life, and his insistence of the necessity of choice had 
apparently left a deep impression on Bohr’s youthful mind. Even if such a cultural debt 
had been historically well documented, it would be a surreptitious conclusion to hold 
that Bohr transposed Kierkegaard’s philosophy into his scientific program. The 
relations, if any, must be found on a methodological level.  
That does not prevent that Bohr was really interested in Kierkegaard. Niels sent his 
brother Harald as a birthday gift Kierkegaard’s book, Stadier paa Livets Vej (Stages on 
Life’s Way), written in 1845, with a letter dated April 20, 1909: 
«I am sending you herewith (in addition to what Mother is so sweet to send you in my name) 
Kierkegaard’s “Stages on Life’s Road”. That is the only thing I have to send; nevertheless, I don’t think I 
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could easily find anything better. In any case, I have enjoyed reading it very much, in fact, I think it is 
something of the finest I have ever read. Now I am looking forward to hear your opinion of it»17. 
In another letter to Harald, April 26, Niels expressed his disagreement with 
Kierkegaard: 
«When you some day have read the “Stages”, what you by no means must hurry with, you shall hear a 
little from me: for, I have written a few remarks about it (not in agreement with K.); but I do not intend to 
be so trite with my poor nonsense as to spoil the impression of so beautiful a book»18. 
We can imagine that Niels Bohr could have enjoyed the aesthetic experience and the 
moral passion, without having to agree also with the antiscientific attitude of much of 
the work. 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the role of discontinuity between incompatibles, on the 
“leap” rather than the gradual transition, on the inclusion of the individual, was as non-
classical in philosophy as the elements of the “Copenhagen doctrine” – quantum jumps, 
probabilistic causality, observer-dependent description, duality – were to be in physics. 
As Harald Høffding wrote: 
«Kierkegaard’s leading idea was that the different possible conceptions of life are so sharply opposed to 
one another that we must make a choice between them, hence his catchword, either-or; moreover, it must 
be a choice which each particular person must make for himself, hence his second catchword the 
individual. He himself designated his thought “qualitative dialectic”, by which he meant to bring out its 
opposition to the doctrine taught by Romantic speculation of continuous development by means of 
                                                 
17
 ROSENFELD, JENS RUD NIELSEN (eds.), Niels Bohr Collected Works, Vol. 1: Early Work, 1905-1911 
(Amsterdam, NL: North Holland Publishing Company, 1972), p. 501. 
18
 Ibidem, p. 503. 
 15 
necessary inner transitions. Kierkegaard regarded this doctrine as pure fantasticalness, a fantasticalness, 
to be sure, to which he himself had felt attracted»19. 
This is to say that Kierkegaard’s “qualitative dialectic” was an acceptance – according 
to Gerald Holton’s interpretation – of thesis and antithesis, without proceeding to 
another stage at which the tension is resolved in a synthesis. Holton, as Jammer did, 
hypothesized that the so-called Kierkegaard’s “leaps” might have inspired Bohr in the 
sense of providing a sort of sympathetic preparation20. But, in my opinion, it would be 
misleading to pretend to demonstrate that Bohr made a direct transposition of 
Kierkegaard’s ideas into a physical context.  
As Professor David Favrholdt pointed out21, discontinuity became a reality to physicists 
when Max Planck discovered the quantum of action in 1900. Einstein’s theory about the 
photoelectric effect was another important fact to be considered. Further investigations 
into radioactivity demonstrated that causal laws ought to be replaced by statistical 
descriptions.  
Niels Bohr wrote about this issue in a paper to his professor of physics Christian 
Christiansen:  
«The reason for speaking of an average life-span [for atoms of a radioactive element – DF] without 
indicating a fixed starting point is that the atoms so to speak do not age before they suddenly go to pieces, 
so that the chance [probability] of them going to pieces is the same at any point in their lifetime. This is 
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what is expressed by the potential law of decrease and by the equation derived from this to the effect that 
the number of atoms that go to pieces is dependent alone on the number of atoms present»22. 
We infer that Bohr renounced causal explanations and held spontaneous changes before 
he got acquainted with Kierkegaard’s existentialism.  
Professor Silvano Tagliagambe, one of the adherents of Jammer’s views, saw the 
following quotation from Bohr’s lecture, “The Unity of Human Knowledge” (1960), as 
an example of Kierkegaard’s description of the attitudes to life, which mutually exclude 
each other23: 
«Confronted with the great diversity of cultural developments, we may therefore search for those features 
in all civilizations, which have their roots in the common human situation. Especially we recognize that 
the position of the individual within the community exhibits in itself multifarious, often mutually 
exclusive, aspects»24. 
But this is just a fair guess and no more than that. In fact, Bohr used to shed light on the 
concept of complementarity by bringing examples taken from the daily life. 
Consequently, it does not legitimize us to make so brave a connection. 
In 1933, Bohr had the opportunity to recall his reading of Kierkegaard during a visit to 
Jens Rud Nielsen. Rud Nielsen recounted in his paper “Memories of Niels Bohr”, 
written in 1963, the incident as follows: 
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«Knowing Bohr’s interest in Kierkegaard, I mentioned to him the translation made by Professor 
Hollander of the University of Texas, and Bohr began to talk about Kierkegaard: “He made a powerful 
impression upon me when I wrote my dissertation in a parsonage in Funen, and I read his works night and 
day”, he told me. “His honesty and willingness to think the problems through their very limit is what is 
great. And his language is wonderful, often sublime. There is of course much in Kierkegaard that I cannot 
accept. I ascribe that to the time in which he lived. But I admire his intensity and perseverance, his 
analysis to the utmost limit, and the fact through these qualities he turned misfortune and suffering into 
something good»25. 
The previous quotation suggests that Bohr had not read anything by Kierkegaard after 
1909 and apparently not before. In fact, if Bohr had ever read more than one book by 
the existentialist philosopher why should he refer to only one specific episode, the one 
we know from other sources?  Nevertheless, this tendency of seeing relevant and 
unconventional philosophical conceptions of the nineteenth century as they could be 
transposed “into the realm of natural philosophy” was quite widespread among some 
historians of science. Holton, while was stressing the absurdity of a direct translation of 
Kierkegaard’s ideas into Bohr’s physics, thought that one should allow one self the 
open-mindedness of reading Høffding and Kierkegaard: 
«Through the eyes of a person who is primarily a physicist – struggling, as Bohr was, first with his 1912-
1913 work on atomic models, and again in 1927, to “discover a certain coherence in the new ideas” while 
pondering the conflicting, paradoxical, unresolvable demands of classical physics and quantum physics 
which were the near-despair of most physicists of the time»26.  
Professor Jan Faye claimed that Holton’s proposal is well stated even though it couldn’t 
be sufficient to warrant the conclusion. Faye wrote that in his Danish edition of 
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Høffding’s Den nyere Filosofis Historie (History of modern philosophy) – written in 
1894 – which was from a late friend of him, in his time professor, there is the following 
marginal note in his hand against the above quotation: “Like ‘quanta’ in atomic 
physics”. This comparison, which was made many years before anyone had ever 
considered the existence of a connection between Kierkegaard and Bohr, is a piece of 
ingenuity. Nevertheless, pointing out the analogy when already acquainted with Bohr’s 
theory of quantum jumps is one thing, but seeing an analogy between Kierkegaard’s 
leaps and the movement of the electron in the hydrogen atom is quite another. What 
Bohr did was to draw an analogy where Kierkegaard definitely had denied the existence 
of any. For Kierkegaard, only animate objects could undergo discontinuous changes of 
state27. In fact, Faye sustains in his book that if Bohr possessed any further knowledge 
of Kierkegaard, in addition to his personal reading of “Stages on Life’s Way”, it was 
from having attended Høffding’s lectures on Kierkegaard in the spring of 1905. 
According to Faye, it was just Høffding’s interpretation that the “leaps” or jerks were 
described in a way very similar to Bohr’s description of the discontinuous change of 
atomic systems between stationary states as expressed in the quantum postulates.  
In fact, contrary to Kierkegaard, Høffding did believe the “leaps” to exist in inanimate 
nature. 
1.3 The Høffding-Hypothesis 
Both Jammer and Holton agreed on the pivotal role played by Høffding in mediating the 
relationship between Niels Bohr and his interest in philosophy and perhaps this might 
have influenced him in the successive elaboration of scientific theories.  
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Jammer emphasized Høffding’s elaboration of Kierkegaard’s idea that the traditional 
speculative philosophy forgot that the originator of the system forms part of the being 
which is to be explained. According to this interpretation, man cannot conceive of 
himself as an impartial spectator, as he always remains a participant. Therefore, man 
regards the delimitation between the objective and the subjective as an arbitrary act. As 
a consequence, science appears as a determinate activity and truth as a human product. 
But this conclusion could be misleading if it leads us to consider it as an anticipation of 
Bohr’s conception of reality. Indeed, Bohr was not a subjectivist, as he rejected the idea 
that the experimental outcome is due to the observer.  
Jammer noted that Høffding’s point of view on the problem of knowledge seems to 
presage some conceptual aspects in later quantum mechanics, as, for instance, when he 
declares: 
«In an earlier connection I made use of Schiller’s words: “Wide is the brain and narrow is the world”; and 
now the sentence can be revised: “Wide is the world and narrow is the brain”. Knowledge, however rich 
and powerful it may be, is after all a part of Being; and the problem of knowledge would be soluble, only 
if Being as a totality (in so far as we can conceive it as such a totality) could be expressed by means of a 
single one of its parts. In any event, our expression must always remain symbolic, even if our knowledge 
reaches its climax; it gives us only an extract from a more inclusive whole. Among all the possibilities of 
thought, only a single one appears in the reality as recognized by us. The reality which we recognize is, 
however, only a part of a greater whole; - and here we are not in a position to determine the relation 
between the parts and the whole. An exhaustive concept of reality is not given us to create»28.  
Moreover, Høffding seems to remark that in life only sudden decisions can lead to 
progress: 
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«Something decisive occurs always only by a jerk, by a sudden turn which neither can be predicted from 
its antecedents nor is determined by these»29. 
Høffding called Kierkegaard “the only indeterministic thinker who attempted to 
describe the leap”30 but added later: “It seems to be clear that if the leap occurs between 
two states or two moments, no eye can possibly observe it, and since it therefore can 
never be a phenomenon, its description ceases to be a description”31. Jammer’s intention 
was to sketch some philosophical conceptions, which he attributed indistinctively to 
Kierkegaard and Høffding, in order to show how these ideas had been translated into the 
realm of natural philosophy and had stimulated a new approach for epistemology. 
However, it seems to us that a line of demarcation should be drawn between 
Kierkegaard and Høffding’s conceptions: it concerns what survived of Kierkegaard’s 
teaching in Høffding’s philosophy and how it may have influenced Bohr’s conceptions 
of nature. But such a study does not arise from Jammer’s book.  
In “On the Roots of Complementarity” Gerald Holton wanted to remark the personal 
sympathy between Høffding and Bohr, giving relevance to the fact that Bohr as a 
student pointed out some errors in Høffding’s book on formal logic, which Høffding 
welcomed as allowed him to improve his handbook. Moreover, Holton emphasized the 
importance of Høffding’s lectures on philosophy for the young Bohr, who perhaps was 
struck by Høffding’s active interest in the applicability to philosophy of the so-called 
philosophierende Naturforscher, from Copernicus to Newton and from Maxwell to 
Mach. A great friendship developed between the two that was acknowledged on both 
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sides on official occasions such as in the still available correspondence. Last but not the 
least, Harald Høffding was a friend of Bohr’s father too since Niels was a youngster.  
As it shall be shown, Jan Faye wrote a distinguished study on Bohr’s philosophical 
background. It is Faye’s claim that Høffding’s influence on Bohr had more of an 
indirect nature, that it took the form of inspiring him to comprehend unity in all 
mankind’s search for knowledge. But this and other essential questions deserve a 
special chapter that will be developed later on.  
1.4 The Møller-Hypothesis 
Bohr himself – Jammer added – was convinced that Poul Martin Møller, a Danish 
writer of the early-eighteenth century, with his novel En Dansk Students Eventyr 
(Adventures of a Danish Student) had influenced him. Møller was “an intellectual 
seeker, almost a wanderer; he had voyaged for two years in the Orient in the guise of a 
ship’s clergyman”32. 
According to the literary historian P.M. Mitchell, Møller represented the beginning of a 
“bourgeois realism in Danish poetry”33. In Møller’s novel Bohr found a vivid and 
suggestive account of the interplay between the various aspects of their position, 
illuminated by discussions within a circle of students with different characters and 
divergent attitudes of life. Møller described a conversation between two cousins, one of 
whom is very soberly efficient in practical affairs, of the type which then, and even 
now, is known among students as a philistine, whereas the other, called the licentiate, is 
addicted to remote philosophical meditations detrimental to his social activities. When 
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the philistine reproaches the licentiate for not having made up his mind to use the 
opportunities for finding a practical job, offered him by the kindness of his friends, the 
licentiate apologizes most sincerely, but explains the difficulties into which his 
reflections have brought him34: 
«My endless inquiries made it impossible for me to achieve anything. Moreover, I get to think about my 
own thoughts of the situation in which I find myself into an infinite retrogressive sequence of “I”’s who 
consider each other. I do not know at which “I” to stop as the actual, and as soon as I stop at one, there is 
indeed again an “I” which stops at it. I become confused and feel giddy as if I were looking down into a 
bottomless abyss, and my ponderings result finally in a terrible headache»35. 
In his reply the cousin philistine says: 
«I cannot in any way help you in sorting your many “I”s. It is quite outside my sphere of action, and I 
should either be or become as mad as you if I let myself in for your superhuman reveries. My line is to 
stick to palpable things and walk along the broad highway of common sense; therefore my “I”s never get 
tangled up»36. 
Léon Rosenfeld – a long-term associated of Niels Bohr – reported that every one of 
those who came into closer contact with Bohr at the Institute (now the Niels Bohr 
Institute), as soon as he showed himself sufficiently proficient in the Danish language, 
was acquainted with Møller’s book. Rosenfeld maintained that Bohr’s insistence on 
Møller’s novel was a sign of Bohr’s rediscovery of the dialectical process of cognition, 
which had so long been obscured by the unilateral development of epistemology on the 
basis of Aristotelian logic and Platonic idealism37.  
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I would like to point out that it would be interesting to demonstrate that the reading of a 
novel had started a train of thought leading to the elucidation of the most fundamental 
aspects of atomic theory and the renovation of the philosophy of science. But all that it 
could be done is to notice in Møller’s novel the idea of an arbitrary dividing line 
between subject and object that Bohr would subscribe later on. Nevertheless, we are still 
in the field of the pure similarities. Conversely, it is a fact that Bohr used the situation 
described in Møller’s novel for explaining the complementarity principle. In the address 
delivered at the Congress held in Copenhagen, October 1960, “The Unity of Human 
Knowledge”, Bohr emphasized that Møller used thoughts and sentiments with reference 
to mutually exclusive experiences, i.e. in a typical complementary manner.  
It is my claim that Bohr’s analogy looks like a post hoc similitude for representing in 
words what he had figured in scientific terms. 
The student in Møller’s novel becomes dizzy when he tries to think about his own 
thought because precise “thought” and “thought about thought” are complementary.  
It resembles to the experimenter who cannot simultaneously show both the wave 
characteristics and the particle characteristics in a light beam. 
Lewis S. Feuer gave a questionable interpretation of Bohr’s interests in Møller’s novel, 
as he suggested linking it to the basic generative anxiety in Bohr’s unconscious. Feuer 
held that every philosophical standpoint reflects underlying emotional anxieties and 
conflicts, together with the attempt to resolve them. According to Feuer, Bohr found the 
academic philosophies of his time lifeless and uncongenial, thus he sensed that the 
whole tenor of his life’s scientific work was toward resolving the psychological and 
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personal anxieties of which the licentiate in Møllers’ novel was the spokesman38. In my 
opinion, Feuer’s proposal is questionable because he seems to suggest that Bohr’s work 
on quantum mechanics lies on subjective decisions. Such a conclusion sounds like a 
mere supposition not supported by sufficient historical proofs. 
1.5 The James-Hypothesis 
As we have written, it was supposed that William James influenced Niels Bohr. As 
Holton reported39, the “discovery” came out “almost by accident”, although it suited 
perfectly with the standpoint of founding the roots of the modern concept of quantum 
mechanics in Niels Bohr’s own experience and, in particular, in his personal interests 
for humanities. William James, the brother of the famous novelist Henry James, was 
both a philosopher and a psychologist. His masterpiece is Principles of Psychology I-II 
from 1890. The episode quoted by Holton was the interview arranged by the American 
Philosophical Society40 to Bohr in the context of a joint project to assemble the sources 
for the scholarly study of the history of quantum mechanics. This project was under the 
general directorship of Thomas S. Kuhn and it spanned several years. Niels Bohr 
consented to a certain number of interviews, the fifth of which was settled on November 
17, 1962 with Kuhn and Aage Petersen, one of Bohr’s long-time assistants.  
Petersen raised the question of the relevance of the study of philosophy in Bohr’s early 
thought: 
Petersen: How did you look upon the history of philosophy? What kind of contributions did you think 
people like Spinoza, Hume, and Kant had made? 
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Niels Bohr: That is difficult to answer, but I felt that these various questions were treated in an irrelevant 
manner. 
P.: Also Berkeley? 
NB: No, I knew what views Berkeley had. I had seen a little in Høffding’s writings, and I thought it was 
obvious that so could one do it, but it was not what one wanted. 
Thomas S. Kuhn: Did you read the works of any of these philosophers? 
NB: I read some, but that was an interest by – oh, the whole thing is coming [back to me]: I was a close 
friend of Rubin, and, therefore, I read actually the work of William James. William James is really 
wonderful in the way that he makes it clear – I think I read the book, or a paragraph, called -. No, what is 
that called? – It is called “The Stream of Thoughts,” where he in a most clear manner shows that it is 
quite impossible to analyze things in terms of – I don’t know what one calls them, not atoms. I mean 
simply, if you have some things ... they are so connected that if you try to separate them from each other, 
it just has nothing to do with the actual situation. I think that we shall really go into these things, and I 
know something about William James. That is coming first up now. And that was because I spoke to 
people about other things, and then Rubin advised me to read something of William James, and I thought 
he was most wonderful. 
TSK: When was this that you read William James? 
NB: That may be a little later, I don’t know. I got so much to do, and it may be at the time I was working 
with surface tension, or it may be just a little later. I don’t know. 
TSK: But it would be before Manchester? 
NB: Oh yes, it was many years before.... [L. Rosenfeld remembers clearly that he and Bohr first 
encountered James together around 1932]. You see, the problem is so difficult, and it may be even 
irrelevant and immodest to speak so, but I was not interested in philosophy as one generally called it, but 
I was interested in this special scheme, and that was even not too good. 
From the interview one ought to infer that Bohr read James at a very early stage: 1905 
approximately. In fact, in 1904 Høffding participated in a congress in St. Louis and 
during his stay in the United States he visited William James in New Hampshire. It is 
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very likely that after his return to Copenhagen Høffding spoke of James both in his 
lectures and with his students.  
For the sake of clearness, it is worth distinguishing between Bohr’s first acquainting 
with James’ psychology and his certain reading of James’ The Principles of Psychology 
in 1932.  
Rosenfeld doubted that Bohr had read James’ book, The Principles of Psychology, 
before that date. Rosenfeld’s impression was manifested in the “Interview with 
Rosenfeld” conducted by Kuhn and John L. Heilbron on July 22, 196341: 
TSK: […] one knows that he [Bohr] was a longstanding friend of Rubin. It seems so likely that this 
suggestion about reading James would have occurred earlier, through Rubin, and that influence, if it was 
an influence, would have begun at a much earlier stage. 
Rosenfeld: No, I don’t think so, because Rubin was a friend of Bohr at the university, or at least at that 
age. And at that age it was not sure at all that Rubin knew already about James. He was only a student, 
but he might have. 
TSK: That was a great big book, The Principles of Psychology, and his other writings. If Rubin had been 
interested in psychology he’d very likely have known about this, and Bohr was obviously talking in this 
period about sorts of problems of language. 
R: When Rubin went into his career as a psychologist, they saw each other occasionally, but they were 
not such close friends at that, so I can very well imagine that it is only when Bohr came out in public with 
complementarity, which happened only in 1927, that it struck Rubin that these were his old ideas. Then of 
course Rubin was well prepared to think of James, but he might not necessarily have seen the similarity at 
this early stage, so I don’t see any incongruence there. All that I can say is that I can remember very 
distinctly Bohr’s enthusiasm. Obviously he read James for the first time then; there was no doubt about it. 
TSK: Did you also read it along with him then? 
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R: Yes. I had read some small articles by James before, but not his Principles of Psychology; I don’t 
remember quite what it was, some small work on pragmatism, a popular exposition of pragmatism. 
TSK: But the two of you at this point read James’ Principles of Psychology? 
R: Yes; at least parts of it. 
Furthermore, in a letter to Gerald Holton (February 28, 1968) Rosenfeld confirmed that 
Bohr showed him a copy of James’ book only in 1932. It happened when Bohr met 
again Edgar Rubin after many years. Rubin, the famous psychologist, had been a friend 
of Bohr since their undergraduate days; and it was he who set up a student club, 
Ekliptica, of which they both were members, whose aim it was to provide a forum for 
the discussion of Høffding’s lectures. So it was supposed that Rubin might have sent the 
book after their 1932’s meeting.  
Rosenfeld recalled that Bohr showed great interest for the book and he pointed out to 
him the passages of “The Stream of Thought”.  
Bohr was so excited of William James’ thought to the extent that Rosenfeld had the 
impression that that was Bohr’s first acquaintance with James’ book. Nevertheless, it 
does not prevent that, in the light of Høffding’s visit to James in the autumn of 1904 and 
his lectures and seminars in the spring of 1905, Bohr had read at least some passages of 
James’ book at the time he was member of Ekliptica. As Jan Faye recalls, in the last 
interview of 1962, Bohr also relates that already in his earliest years as a student he had 
a theory about free will and determinism as well as about the knowing subject. Thus, he 
believed there was an analogy between the solutions of multi-valued functions and 
those of the problems of free will and such matters. According to Faye, it is reasonable 
to believe that Bohr’s interest in these subjects sprang from Høffding’s lectures on the 
psychology of free will, as well as from the conversations in the Bohr family home, 
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where his father and Høffding very probably also discussed free will in the context of 
the debate concerning mechanism versus vitalism, and thus to believe that he must have 
been influenced by Høffding’s thoughts on these matters and maybe by William James’ 
as well42. 
It is beyond doubt that there are striking analogies between James and Bohr’s ideas. It is 
worth mentioning some quotations of the two authors in order to appreciate the 
remarkable resemblances of their conceptions. 
1) According to James, thought can exist only in association with a specific 
“owner” of the thought. Consequently, thought and thinker, subject and object 
are entangled and it is impossible to conceive of the objectivization of thought. 
2) We cannot pass over Bohr’s sympathetic response: “[…] for objective 
description and harmonious comprehension it is necessary in almost every field 
of knowledge to pay attention to the circumstances under which evidence is 
obtained”43. 
1) According to James, consciousness cannot be concretized or atomized: 
“consciousness does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 
“chain” or “train”, does not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first 
instance. It is nothing jointed. It flows. A “river” or a “stream” are the metaphors 
by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the 
stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life”44. Nevertheless, there 
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does exist a discontinuous aspect: “the changes, from one moment to another, in 
the quality of the consciousness are not absolutely abrupt”45. 
2) Paraphrasing Bohr, James would appear to propose a sequence of individual 
changes between stationary states, with short period of rest between these states 
– a metaphor that brings to mind Bohr’s 1912-13 quantized atomic model. 
Klaus Meyer-Abich reported in his interesting book of 1965, Korrespondenz, 
Individualität und Komplementarität, that among German scientists it was remembered 
that Bohr was used to quote James and only a few others western philosophers. He also 
wrote that the philosophical content of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics was 
thought out by James already in the years from 1884 to 1890. 
To summarize, whereas both Mayer-Abich and Jammer believed that Bohr had read 
James early enough to be directly influenced, Rosenfeld and Favrholdt sustained that 
Bohr had independently arrived to analogous conceptions. In a letter to H. P. Stapp from 
1972 Rosenfeld wrote:  
«With regards to William James, I am quite sure that Bohr only heard of him from his friend, the 
psychologist Rubin, and from myself in the 30’s. He then expressed enthusiastic approval of James’ 
attitude, which he certainly felt akin to his own; but it is a fact – a very significant one, I think – that 
James and Bohr developed a pragmatic epistemology independently of each other»46.  
Stapp quoted this letter on the article titled “The Copenhagen Interpretation” from 1972 
in order to introduce another important issue: the influence of pragmatism on the 
concept of complementarity. He tried to show that the quantum theoretical formalism is 
to be interpreted pragmatically.  
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Stepp went on to maintain that: 
«The pragmatic orientation of the Copenhagen interpretation is fixed in the opening words of Bohr’s first 
book: “The task of science is both to extend the range of our experience and reduce it to order […]. In 
physics […] our problem consists in the coordination of our experience of the external world […]”. In our 
description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of phenomena but only to track down 
as far as possible relations between the multifold aspects of our experience»47. 
Moreover, we have to notice that Jammer saw an influence from James even in Bohr’s 
articles from 1928 and 1929, “The Quantum of Action and the Description of Nature”:  
«The unavoidable influence on atomic phenomena caused by observing them here corresponds to the 
well-known change in the tinge of psychological experiences which accompanies the direction of 
attention to one of the various elements»48.  
This can be read in many ways. In fact – as I shall return to this below – Bohr knew a 
lot about psychology through Rubin, and he might have considered the problems of 
perception as already dealt with both in Rubin’s doctoral thesis and in the discussions 
they had together in the “Ekliptica club” some years before, as it is confirmed by Bohr’s 
personal correspondence. 
1.6 The Emergence of Continuity 
Returning to the Jammer/Rosenfeld’s “disagreement”, Holton, in his “The Roots of 
Complementarity”, reputed Rosenfeld’s alternative as regards Bohr’s autonomous way 
of approaching the concept of complementarity as more interesting, though difficult 
one, “for hints that here may be a place to attack the haunting old question why and by 
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what mechanism the same themata attain prominence in different fields in nearly the 
same periods”49. One could hypothesize that Bohr was brought to analogous thought by, 
for instance, the reflection on the concept of multiform function or Riemann’s surface.  
Nonetheless, Holton rightly noted that the analogy between James’ “The Stream of 
Thought” and Bohr’s concept of complementarity is striking, apart the question of the 
genetic connection between the two uses of the same word. Thus he suggested that a 
James’ influence on Bohr must be occurred if we consider the importance that Høffding 
recognized to James’ works among all the philosophers and scientists discussed during 
his lectures. 
Perhaps the way out to such a riddle could be found by heeding the thematic origin of 
Niels Bohr’s rational generalization thesis. Max Jammer too noted that Bohr regarded 
the older quantum theory as a rational generalization of classical mechanics. 
Consequently, its metaphysical and epistemological foundations were generally held to 
be those of classical physics. For this reason – Jammer wrote – “no specific 
philosophical study of the conceptual foundations of the older quantum theory seemed 
to be required with the possible exception of Bohr’s insistence on methodological 
considerations”50.  
As a matter of fact, philosophers of science before mid-twenties regarded quantum 
theory as of no interests.  
I want to emphasize that it is just Bohr’s insistence on methodological considerations 
the key to clarify his conception of the quantum theory as a rational generalization of 
classical mechanics. As Holton noted – there is a methodological strategy underneath 
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Bohr’s older quantum theory of emphasizing conceptual conflict as a necessary 
preparation for its solution that culminated, fourteen years later, in the announcement of 
the complementarity principle51. In the meantime, Bohr formulated a proposal of 
reconciliation between classical and quantum mechanics, the correspondence principle.  
Bohr was still searching for a resolution of the opposites by developing a principle for 
which classical physics becomes the limiting case of quantum physics. As Holton 
wrote:  
«In this situation the quantum of action relative to the energies involved is effectively zero rather than 
having a finite value, and the discreteness of individual events is dissolved, owing to the large number of 
events, in an experienced continuum»52.  
In other words, this striving after the reconciliation of the two physics is the main 
characteristic of Bohr’s method that should lead us to reconsidering the Aristotelian 
maxim Natura non facit saltus – that stresses the element of continuity – on the 
gnoseological level, rather than the mere physical one, for which Bohr would emphasize 
the element of discontinuity.  
It is worth remarking that the reconciliation of classical with the quantum physics was 
in Bohr’s view the return to the condition of continuity. In fact, Bohr sustained that the 
breakdown of visualisability in microphysics was primarily due to the failure of the 
condition of continuity. Space, time and causality are forms of perceptions according to 
Bohr. Moreover, he pointed out that the causal spatio-temporal description of classical 
physics presupposes continuity. Generally speaking, it is the organization of our 
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ordinary sensory experience, i.e. the ordinary language itself that presupposes 
continuity.  
The forms of perception are the means by which we organize our perceptual experience, 
and they also determine the conceptual structure of classical physics. It is also worth 
noting that Harald Høffding stressed that the forms of perception and the categories of 
understanding are essentially equivalent to the requirement of continuity. One of the 
main themes of his philosophy in fact is a dualism of continuity and discontinuity, 
which underlies almost every philosophical problem.  
As is known, in 1913 Bohr put forward a mathematical model of the atom, which 
provided the first theoretical support for Rutherford’s atomic planetary model for 
explaining the emission spectrum of the hydrogen atom. In short, Bohr’s model consists 
of the application to Rutherford’s of the two famous postulates: that an atomic system is 
stable only in a certain set of states and that the possibility for the atom to absorb/ emit 
radiation is determined by a law according to which the energy of the radiation is given 
by the energy difference between two stationary states being equal to hv where h is 
Planck’s constant53 and v is the frequency. As a consequence, Bohr’s semi-classical 
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model was anomalous, as it introduced elements of discontinuity and indeterminism 
almost foreign to classical physics. Moreover, as Merle A. Tuve noted, Bohr’s atom 
was “quite irrational and absurd from the viewpoint of Newtonian classical mechanics 
and Maxwellian electrodynamics […] Various mathematical formalisms were devised 
which simply ‘described’ atomic states and transitions, but the same arbitrary avoidance 
of detailed processes, for example, description of the actual process of transitions were 
inherent in these formulations”54. Jan Faye outlined the main characteristics of Bohr’s 
model as follows55: 
1. Apparently not every point in space was accessible to an electron moving 
around a hydrogen nucleus. An electron moved in classical orbits, but during its 
transition from one orbit to another it was at no definite place between these 
orbits. Thus, an electron could only be in its ground state (the orbit of lowest 
energy) or an excited state (if an impact of another particle had forced it to leave 
its ground state). 
2. It was impossible to predict when the transition would take place and how it 
would take place. Moreover, there were no external (or internal) causes that 
determined the “jump” back again. Any excited electron might in principle 
move spontaneously to either a lower state or down to the ground state. 
3. Rutherford pointed out that if, as Bohr did, one postulates that the frequency of 
light v, which an electron emits in a transition, depends on the difference 
between the initial energy level and the final energy level, it appears as if the 
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electron must “know” to what final energy level it is heading in order to emit 
light with the right frequency. 
4. Einstein made another strange observation. He was curious to know in which 
direction the photon decided to move off from the electron. 
Moreover, Bohr continued to pursue the reconciliation of quantum and the classical 
physics in spite of the new quantum theory would violate some of the basic ontological 
principle on which classical physics rests: 
1. The principle of space and time, i.e., physical objects (systems) exist separately 
in space and time in such a way that they are localizable and countable, and 
physical processes (the evolution of systems) take place in space and time; 
2. The principle of causality, i.e., every event has a cause; 
3. The principle of determination, i.e., every later state of a system is uniquely 
determined by any earlier state; 
4. The principle of continuity, i.e., all processes exhibiting a difference between the 
initial and the final state have to go through every intervening state; 
5. The principle of the conservation of energy, i.e., the energy of a closed system 
can be transformed into various forms but is never gained, lost or destroyed. 
For this reason, in retrospect, it was remarked how “courageous” Niels Bohr’s 1912-
13’s work was. Notwithstanding the conceptual and scientific contradictions, Bohr had 
the courage to carry his atomic model through, as he stressed these conflicts from the 
beginning. Indeed, the explanation of the spectral lines, which were the main result he 
had achieved, appeared to represent an addendum in his own work. As Holton noted: 
“his interest was precisely to examine the area of conflict between the conceptions of 
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ordinary electrodynamics and classical mechanics on the one hand and quantum physics 
on the other”56. The principle of correspondence seems to be informed by such a spirit 
of “conceptual reconciliation” that pervaded Bohr’s program since the beginning. Bohr 
and his collaborators saw in the principle of correspondence the hope to connect the 
discontinuous processes of the atoms with the continuous character of the radiation 
field.  
In more general terms, they saw in such a principle the possibility to obtain the 
harmonious re-incorporation of the quantum of action into a new consistent theory.  
The peculiar process they followed deserves a specific study, as we are just in sight of 
the question of what makes scientific discovery so unrepeatable an event. As I see it, it 
was just the weight of the philosophical background that moulded Bohr’s aim to pursue 
that harmony or unity between macrocosm and microcosm, possibilities of observation 
and definition, theory and reality, and whose necessary condition was the above-
mentioned concept of continuity.  
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Chapter 2  
 
The Foundation of Metaphysical Heuristic 
 
2.1 Some Introductory Considerations 
Neo-empiricist Philosophy of Science regarded knowledge’s validity as man’s capacity 
of discerning science, i.e. the most respectable kind of knowledge, from superstition, 
ideology and pseudoscience1. 
Therefore the problem of demarcation became of social and political relevance. 
Nevertheless, post-empiricist epistemologies of Sixties and Seventies hardly criticized 
the criterion of demarcation, which the history of science’s development also suggested 
to abandon. 
Imre Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programs [MSRP] was built on 
insufficient explanations concerning the hard core and the negative heuristic. In fact, 
Lakatos seemed to introduce two meanings of the latter [methodological decision and 
metaphysical “conceptual picture”] and an incomplete definition of the former. 
Furthermore, he did not clarify the origin of the so-called metaphysical value of the 
positive heuristic. In light of the concepts of “metaphysical heuristic” and “inter-
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translatability” I propose to merge the two negative heuristic’s meaning. Therefore, both 
the positive and the negative heuristic are methodological rules deriving directly from a 
common metaphysical principle. Consequently, the traditional distinction between 
internal and external history becomes untenable. 
I shall start from a critic of Lakatos’ MSRP in order to clarify the origin of Niels Bohr’s 
methodological precepts at the basis of his research program. As a matter of fact, 
Lakatos gave the first epistemological account for the role played by heuristic within a 
research program. Nevertheless, beyond his merits as one of the most influent 
philosophers of science in the twentieth century, he was not able to clarify the 
metaphysical role of heuristic, as he tried to confine metaphysics in the world of 
irrationality. Zahar provided the so-called metaphysical heuristic with a new statute but 
without attempting to define the meaning of the “genetic material”, which scientific 
theories originated from. In order to fill Zahar’s gap I shall make use of Gerald Holton’s 
thematic analysis and Michael Friedman’s role of philosophical reflection.  
2.2 Introduction and Criticism to Lakatos’ Philosophy of Science 
According to Lakatos’s account, the typical unity of science is not an isolated 
hypothesis, but rather a research program consisting of a developing series of theories, 
characterized by a continuity which evolves from a proto-program adumbrated at the 
research’s start. Lakatos laid down rules in order to appraise programs, which he 
divided in either progressive or degenerating ones.  
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As it is well known through his special jargon, a program is theoretically progressive if 
each modification leads to new unexpected predictions. It is empirically progressive if 
at least some of these novel predictions are corroborated2. 
The program’s structure consists of three main components3: 
a) the “Hard Core”. 
b) The “Negative Heuristic”. 
c) The “Positive Heuristic”. 
It is worth noting that Lakatos gave also ambiguous definitions of heuristic and 
incomplete descriptions of the hard core. 
According to his paper, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programs”4, one apprehends that every research program may be characterized by its 
own hard core, whose negative heuristic forbids us to refute it by means of a 
methodological ukase. Therefore Lakatos affirmed that the negative heuristic specifies 
the hard core of a program.  
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Elie Zahar interpreted Lakatos’s account by explaining that the hard core, in order to be 
protected against experimental refutation, ought to be metaphysical in Popper’s sense. A 
conclusion that Lakatos did not clearly draw5.  
The Hungarian philosopher rather appealed to history of science’s examples, such as the 
three laws of motion and the law of gravitation in Newton’s research program, for 
explaining the hard core’s structure6.  
Both Lakatos and Zahar in a 1972-73 paper stressed the point that the demarcation 
between hard core and heuristic is frequently a matter of convention as they suggested 
in their historical analysis of the Pythagorean-Platonic programs. The key principle of 
the two-programs was that all astronomical phenomena should be regarded as a 
combination of uniform circular motions since “heavenly bodies” are perfect. This 
principle represented the heuristic of both the programs and it was primary with respect 
to the hard core [secondary] that should indicate where the centre of the universe lies7. 
This remark gives rise to an ambiguity on the hard core’s meaning. 
As mentioned above, it might seem that a program’s hard core is specified by the 
negative heuristic, although this “specification” does not allow us going back 
historically to the source of the hard core’s statements. 
In a footnote to his masterpiece Lakatos pointed out that «the actual hard core of a 
program does not emerge fully armed like Athena from the head of Zeus. It develops 
slowly, by a long, preliminary process of trial and error»8.  
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I think that a thorough study of the hard core’s structure should take the above-
mentioned assertion into account. 
Some others interesting objections to Lakatos’s theory of science had been raised by 
Alan Musgrave9, who asked why scientists should specify in advance a program’s hard 
core. In fact, before 1850, Newtonians rarely treated Newton’s law of gravitation as a 
part of it. Musgrave claimed that there are no reasons to rule it out in advance despite 
the difficulties of producing a progressive theoretical problem-shift by changing central 
assumptions. Musgrave thought that Lakatos was overcautious in not recommending 
any rule for choice between competing research programs. Why not say, that on the 
whole, the scientific community should devote more resources to progressive as 
opposed to degenerating research programs, Musgrave added.  
Karl Popper10 and John Watkins11 proposed arguments concerning the inter-
translatability between metaphysics and heuristic in a way that might have worked out 
retrospectively the problem of the regulative role of negative heuristic. 
Elie Zahar wrote enlightening words about ontology and metaphysics in scientific 
theories, which I shall refer to. 
Returning to Lakatos’ MSRP, a research program may be defined as a set of 
methodological rules otherwise said heuristic: negative heuristic «tells us what path of 
research to avoid», positive heuristic «what path to pursue»12.  
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Lakatos brings to our attention “Cartesian metaphysics” as an example of a particular 
research program, that is the mechanistic theory, according to which the universe is a 
“huge clockwork” and a system of vortexes. It played both the positive and the negative 
heuristic’s role13.  
It discouraged work on theories incompatible with it [Newton’s theory of action at a 
distance], and it encouraged work on auxiliary hypotheses, which might have saved it 
from apparent counterevidence [Keplerian ellipses].  
But I want to emphasize the negative heuristic’s meaning. Lakatos termed it the 
methodological decision «not to allow refutations to transmit falsity to the hard core as 
long as the corroborated empirical content of the protecting belt of auxiliary hypotheses 
increases»14. The above-mentioned definition, from my point of view, does not throw 
light on the point because the negative heuristic is also the metaphysical expression of a 
“conceptual picture” which affects the research’s path. As it is exampled by the 
heuristic role of the mechanistic theory of the universe in the seventeenth Century. 
What is the epistemological statute of such a heuristic?  
One may hypothesize that the two meanings of negative heuristic could be bridged by 
considering such a methodological decision as metaphysics in the sense that the 
decision is inspired either by scientists’ (personal) convictions or by “philosophical” 
doctrines. Thus, metaphysics would be nothing but scientists’ “general ideas” about 
science: determinism, indeterminism, atomism et cetera.  
But such metaphysics could not be internal to a research program. 
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The positive heuristic’s role is apparently more explicit than the negative because it 
constructs the belt, which protects the irrefutable nucleus of the program from the 
counter-evidence. The positive heuristic is «a partially articulated set of suggestions or 
hints on how to change, develop the “refutable variants” of the research program, how 
to modify, sophisticate, the “refutable” protective belt»15. 
It rules the program’s “research policy” but it is a “model” too, a kind of “theoretical 
cabinet” in which initial conditions, together with corroborated observational theories, 
allow the scientist to develop the program by adopting an ad hoc strategy. 
The positive heuristic, according to Lakatos, may be formulated also as a metaphysical 
principle: when a research program is to degenerate, a creative shift in its positive 
heuristic may reinvigorate it.  
Lakatos defined the positive heuristic more flexible than the negative therefore it is 
better – he affirmed – to separate the hard core from the metaphysical principles 
expressing the positive heuristic. An assertion which does need to be clarified. 
2.3 The metaphysical Structure of the Hard Core 
The hard core of a program becomes unassailable only through a methodological 
decision16, from which it follows that any falsifier of the hard core can be rejected. The 
hard core forms the main defining characteristic of the research program: whenever the 
hard core is rejected, the program as a whole is rejected too.  
It has to be remarked that every proposition, independently of any stipulation, either is 
or is not metaphysical. In particular, if the hard core is un-falsifiable, it must be 
metaphysical in some absolute sense. 
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As Zahar suggested17, the requirement that the hard core be per se irrefutable establishes 
a close correlation between MSRP and Popper’s notion of a metaphysical research 
program. 
According to classical empiricist epistemology [Hume, Mach] an entity was said to be 
metaphysical if it could be neither observed nor operationally determined. Thanks to 
Bridgman’s contribute, a proposition could then be termed metaphysical in a secondary 
sense: if it involves “occult” entities.  
By contrast, Popper affirmed that metaphysical propositions possess no empirically 
decidable consequences.  
According to falsificationism, the difference between physics and metaphysics is no 
longer the unbridgeable gap between sense and nonsense, which “The Vienna Circle” 
upheld, but the simple difference between the testable and the irrefutable. Popperian 
philosophy can be thus said to have rehabilitated metaphysics. 
After taking cognizance of Tarski’s truth-definition – Zahar explains18 – Popper realized 
that syntactically well-formed sentences could be regarded true-or-false without 
necessarily having to be effectively verifiable or even refutable; more particularly: a 
metaphysical thesis ought by right to possess a definite, though possibly un-decidable 
truth-value.  
In this sense Popper affirmed the existence, within the history of science, of 
metaphysical research programs. By contrast, Lakatos claimed that metaphysics is 
internal to research programs. 
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Zahar makes clear the thesis that the hard core K of a research’s program RP is a 
metaphysical principle entailed by every member of the program. So the sustained 
empirical success of a RP can lend some support to its hard core. Conversely, the 
repeated failure of a RP must negatively reflect on its metaphysics19. For example: as 
regards Newton’s Absolute Time Hypothesis [ATH] Zahar showed20 how the addition 
law of motion depends on the assumed absoluteness of all temporal distances between 
events.  
It is Zahar’s claim that heuristic must be connected to the core, i.e. the metaphysics 
underpinning the program, in order for the heuristic to be appraised.  
He added that certain components of the hard core have prescriptive counterparts, 
which can in turn be translated into meta-statements about scientific hypotheses. 
Therefore an ontological thesis will impose constraints on theories. Such constraints 
form heuristic, which Zahar termed metaphysical. It follows that the distinction between 
negative and positive heuristic is not as sharp as Lakatos affirmed.  
Zahar’s thesis is consistent with the example of Quantum Mechanics, which continues 
to support indeterminism at the micro-level and to undermine the classical notion of 
causality. 
In addition it is worth remarking that, for instance, Bohr’s quantum conditions21 are 
ontologically different, in degree rather than in kind, from indeterminism, although both 
are metaphysical. 
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The question is how to assess the metaphysics underlying the methodological decision 
made at the RP’s start, for which the hard core’s statements become irrefutable.  
As mentioned above for Cartesian metaphysics, such ontological theses, e.g. 
determinism, indeterminism, mechanism, etc, could play a vital role in deciding the 
direction of Modus Tollens’s arrow. I suppose they would act on the hard core as 
“metaphysical heuristic”. 
2.4 On the logical structure of Metaphysical Heuristic 
Following the conclusions of the last paragraph, I should define the concept of 
“metaphysical heuristic”. I owe this term to Zahar but I shall use it in a different and 
perhaps improper meaning (see above in the previous page).  
Zahar gives a rational account of heuristic22 as he showed by means of a few examples 
from the history of science that the logic of scientific discovery is not inductive but 
deductive. If this claim holds, the “irrational” character of the context of discovery will 
be not different from that of the context of justification; for in both cases, the methods 
used turn out to be largely deductive. 
Against Lakatos, he defends the view that heuristic possesses «no special status halfway 
between psychology and logic»23, for he thinks that deduction constitutes the most 
important moment in the process of invention.  
Zahar claims that heuristic principles are connected with the birth of science proper. 
They are as stable as «the genetic material of which we are made»24. They arose from 
confrontations with different problem-situations.  
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The heuristic of any RP «is determined by the coherent choice it operates among these 
principles»25.  
An RP would evolve through the application of its heuristic to existing hypotheses, 
some of which might initially have belonged to commonsense knowledge: the Identity 
Principle, the Unity Principle, the Principle of the Proportionality of the Effect to its 
Cause, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Rejection of Conspiracy Theories.  
In light of Watkins’ article, “Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics”, I shall assess 
the logical structure of both “made-by-decision” metaphysical statements and the so-
called haunted-universe doctrines. 
Moreover, I hypothesize that the concept of inter-translatability may explain the 
regulative, heuristic, role of metaphysics within research programs. Considering the 
classification26 of the statements proposed by Watkins, there are four degrees of 
empirical decidability: 
1) Level – 1: Circumscribed existential statements. Falsifiable and verifiable, e.g. 
“There is a car in my garage”. 
2) Level – 2: Universal empirical hypotheses. Falsifiable but not verifiable, e.g. 
“All metals expand if heated”. 
3) Level – 3: Un-circumscribed existential statements. Un-falsifiable but verifiable, 
e.g. “There exists a metal which does not expand if heated”. 
4) Level – 4: “All-and-some” statements. Unverifiable and un-falsifiable, e.g. “For 
all metals there exists some acid which will dissolve them”. 
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Lakatos’s sketch27 of Niels Bohr’s RP illustrates how a program may progress even on 
inconsistent foundations following the decision to isolate certain conditions in order to 
develop the program. 
Therefore, Bohr decided, for the time being, to ignore the inconsistencies between 
Rutherford’s atomic planetary model and the Maxwell-Lorentz theory. 
He proposed five postulates as the hard core of his program. 
i) That energy radiation [within the atom] is not emitted (or absorbed) in the 
continuous way assumed in the ordinary electrodynamics, but only during 
the passing of the systems between different “stationary” states. 
ii) That the dynamical equilibrium of the systems in the stationary states is 
governed by the ordinary laws of mechanics, while these laws do not hold 
for the passing of the systems between the different states. 
iii) That the radiation emitted during the transition of a system between two 
stationary states is homogeneous, and that the relation between the frequency 
ν and the total amount of energy E is given by E = hν, where h is Planck’s 
constant. 
iv) That the different stationary states of a simple system consisting of an 
electron rotating round a positive nucleus are determined by the condition 
that the ratio between the total energy, emitted during the formation of the 
configuration, and the frequency of revolution of the electron is an entire 
multiple of ½ h. Assuming that the orbit of the electron is circular, this 
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assumption is equivalent with the assumption that the angular momentum of 
the electron round the nucleus is equal to an entire multiple of h/2pi. 
v) That the “permanent” state of any atomic system, i.e. the state in which the 
energy emitted is maximum, is determined by the condition that the angular 
momentum of every electron round the centre of its orbit is equal to h/2pi. 
By the comparison of Bohr’s postulates with Watkins’ classification, it follows that the 
former are second level statements i.e. universal empirical hypotheses which have been 
rendered metaphysical only by decision.  
According to Watkins’ paper, “haunted-universe doctrines” are unempirical in the sense 
they are compatible with every conceivable finite set of observation statements. They 
are factual because there are empirical theories with which they will not be compatible. 
They match with the fourth level “all-and-some” statements. 
Classical examples of “all-and-some” doctrines, according to Watkins’s account, are 
determinism, historicism, the theological variant of historicism, mechanism and its 
variants. For instance: “Every event has its cause” is an “all-and-some” statement 
deriving directly from mechanism. 
Lakatos took Watkins’s position into account in his 1972-7328 paper, but he had 
formerly by-passed the “external” role of metaphysics in science by circumscribing the 
adjective “metaphysical”: «I only talk about scientific research programs whose hard 
core is irrefutable not necessarily because of syntactical but possibly because of 
methodological reasons which have nothing to do with logical form. […] Separating 
sharply the descriptive problem of the psychological-historical role of metaphysics from 
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the normative problem of how to distinguish progressive from degenerating research 
programs. […]»29. 
Nevertheless Lakatos, as I see it, failed to establish the foundations of such 
methodological reasons, which express metaphysical content of the fourth level (see 
above on the negative heuristic meanings).  
The inter-translatability between metaphysics and heuristic could bridge the gap: “all-
and-some” doctrines may «exhort the scientist to look for a certain kind of thing while 
appearing to inform him that that sort of thing is there to be found»30. Universal 
doctrines clash with certain kinds of falsifiable hypotheses and so prohibit their 
construction. 
I would highlight that the function of metaphysical heuristic is twofold with respect to 
Watkins’s influential metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysical heuristic in its negative version 
would affect the research program in the very early stages of its evolution. Metaphysical 
heuristic in its positive double-version [“protective mechanism” and “metaphysical 
principle”] lets it develop on.  
I daresay that inter-translatability is thus consistent with the formulation of the positive 
heuristic as metaphysical (heuristic) principle. For instance: the hypothesis that «the 
planets are essentially gravitating spinning-tops of roughly spherical shape»31, as 
Newton’s program may be formulated, is certainly metaphysical because the planets, for 
example, have also electromagnetic characteristics. Ultimately, Lakatos seems to prove 
us right. In fact, on page 51 of his “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
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Research Programs” he formulates the “positive heuristic of a research program” as 
“metaphysical principle” in its double role of creative and protective device. While on 
page 58, explaining the twofold role of Bohr’s correspondence principle, he clearly 
states that the correspondence principle functioned both as an important “heuristic 
principle” and a defence mechanism. This is to say that he equated the term 
“metaphysical principle” to the term “heuristic principle”, from which we get the 
concept of metaphysical heuristic. On the one hand, the correspondence principle on 
behalf of metaphysical heuristic exerted “creative functions” and suggested many new 
scientific hypotheses, which, in turn, led to novel facts, especially in the field of the 
intensity of spectrum lines. On the other hand, as a defence mechanism, the 
correspondence principle endeavoured to utilize to the utmost extent the concepts of the 
classical theories of mechanics and electrodynamics, in spite of the contrast between 
these theories and the quantum of action. 
Positive and negative heuristic, as regards their common metaphysical origin, would be 
different faces of the same medal. Metaphysics, by playing both a decisional role at the 
RP’s start and a guiding one during its evolution, is not influential but rather immanent. 
Therefore the difference between internal and external history, i.e. between rational and 
irrational factors, is not as sharp as Neo-Popperians wish. 
2.5 The Thematic Approach 
Zahar’s arguments are fruitful because they permit bypassing the schematic distinction 
between positive, negative heuristic and hard core. Nevertheless, they are also 
incomplete in the sense that the relation between metaphysics and the “existing 
hypotheses” belonging to common sense knowledge has not been defined as well as it 
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has not been the origin of such hypotheses: what does it mean common sense 
knowledge?  Are they a priori pure intuitions? In short, it is not still clear at all what is 
the place of metaphysics with respect to RP. 
For these reasons it was necessary to make use of the concept of inter-translatability 
between metaphysics and heuristic. Even so we cannot pass over the importance of 
Zahar’s work that brought to light the independent role of metaphysics within RP: i.e. 
not as a mere consequence of a methodological decision. 
After having ascertained that science needs metaphysics, we are about to define the 
function exerted by metaphysics in science in some practical terms. 
Gerald Holton wrote enlightening words on the study of the thematic origins and 
elements in scientific works, with particular reference to the personal presuppositions. 
Almost five decades ago he published for the first time on the concept of thematic 
analysis of scientific thought (in Eranos-Jahrbuch of 1962). The approach laid out there 
and in the book published by Harvard University Press in 1973 (revised edition, 1988) 
has been at the heart of much of his subsequent research in the history of science, as 
well as having been taken up by others. 
I am referring to Holton’s thematic analysis because following Watkins he was the first 
to describe in historical terms the so-called third dimension of science, characterized by 
presuppositions that are neither confirmable nor falsifiable. They do not arise from the 
data or the theory but are imposed on them by the scientist from the outset. Holton 
distinguished the third dimension of science from the phenomenic one as well as from 
the logical-analytical system, which form the x-y axes of the plane of discourse in 
science. The two-dimensional view of science has his defects because it does not 
explain, for instance, why at any given time the choice of problems or the reception of 
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theories may be strikingly different among individuals or like-minded groups who face 
the same corpus of data. That was the case of Einstein and Bohr.  
Holton noted that thematic analysis is not an ideology, a school of metaphysics, a plea 
for irrationality, an attack on the undoubted effectiveness of empirical data and 
experimentation, or a means for teaching scientists how to do their job better. It is rather 
useful for explaining the willingness of the scientists to adopt what can only be called a 
suspension of disbelief about the possible falsification of their hypotheses that emerges 
from the data. Consequently, Holton’s account of themata [singular, thema; it 
corresponds to the Greek for “that which it laid down”; “proposition”; “primary word”] 
matches with the concept of negative heuristic as “conceptual picture”. I would say that 
such themata might exert metaphysical-heuristic functions within the theories’ 
development. Even though it should be necessary to set the origin of each singular 
thema.  
If we decided to apply the thematic approach to Zahar’s scheme, it would seem that we 
tried to connect each thema to its original or “a priori” principle. But it is worth 
remarking that among the concepts that might be confused with themata, the most 
obvious is what Immanuel Kant called “Categories”. Apart from other differences, 
Kant’s “Categories” were to be accepted as “pure concepts of the understanding, which 
apply a priori to objects of intuition in general”. 
Holton warns us against confusing other concepts with thematic propositions. Examples 
are metaphors and related notions such as mental models, frames, and schemata. The 
metaphoric imagination is a lively component of science such as the visual and the 
thematic. But as even its original Greek definition implied, metaphor, unlike themata, 
serves the traditional function of making conceptual connections between selected 
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similarities; moreover, they are in principle infinite in numbers. On the contrary, many 
themata are widely shared, and in science such as physics they are and have been few in 
number. 
Another potential confusion involves the concept of “paradigm” that refers primarily to 
a social phenomenon in the scientific profession. By contrast, a thema is found in 
individual work, as part of an individual’s spectrum of themata that no one else may 
have accepted in toto. Moreover, themata are found to be finite in number and generally 
of long duration, and so accentuate the longevity and evolutionary nature of scientific 
advance.  
The main point of interest of Holton’s account rises from his immersion in Einstein’s 
correspondence and manuscripts. Through the reading of Einstein’s drafts of his work 
and copies of his correspondence, Holton came to understand that, in addition to his 
attention to data and logical/analytical tools (which Einstein himself referred to as the 
“empirical” and the “rational” aspects), a mainspring of his work was often a set of 
fiercely held presuppositions, what he had identified as thematic elements. Holton 
enumerated the themata guiding Einstein’s theory construction: the primacy of formal 
rather than materialistic explanation; unity or unification; logical parsimony and 
necessity; symmetry; simplicity; causality in the classical sense; completeness in the 
subordination of every phenomenon under the respective theory; the continuum; and of 
course constancy and invariance. 
These thematic components can sometimes be observed also in the public papers, 
although most scientists take care to keep such metaphysical aspects of their works out 
of view. Holton pointed out that the public sources offer only a partial view of the 
history of science: 
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«In all these cases, one may discover that during the nascent, “private” period of work, some 
scientists, consciously or not, use highly motivating, very general thematic presuppositions. But 
when the work is then proposed for entry into the “public” phase of science, these motivating 
aids tend to be suppressed, and even disappear from view. Even though thematic notions arise 
from a deep conviction about nature, on which the initial proposal and eventual reception or 
rejection of one’s best work may be based, they are not explicitly taught, and they are not listed 
in the research journals or textbooks. That has certain advantages, insofar as silence about 
personal motivations and thematic preferences avoids any deep, un-resolvable, disputes in the 
public phase. Consensus is more easily reached if thematic elements are kept out of sight»32. 
I would add in addition to Holton’s account that if we focused the attention on 
scientist’s personal convictions or individual presuppositions, we would be able to look 
at the public papers with different eyes because the motivations underpinning the 
scientific discovery would emerge also from the public sources. Even the greatest 
scientist would appear with his uncertainties, contradictions, doubts, hesitancies, from 
which the scientific papers are considered excepted.  
If Holton sustains that these elements are to be found within the private sources, my 
suggestion is that we should also be looking for them in the public ones, as it will be 
explained in the chapter on the heuristic value of continuity in Bohr’s trilogy. 
Holton distinguished three aspects as regards the thematic thought: 1) the thematic 
concept, e.g. symmetry and continuum. 2) The methodological thema, such as the 
preference to express the laws of science in terms, for example, of constancies. 3) The 
thematic propositions, viz. Newton’s hypothesis concerning the immobility of the 
centre of the world. 
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According to Holton’s account the “themata” is the historiographical key to understand 
the relations between science and humanities.  
This “time-honoured” term is used in disciplines such as anthropology, art criticism and 
musicology. But Holton suggested that in scientific methods and hypotheses there are 
elements that constraint or motivate the individuals and sometimes they polarize the 
scientific community.  
Thematic analysis, if adopted, could permit to answer to such questions: 
«What is constant in the ever-shifting theory and practice of science - what makes it one 
continuing enterprise, despite the apparently radical changes of detail and focus of attention?  
What element remains valuable in theories long after they have been disproved?  What are the 
sources of energy that keep certain scientific debates alive for decades?  Why do scientists - and 
for that matter also historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science - with good access to 
the same information often come to hold so fundamentally different models of explanation?  
Why do some scientists hold on to models of explanation that are contrary to the evidence, 
sometimes at enormous risks?»33. 
If we pay attention to the method that Niels Bohr adopted for formulating the first 
atomic theory of 1912-13, we note that his atomic model was irrational from the point 
of view of the classical mechanics and electrodynamics. Bohr started from Rutherford’s 
theory, according to which the atoms consist of a positively charged nucleus surrounded 
by a system of electrons kept together by attractive forces from the nucleus.  
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As we know, Rutherford assumed the existence of nuclei in order to account for the 
results of the experiments on large angle scattering of the α-rays34. He tried to explain 
some of the properties of matter on the basis of this atomic model, but the main 
difficulty was that of the instability of the system of electrons. Thus Bohr made use of a 
quantity foreign to the classical electrodynamics: Planck’s constant, i.e. the elementary 
quantum of action, although he was not the first to introduce it. In fact, in atomic 
models, the quantization of energy via the use of Planck’s constant was already 
introduced in 1910 by Arthur Erich Haas and in 1911 by John William Nicholson. 
Moreover, in 1905 Albert Einstein had already proposed the quantization of 
electromagnetic field. Nevertheless, Bohr distinguished himself for his insistence on a 
methodological consideration, which conceptual foundations seem to require an 
appropriate historical and philosophical study. 
Bohr fully recognized the conceptual gap in his theory and he was convinced that the 
antithesis between quantum-theoretic and classical conceptions had to be brought to the 
forefront of theoretical analysis in order to achieve the progress in quantum theory35. 
It was in the attempt to trace the roots of this antithesis that he introduced the 
revolutionary conception of “stationary states”. Bohr explained them as “some kind of 
waiting places between which occurs the emission of the energy corresponding to the 
various spectral lines”36.  
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The idea of “waiting places”, in my view, plays a double role: on the one hand it refers 
to the electrons, on the other hand, it concerns the meta-level of his theory.  
As a matter of fact, Bohr was aware that Planck’s idea of discontinuity was 
irreconcilable with classical physics. Therefore his “new” atomic model had to be 
conceived as a transitional phase towards a more coherent theory. 
It was evident that Bohr regarded his theory as a hypothetical, incidental way of 
representing a number of experimental facts, which were inexplicable on the basis of 
classical physics.  
It was an established fact that the ordinary electrodynamics and classical mechanics 
were unable to account for the stability of Rutherford’s atomic model and the way to 
follow was that of trying, firstly, an alternative, although approximate, solution; 
Secondly, of searching for harmony among the new ideas. 
So far so good, but Holton himself wondered why some scientists hold on to models of 
explanation that are contrary to the evidence. 
As I see it, Bohr’s methodological decision to persist in spite of the conceptual conflict 
is understandable in the light of the thematic concept of continuity between classical 
and quantum physics, which characterizes, as we have seen earlier, his research 
program. 
I end this paragraph by stressing again Holton’s unsolved puzzle: what is the source of a 
person’s particular set of thematic concepts and hypotheses? Namely, what is the source 
of Niels Bohr’s thematic concept of continuity? 
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2.6 The Role of Philosophy 
In Victory and Vexation in Science Holton concludes his reflections on the origin of 
themata with the hope that someday will be possible to approach them through studies 
of the nature of perception and apperception, i.e. the psychodynamics of the 
development of concepts in early life. 
In 2001, three years before Holton completed his last work, Michael Friedman 
published Dynamics of Reason, which includes the well-known Kantian lectures held 
from the mid to late 1990s. Friedman’s primary aim was to depict the deep and intricate 
connections between the historical development of scientific philosophy, on the one 
hand, and the parallel evolution of the exact sciences themselves, on the other. He 
started from the acknowledgement that Kant’s original philosophical synthesis had 
failed due to unforeseen revolutionary changes within the sciences, and the logical 
empiricist’s radical revision of this synthesis had also failed to do justice to the very 
rapid changes taking places within early twentieth century science. In response to this 
situation, Friedman offered the suggestion that we should attempt a fruitful interaction 
between contemporary philosophical practice and developments within the sciences 
themselves. 
Furthermore, he suggested that distinctly philosophical reflection plays a special and 
characteristic function in transitions between radically different conceptual frameworks 
during scientific revolutions. At this point Friedman proposed to distinguish three 
different levels of discourse at work in such revolutions: 
1. Properly empirical laws. 
2. Constitutively a priori principles. 
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3. A meta-scientific level, where distinctively philosophical reflection takes place. 
Friedman called the third level meta-paradigm or meta-framework. It plays an 
indispensable role in mediating the transmission of rationality across revolutionary 
paradigm shifts. In particular, when the concepts and principles of a later scientific 
research program develop through the concepts and principles of an earlier one, 
reflection on the distinctively philosophical level helps us to define such continuation. 
Therefore, we could add that philosophical reflection is the place where the themata 
come from. Namely, considering the transition from classical to quantum physics, we 
can suggest that the concept of continuity derives from such meta-scientific level. 
Friedman gave the example of “natural philosophers” such as Descartes, Huygens, 
Leibniz who, in the seventeenth century, agreed on the first-level scientific paradigm of 
the mechanical philosophy. They had divergent standpoints on absolute versus relative 
motion. It was this disagreement, which, in part, alimented Newton’s own articulation 
of both a radically different first-level scientific paradigm (based on the laws of motion 
and the possibility of instantaneous action at a distance) and a radically different answer 
to the question of absolute versus relative motion. 
It is worth noting that in this like in other case histories, Friedman aimed at showing 
how philosophical reflection interacts with properly scientific reflection in such a way 
that problematic philosophical themes become interwoven with relatively 
unproblematic scientific accomplishments. 
As I see it, there is room to affirm that like in Niels Bohr’s case study, philosophical 
reflection can provide areas of scientific reflection with those concepts, which can 
facilitate the development of theories from their early stages. Friedman does not speak 
of thematic concepts, rather of properly philosophical themes, which are intertwined 
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with scientific statements. As it shall be shown in the chapter to follow, it was reflection 
on philosophical level that historically produced Niles Bohr’s themata of unity and 
continuity. 
2.7 The Heuristic Role of Unity and Continuity in Bohr’s First Atomic 
Theory 
Lakatos identified the background problem of Bohr’s program with the riddle of how 
Rutherford’s atoms can remain stable, for, according to the Maxwell-Lorentz theory, 
they should collapse. According to Lakatos, Bohr’s suggestion was to ignore for the 
time being the inconsistencies and consciously develop a research program whose 
refutable versions were inconsistent with the Maxwell-Lorentz theory. Thus Bohr 
proposed the two postulates [five according to Lakatos’ reconstruction] as the hard core 
of his program.  
The hard core would be the starting point of the new program, and the decision to not 
falsify the postulates would be the negative heuristic. The correspondence principle 
would stand for the positive heuristic. Lakatos stressed the crucial methodological 
difference between the inconsistency introduced in other scientists’ programs and that 
introduced by Bohr. Bohr’s research program contained no design planned in order to 
replace the older one (Maxwell-Lorentz theory). Even if it had been completely 
successful, would have left the inconsistency with the old theory unresolved. Bohr’s 
idea to carry on his program in spite of the contradictions required great courage. As a 
Hevesy’s letter testifies, the idea crossed Einstein’s mind but he found it unacceptable, 
and rejected it.  
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The present paragraph is an attempt to understand what motivations do subtend such a 
decision. The answer, as I see it, must be found within Bohr’s cultural and philosophical 
background, and in particular in certain concepts and schemes as parts of his cultural 
background. 
The constant searching for harmony and unity that characterized Bohr’s method of 
scientific inquiry needs something more than the appeal to the reason’s natural tendency 
towards unity. Bohr’s methodological decision arises in all its evidence from a passage 
of the speech delivered on December 1913 before the Danish Society of Physics, when 
he admitted that “Still the fact that we cannot immediately apply Planck’s theory to our 
problem is not as serious as it might seem to be, for in assuming Planck’s theory we 
have manifestly acknowledged the inadequacy of the ordinary electrodynamics and 
definitely parted with the coherent group of ideas on which the latter theory is based. In 
fact in taking such a step we cannot expect that all cases of disagreement between the 
theoretical conceptions hitherto employed and experiment will be removed by the use of 
Planck’s assumption regarding the quantum of the energy momentarily present in an 
oscillating system. We stand here almost entirely on virgin ground, and upon 
introducing new assumptions we need only take care not to get into contradiction with 
experiment”37. 
Such a statement seems to be nothing but Bohr’s aware decision to not contradict the 
new assumptions and to search for their harmonization in the “new mechanics”, in the 
sense that what apparently seemed contradictory would have shown its coherence only 
later on. As I see it, it is such an intimate belief that asks for an explanation. With this in 
mind Bohr examined the experiments on temperature radiation as he focused on the 
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distribution of radiant energy over oscillations of the various wavelengths. Bohr 
assumed that the radiant energy comes from systems of oscillating particles. But, at the 
same time, he did not know anything about these systems, as no one had ever seen a 
Planck’s resonator. It was only possible to observe the period of oscillation of the 
radiation, which was emitted. In order to obtain the laws of temperature radiation it was 
necessary to assume that the amount of energy emitted each time was equal to hν, 
where h is Planck’s constant and ν is the frequency of the radiation. Thus Bohr showed 
that it was possible to bring this assumption about emission of radiation into agreement 
with the spectral laws: 
«If the spectrum of some element contains a spectral line corresponding to the frequency ν it will be 
assumed that one of the atoms of the element (or some other elementary system) can emit an amount of 
energy hν. Denoting the energy of the atom before and after the emission of the radiation by E1 and E2 we 
have hν = E1 – E2 or ν  = E1 / h – E2 / h. 
During the emission of the radiation the system may be regarded as passing from one state to another; in 
order to introduce a name for these states, we shall call them “stationary” states, simply indicating thereby 
that they form some kind of waiting places between which occurs the emission of the energy 
corresponding to the various spectral lines. As previously mentioned the spectrum of an element consists 
of a series of lines, whose wavelengths may be expressed by the formula [1 / λ = Fr (n1) – Fs (n2)]. By 
comparing this expression with the relation given above it is seen that – since ν = c / λ, where c is the 
velocity of light  - each of the spectral lines may be regarded as being emitted by the transition of a 
system between two stationary states in which the energy apart from an additive arbitrary constant is 
given by –chFr(n1) and –chFs(n2) respectively»38. 
By using this interpretation, the combination principle asserts that a series of stationary 
states exists for the given system, and that it can pass from one to any other of these 
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states with the emission of a monochromatic radiation. Bohr demonstrated that with a 
simple extension of the first assumption it was possible to give a formal explanation of 
the most general law of line spectra. 
In order to appreciate the importance of the so-called positive heuristic role of the 
concept of unity, which underlies Bohr’s method, we would need to go back to the 
Manchester period, when Bohr took up for the first time the problem of the stability of 
Rutherford’s atomic model. 
We are taking in consideration the period May-July 1912, the same regarding the 
correspondence Bohr-Rubin. The electron theory of metals, which had brought Bohr to 
Cambridge, continued to be his primary commitment, that was stronger in the last days 
of May 1912 than it had been at any previous time during his stay in Manchester. Two 
months later, however, by his departure from Manchester to Copenhagen in late July, 
Bohr had shelved these problems indefinitely.  
Indeed, in the early-mid summer of ’12, Bohr turned from the electron theory of metals 
to the researches of Rutherford’s laboratory. Bohr explained this transition to his brother 
Harald in a letter dated June 12, 1912: 
«[…] I am not getting along badly at the moment; a couple of days ago I had a little idea with regard to 
understanding the absorption of α-rays (it happened in this way: a young mathematician here, C. G. 
Darwin (grandson of the real Darwin), has just published a theory about this problem, and I felt that it not 
only wasn’t quite right mathematically (however, only slightly wrong) but very unsatisfactory in the basic 
conception), and I have worked out a little theory about it, which, even if it isn’t much, perhaps may 
throw some light on certain things connected with the structure of atoms […]»39. 
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From the letter one apprehends that Bohr was unaware of Darwin’s work until the time 
of its publication, therefore Bohr had for the first time engaged the local problem of α-
absorption. Furthermore, he was pioneering the employment of Rutherford’s planetary 
model in his own research. One week later, Bohr’s scientific transition to the new 
researches became real conversion, as the enthusiastic letter he wrote his brother on 
June 19 testifies it: 
«Perhaps I have found out a little about the structure of atoms. Don’t talk about it to anybody, for 
otherwise I couldn’t write to you about it as soon. I should be right it wouldn’t be a suggestion of the 
nature of a possibility (i.e. impossibility, as J.J. Thomson’s theory) but perhaps a little bit of reality. It has 
grown out of a little information I got from the absorption of α-rays (the little theory I wrote about last 
time)»40. 
What can Bohr have learnt from Darwin’s paper by June 12? This crucial event reminds 
us of Lakatos’ account about the formation of the program’s hard core. Lakatos 
affirmed, with his picturesque typical words, that the hard core does not emerge fully 
armed like Athena from the head of Zeus but it develops slowly, by a long, preliminary, 
process of trials and errors. It means that the so-called hard-core’s statements do not 
drop down from a superior mind, but they mature throughout technical and scientific 
problems, which the scientist has to deal with. The point is how to explain the 
subsequent decision necessary for not rejecting those statements. Lakatos, as I see it, 
failed to establish the foundation of such a decision, which, in the case of Bohr, is 
upheld by the concept of unity. The inter-translatability between metaphysics and 
heuristic, according to John Watkins, comes to assistance: «“all-and-some” doctrines 
(the concept of unity, for instance) may exhort the scientist to look for a certain kind of 
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thing while appearing to inform him that that sort of thing is there to be found»41. 
Universal doctrines clash with certain kinds of falsifiable hypotheses and so prohibit 
their construction. Watkins termed such metaphysics as influential. In addition to 
Watkins’ account I would highlight that inter-translatability between metaphysics and 
heuristic is also consistent with the formulation of the positive heuristic in a Lakatosian 
sense. Positive and negative heuristic, as regards their common metaphysical origin, 
would be different faces of the same medal. For this reason I assume that the principle 
of unity is also the hypostatization of Bohr’s correspondence principle as far as “not a 
few doctrines, which are metaphysical, could be interpreted as typical hypostatization of 
methodological rules”42. As a matter of fact, in the practice of science certain heuristic 
rules are used, they guide the search for new knowledge by drastically restricting the 
range of possible decisions the scientist has to make in the searching process. Bohr tried 
to construct a new quantum theoretical explanation. In doing so he was guided by the 
idea that, for certain domains of phenomena, classical theory and quantum theory 
should lead to the same results. 
As far as the epistemological analysis about the statute of the concept of unity is 
concerned, one could properly define this concept as a thematic one. According to 
Watkins’ article, “Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics”, in which he provided four 
degrees of empirical decidability as regard as the classification of the statements, one 
could classify the so-called “all and some” statements both as unverifiable and un-
falsifiable, i.e. metaphysical. They coincide with scientist’s thematic presuppositions, 
which do not arise from data or theory, but are imposed on them by him, as they 
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constitute the mode of thought through which he understands the world. By the 
comparison of Bohr’s quantum postulates with the classification proposed by Watkins, 
it follows that the former are second level statements: falsifiable but not verifiable. They 
are universal empirical hypotheses, which have been rendered metaphysical (in a 
Lakatosian sense) only by the decision to not falsify them for the time being. The 
decision is inspired by a fourth level, “all and some”, statement, i.e. the thematic 
concept of unity. As well as the principle of correspondence is informed by the same 
thematic concept. 
Now it is interesting to trace back to origin of Bohr’s new research program. 
Darwin’s primary objective was to investigate Rutherford’s model by applying it to the 
computation of the velocity loss of a α-particle moving through air or a thin sheet of 
metal. To make his computations manageable Darwin had introduced two related 
assumptions of which Bohr was extremely critical. The first was that a α-particle would 
not be impeded unless it actually penetrated the atom; the second that the intra-atomic 
forces on an electron could be neglected during the short time of its interaction with a 
rapidly moving α-particle. The latter assumption required the former, for, as Bohr 
pointed out in his critique, any computation which did include the interaction between 
atomic electrons and non-penetrating α-particles would yield an infinite result for the 
transferred energy unless the forces exerted by the rest of the atom on the electron were 
taken into account. Bohr rejected Darwin’s first assumption at once. He agreed that the 
net force, outside the atom, on a passing particle due to the nucleus and electrons must 
be very near to zero, as far as the net force is relevant principally to scattering 
computations. Absorption computations demand the consideration of energy transfer; 
the nucleus, because of its weight, scarcely contributes; and the relevant forces are those 
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between particle and electrons alone. Therefore, the force binding the electron into the 
atom must be taken into account. Bohr’s first contribution to the problem was to 
recognize that the effect of this force depend critically on the relation between the 
period of the electron’s motion and the collision time. It follows that knowledge of the 
frequencies of the electrons in an atom should permit a computation of absorption far 
more accurate than Darwin’s43. But, unlike the Thomson’s atom, in which the effective 
charge attracting an electron towards the atom’s centre increases with the radius of the 
electron’s orbit, the Rutherford’s atom is mechanically unstable. Before Bohr took up 
the problem of the electronic structure, the Manchester group had been content to treat 
the electrons as uniformly distributed through the atomic sphere. 
Bohr, however, could not long have remained unaware of mechanical instability. In fact, 
among Bohr’s scientific manuscripts, the Niels Bohr Archive, are some forty sheets, 
which appear to record his first encounter with the problem of stability. They are 
collected in a file titled “Dispersion and Absorption of Alpha Rays” and they divide into 
three parts. The first two parts reach a conclusion, while the cover sheet of the third 
announces that it is “Temporarily Abandoned, since the Computation breaks down over 
the System’s Instability, [and] cannot be continued without Applying some other 
Hypothesis”. None of these sheets is internally dated. It is plausible to think that Bohr 
had completed the manuscript before June 12, the date of his letter to Harald about 
Darwin’s calculations and Rutherford’s atom. According to John Heilbron and Thomas 
Kuhn’s account about the genesis of Bohr’s atom, it is possible to conjecture that it was 
just this hypothesis that was discussed with Rutherford during the week prior to June 
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19. The hypothesis was: stabilization of the orbit by extra-mechanical fiat, through the 
introduction of Planck’s quantum. As late as February 7, 1913, Bohr’s research program 
remained that of the “Rutherford Memorandum”. A month later, however, that program 
changed. Part I of Bohr’s trilogy was sent to Rutherford on March 6, 1913. The subject 
was for Bohr entirely new: atomic spectra, in particular the line spectrum of hydrogen. 
In that interval of 9 months, Bohr got acquainted with a series of paper published by J. 
W. Nicholson, which dealt with the application of a quantized Saturnian model to the 
spectrum of the solar corona44. Because of his concern with Nicholson, Bohr became 
interested in the optical spectra for the first time during the early weeks of 1913. In any 
case, it was in such circumstance that H. M. Hansen, one of Bohr’s assistance, told him 
about the Balmer’s formula. So Bohr had to forge a quantum theory of atom mechanics 
and of radiation, which would permit the derivation of the Balmer’s formula. Maxwell’s 
theory demanded that a system of the sort considered by Bohr radiates energy and that 
the electron spirals rapidly into the nucleus. Bohr used the quantum to select and 
stabilize particular stationary states. Notwithstanding the contradictory procedure, Bohr 
was able to get around the obstacles of classical electrodynamics and to determine in 
quantitatively rigorous terms the permitted energy of any atomic element. But we 
cannot pass over the fact that there remained the problem on the internal consistency of 
a theory characterized by a logical incoherence that would discourage any other 
scientist. From this point of view, the new research program of quantum theory as a 
whole appears to us as a “grafted program” incompatible with the conservative 
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standpoints of some physicists. The conservative position would consider irrational to 
work on inconsistent foundations. Einstein took the decision to proceed despite 
temporarily inconsistent foundations in 1905, but he waved in 1913 whereas Bohr did 
not. Bohr’s behaviour is an example of rational position as he exploited the heuristic 
power of his program without resigning himself to the initial inconsistencies on which 
the program was growing. Contrary to Planck and Einstein, Bohr did not try to bridge 
the abyss between classical and quantum physics, but he searched, from the very 
beginning of his work, for a system of quantum conceptions just as coherent as that of 
the classical notions. Bohr’s plan was to work out the theory of the hydrogen atom. His 
model had to be based on a fixed proton-nucleus with an electron in a circular orbit. The 
idea that the atoms are analogous to planetary systems, in spite of the problem of the 
stability, presupposed a long and optimistic program. Bohr was convinced that the 
authentic key to the spectra had to be found, as if only time and patience would be 
needed to resolve his riddle completely. Therefore I suppose that such a conviction must 
have been inspired by a philosophical doctrine that he learned in the years of his youth, 
on which the concept of unity and the condition of continuity are hinged. Concretely 
speaking, the concept of unity did inspire his program’s strategy, i.e. the 
correspondence principle. Bohr’s paper of 1913 contained the initial step in his research 
program. It predicted facts hitherto unpredicted by any previous theory: the wavelengths 
of hydrogen’s line emission spectrum. On the basis of his atomic model, Bohr was led 
to aspect that the “numerical values” of the classical frequency and of the quantum 
frequency would be approximately identical for a certain part of these spectra. With the 
aid of the correspondence principle it was possible to develop a complete quantum 
theory explanation of the Zeeman effect for the hydrogen lines, which in spite of the 
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essentially different character of the assumptions that underlie the two theories, was 
very similar throughout to Lorentz’s original explanation based on the classical theory. 
In the case of the Stark effect, where the classical theory was completely at loss, the 
quantum theory explanation was extended with the help of the correspondence principle 
as to account for the polarization of the different components into which the lines were 
split, and also for the characteristic intensity distribution exhibited by the components. 
However, although Bohr and others were able to explain many spectroscopic data on the 
basis of the principle of correspondence, they never made a decisive breakthrough. In 
fact, Bohr’s theory of atomic structure was confronted with serious problems, such as 
that concerning the determination of the energy states of any atoms others then 
hydrogen atoms. In the end it was not Bohr himself but Werner Heisenberg who in 1925 
articulated the foundation of a coherent quantum theory for which Bohr had been 
searching for so long. Nevertheless, Bohr saw Heisenberg’s theory as “a precise 
formulation of the tendencies embodied in the correspondence principle”45.  
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Chapter 3  
 
On the Historical Roots of Unity and Continuity  
 
3.1 At the Origin of Thematic Analysis  
Gerald Holton contributed to clarify Niels Bohr’s cultural and philosophical background 
by presenting a brief but deep analysis of William James and Paul Martin Møller’s 
thought as well as of Kierkegaard and Harald Høffding. He put emphasis on the gulf 
between the classical and quantum description, in particular between the essential 
continuity that underlies classical description, where coordinates such as space, time, 
energy and momentum can in principle be considered indefinitely indivisible, and the 
essential discontinuity and discreteness of the atomic processes. In the classical physics, 
causality was taken for granted, whereas in quantum physics the concept of 
indeterminacy, statistical description, and probabilistic distribution began to be accepted 
as an inherent aspect of natural description. Whereas in the classical physics a sharp 
subject-object separation was accepted, in the new physics it was seen that the subject-
object coupling could be cut only in an arbitrary way. As Holton pointed out, Bohr’s 
proposal of 1927 was to realize the complementarity of representations of events 
because in the ordinary language it is possible to explain the totality of nature only 
through a complementary mode of description1. For this reason – Holton noted – Bohr’s 
preferred aphorism was Schiller’s “Nur die Fülle führt zur Klarheit, / Und in Abgrund 
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wohnt die Wahrheit” (Only the wholeness leads to clarity, / And the truth dwells in the 
abyss)2. 
Holton’s reconstruction is the attempt to connect specific themes (viz. continuity, 
discontinuity, totality) to certain authors (both philosophers and scientists as well) as 
each theme was generated by a meta-historical context and the various authors were 
suspended from each theme respectively. Therefore, it might happen that different 
authors could share the same theme. Thus, the historian of science should try to 
ascertain whether any contacts between the authors were occurred. If the answer is in 
the affirmative, he should seek also to verify if in the course of time one author might 
have instilled the corresponding theme into the other. If the answer is in the negative, he 
rather should focus on the “genetic material” of the shared conceptions. I want to 
remark that Holton’s work lacks of historical research as regards the philosophical 
debate at the basis of the thematic origin of scientific thought. Neither Holton nor 
Jammer stressed the methodological weight of the philosophical background for 
clarifying Bohr’s decision to carry on the program notwithstanding the contradictions. 
In fact, both they suggested that was a peculiar philosophical background – although 
Holton stressed the themes, whereas Jammer emphasized the individual endeavours – to 
have influenced Bohr’s scientific thought without saying anything about how it did it.  
In my opinion, what both Holton and Jammer did was to point out some striking 
conceptual analogies among the avant-garde philosophers and some young physicists of 
the early twentieth century. 
I would like to bring, in addition to the well-known Michael Friedman’s reflections on 
the role of philosophy, William Whewell’s teaching that, in some way, represents a 
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forerunner in his attempt to shed light on the relation between science practice and 
history of science, as an example of historical reconstruction of the thematic origin of 
scientific thought. An issue of interest to philosophers of science is the relation between 
knowledge of the actual practice and history of science and writing a philosophy of 
science.  
Whewell is interesting to examine in relation to this issue because he claimed to be 
inferring his philosophy of science from his study of the history and practice of science. 
His large-scale History of the Inductive Sciences (first edition published 1837) was a 
survey of science from ancient to modern times. He insisted upon completing this work 
before writing his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their history. 
Moreover, Whewell sent proof sheets of the History to his many scientist-friends to 
ensure the accuracy of his accounts. Besides knowing about the history of science, 
Whewell had first-hand knowledge of scientific practice: he was actively involved in 
science in several important ways. In 1825 he travelled to Berlin and Vienna to study 
mineralogy and crystallography with Mohs and other acknowledged masters of the 
field. He published numerous papers in the field, as well as a monograph, and is still 
credited with making important contributions to giving a mathematical foundation to 
crystallography. He also made contributions to the science of tidal research, pushing for 
a large-scale world-wide project of tidal observations; he won a Royal Society gold 
medal for this accomplishment. Whewell acted as a terminological consultant for 
Faraday and other scientists, who wrote to him asking for new words. Whewell only 
provided terminology when he believed he was fully knowledgeable about the science 
involved.  
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In his section on the “Language of Science” in the Philosophy, Whewell made clear this 
position. Another interesting aspect of his intercourse with scientists becomes clear in 
reading his correspondence with them: namely, that Whewell constantly pushed 
Faraday, Forbes, Lubbock and others to perform certain experiments, make specific 
observations, and to try to connect their findings in ways of interest to Whewell.  
In all these ways, Whewell indicated that he had a deep understanding of the activity of 
science3.  
The philosophical debate can generate concepts, ideas and themata with respect to 
science on a meta level as well as the history of science in Whewell’s view produced 
knowledge and materials for science itself.  
As it was said earlier, in Bohr’s case we rather should focus on his insistence on 
continuity between the two physics that is exclusively a methodological issue. It’s my 
claim that the concept of unity is deep-rooted in Danish culture as it originates in the 
reception of certain instances arising from the philosophical debate in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century.  
As it shall be shown, the philosophy of Harald Høffding – Niels Bohr’s mentor – 
ascribed a fundamental importance to the couple unity/ continuity. For this reason I am 
going to present two hypotheses in order to explain the origin of such a thematic couple. 
One plausible hypothesis is that to refer such binomial to the so-called Leibniz-Wolffian 
system. The second hypothesis will deal with Post Kantian and German Idealism. 
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3.2 The Leibniz-Wolffian Monism 
In the introduction of Johs Witt-Hansen’s article, “Leibniz, Høffding, and the 
‘Ekliptica’ Circle”, from 1980 one can find an interesting reference to the Leibnizean 
“brand” of the Danish culture.  
Witt-Hansen reminded that around the turn of the eighteenth century the reception of 
Leibniz’ philosophy was in Germany still under the sway of Kant’s critical analysis.  
In the Appendix, “The amphiboly of concepts of reflection”, contained in his Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant attacked Christian Wolff’s interpretation of Leibniz’ metaphysical 
doctrine. Kant affirmed: «Leibniz intellectualised appearances, just as Lock sensualised 
all concepts of the understanding»4.  
He also explained that since Leibniz’ doctrine is valid only for things in themselves, and 
not for appearances, it is not valid at all. 
Schelling made a remarkable statement against Kant’s critique of Leibniz’ metaphysics 
in his Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (Essays in 
Explanation of the Idealism of the Doctrine of Science), written in 1796 and 1797:  
«The history of philosophy provides examples of systems which have for ages remained obscure. A 
philosopher [Fichte] has recently passed the judgement upon Leibniz, that he was probably the only one 
in the history of philosophy to stick to his convictions, and, consequently, the only one who was basically 
right. This remark is noteworthy because it bears witness to the view that time has now come to 
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understand Leibniz. For if he is supposed to be basically right, he cannot be understood up to now. The 
subject deserves a closer investigation»5. 
Furthermore, Schelling continued his reflections on Leibniz in Ideen zu einer 
Philosophie der Natur. Als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft (Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature: as the Introduction to the Study of this Science): 
«He [Leibniz] embodies the universal spirit of the world, which discloses itself in the most multifarious 
forms, and diffuses life where it happens to emerge. The claim that the right words for the presentation of 
his philosophy have not been discovered until now is therefore doubly insufferable; and it is likewise 
insufferable that the Kantian school obtrudes its feigned views upon him – charges him with statements 
on subjects where he in all cases precisely taught the opposite»6. 
Schelling’s reflection allows us to give a hint of Leibniz’ life and philosophy, as he 
grasped the essential unity that arises from the animate and rational nature. As I will 
show later on, Schelling joined Leibniz’s view with Kant’s dynamical theory of matter. 
In fact, Kant’s transcendental philosophy was too great an obstacle to allow Leibniz’s 
hylozoistic conception to supersede without a thorough critical analysis of the Kantian 
dichotomy between constitutive a priori principles and regulative a priori principles. 
Nevertheless, Kant was not the only responsible for the transitory misfortune of 
Leibniz’ philosophy and scientific work. It was due more likely to the political situation 
in Hannover, ill disposed towards Leibniz’ philosophical, scientific and technical 
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activities as Privy Court Counsellor to the Elector of Braunschweig-Hannover and 
(from 1714) to George I, king of England7. 
Leibniz died on November 14, 1716, and the entire court was invited to attend the 
funeral. No one attended except his secretary, Eckhart, and a close friend, the Scottish 
knight, John Ker of Kersland, who happened to be passing through Hannover at the 
time.  
Leibniz was buried in an unmarked grave in the court church of Hannover. However, on 
each side of the coffin Eckhart placed 6 tin armorial ensigns or emblems. At the head of 
the coffin on the right side he placed the figure “1” circumscribed by a circle with the 
inscription Omnia ad unum, symbolizing the binary number system invented by 
Leibniz; and at the base on the left side he placed a spiral with the inscription Inclinata 
resurget8. 
As we have seen, Schelling tried to take up a fragment of Leibniz’s thought by directing 
attention to the dynamic conception of nature that became an essential part of his own 
theory of nature.  
In Denmark, Leibniz was rediscovered thanks to the Norwegian mineralogist and 
philosopher Henrik Steffens, who, as a follower of Schelling, gave Leibniz’ theses a 
special relevance. In 1802-1803 he delivered at Ehlers Kollegium in Copenhagen the 
memorable “Introduction to Philosophical Lectures”, which influenced Danish culture 
to such an extent that the debate about religion, philosophy, science and history in 
nineteenth century Denmark took a new direction. 
                                                 
7
 Cf. WITT-HANSEN, “Leibniz, Høffding” (cit. note 4), p. 32. 
8
 KURT MÜLLER, “Supra ossa Leibnitii”, in “Leibniz. Der Internationale Leibniz-Kongress in Hannover“, 
1968, pp. 43-46. 
 79 
Steffens became the spiritual author of Grundtvig’s visionary conception of history, a 
conception nourished by “the idea of the association of ages and Christ in the midst of 
historical events”9. This historical vision inspired the Danish Folk High School 
movement, and found its expression in the fields of religion, poetry, history, 
mathematics, physics and technology at the Danish Folk High School in Askov in 
Southern Jutland. 
To summarize Steffens’ philosophical conception, it is worth noticing a brief report that 
he gave in a retrospect on his “Beyträge zur inner Naturgeschichte der Erde” from 1801, 
dedicated to Goethe: 
«The subject which I tried to develop in this work became the main theme throughout my life, i.e. 
Existence as a whole should become history; I called it the intrinsic history of the Earth […]. Man himself 
should be regarded fully and entirely as a product of the development of nature […]. It became more and 
more clear to me that natural science itself, in so far as it introduced quite a new element in history, 
though which our time distinguished itself from the past as a whole, must become the most important of 
all sciences, the basis of the whole spiritual future of the human race»10. 
Moreover, in another text he added: 
«Obviously it was my intention in writing this work to connect all phenomena of life in the unity of 
nature and history and, from the point of view of their unity, to trace the footprints of a divine purpose in 
the grandiose development of the universe»11. 
The above passages suggest a Steffens’ dependence on Leibniz’ universal conception of 
development, and a dependence on Leibniz’ “Protogaea”. After Steffens’ attempt, 
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Schelling’s philosophical and scientific influence came to an end, although the Danish 
physicist and chemist Hans Christian Ørsted was able to transpose the idea of unity into 
physics. He proposed the unity of physical forces and the doctrine that “all phenomena 
are produced by the same original force”12. 
But, in Denmark, the principal mediator of Leibniz’ philosophical thought was Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing.  In contradiction to Schelling, Lessing did not place emphasis on 
Leibniz’ philosophy of nature, but he focused rather on Leibniz conception on religion 
and on his theory of truth and cognition, and did so in the light of Leibniz’ basic 
philosophical tenet: the principle of continuity. Lessing presented Leibniz’ conceptions 
as follows: whereas nature is the product of a continuous process of creation, religion is 
the process of a continuous revelation. Lessing’s interpretation of Leibniz’ thought was 
portrayed in a poetical form in “Eine Duplik” from 1778. It is worth reminding that 
Harald Høffding in his “History of Modern Philosophy” from 1885 quoted “Eine 
Duplik”, adding that: 
«The excellence mentioned by Lessing has a bearing on the expansion of man’s powers in the act of 
research. However, such expansion would, none the less, be impossible or only a persistent 
disappointment if nothing whatsoever were achieved. Eternal striving without any achievements is in 
itself a contradiction in terms. It should not be overlooked, however, that any achievement is merely 
preliminary and becomes a starting point for a renewed striving. As will be shown below, this is precisely 
Lessing’s conviction»13. 
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As Witt-Hansen noted, in the above passage is possible to discover the origin of 
Høffding’s insistence on the non-finality of the process of cognition. As I see it, Witt-
Hansen failed to recognize the most important evidence of Leibniz’ methodological 
tenet with respect to Høffding’s theory of knowledge: the principle of continuity that is 
inextricably associated with the idea of unity.  
The principle of continuity is one of the most known concepts of Leibniz’ doctrine. In a 
somewhat nebulous form this principle had been employed on occasion by a number of 
Leibniz’ predecessors, including Cusanus and Kepler, but it was Leibniz who clarified 
it, and for this reason it was regarded as his own discovery. In a letter to Bayle of 1687, 
Leibniz gave the following formulation of the principle: “in any supposed transition, 
ending in any terminus, it is permissible to institute a general reasoning in which the 
final terminus may be included”14. This would seem to indicate that Leibniz considered 
“transitions” of any kind as continuous. Certainly he held this to be the case in geometry 
and for natural processes, where it appears as the principle Natura non facit saltus. 
According to Leibniz, it is the law of continuity that allows geometry and the evolving 
methods of the infinitesimal calculus to be applicable in physics15. In Leibniz’ view, the 
principle of continuity is a necessary precondition for knowledge. To clarify, Leibniz 
deemed necessary that the principle of continuity would hold in the best of all possible 
worlds. In fact, Leibniz concluded his discussion of the principle of continuity with this 
remark: 
«We see how the true physics should in fact be derived from the source of divine perfection». 
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Leibniz employed the conservation principle and the principle of continuity as tests for 
the acceptability of proposed laws of impact and motion. The study of an ideal world, in 
which the law of order holds, would stand for a heuristic in the formulation of scientific 
hypotheses16. This is the reason why it does not contradict Leibniz’ rejection of 
atomism doctrine. 
In the “Demonstratio possibilitatis mysteriorum eucharestiae” from 1668, Leibniz 
claimed that the composition of the ideas of the things in god’s mind does not give rise 
to “separate parts”, but a re-composition of the varieties occurs in the mind’s unity that 
is the fundamental concept of harmony, termed as unitas plurimorum, unitas varietate 
compensata, diversitas unitate compensata, similitudo in dissimilibus, ratio identitatis. 
The concept of unity/harmony is essential for understanding Leibniz’s holistic 
philosophy and, as we shall see, is at the origin of Høffding’s philosophical monism. 
Harald Høffding coined the term critical monism to indicate in ontology the view of 
reality, which holds that it is one in number but that the unity embraces real multiplicity. 
Høffding gave the title of critical monism to the theory that reality, like conscious 
experience, is one although there are many items within that experience. Another 
example: both the one and the many exist and in the closest relation without either 
merging or cancelling the other. The one is immanent in the many although 
transcendent; the many are immanent in the one although in a sense beyond it. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Leibniz expressed the concept of unity in his 
Demonstratio as follows: 
«Unionis Mentis et Corporis sunt Ideae, uti Anguli uniones puncti cum lineis. Ideae sunt idem cum formis 
Substantialibus, Ideae ita sunt in Deo uti omnis action in agente, et uti Creatio est in Deo. Si quis quaerat: 
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an Idea sit creata an non? Respondere cogetur: creata sit creatura an non?»17. 
As we can read from the Latin quotation, the ideas are unifications of mind and body 
such as the angles unify points and lines. Leibniz anticipated with a geometric 
representation Høffding’s critical monism. It’s not my claim that Leibniz influenced 
directly Høffding, I rather sustain that Leibniz contributed to foster a cultural tradition 
that became predominant in Germanic world, and in nineteenth century Denmark. 
Perhaps Høffding took up the theme of Leibnizean monism as well as of Kantian 
Criticism, Idealism, Positivism and Existentialism, which he elaborated in a personal 
and original form. However, Leibniz’s conception of unity and continuity alone 
wouldn’t be sufficient to give account of the thematic concept of unity that I assume 
permeates Bohr’s methodology of scientific research program, and in particular the 
complementary conception of subatomic phenomena if we are not able to shed light on 
Schelling’s contribution to the revision of the fundamental distinctions, which Kant had 
introduced in the philosophy of nature. 
3.3 Post-Kantian German idealism, Naturphilosophie and the  
Empirical Concept of Unity 
Kant’s philosophy of human knowledge and experience is based on a number of 
fundamental distinctions as it was also stated in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Sciences from 1786. As is known, Kant made a distinction between the passive 
or receptive faculty of pure intuition or sensibility (involving the pure forms of sensible 
intuition, space and time) and the active or intellectual faculty of pure understanding 
(involving the categories or pure concepts of the understanding: substance, causality, 
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community, and so on). This distinction is at the basis of the dichotomy between 
appearances (spatio-temporal objects given to our sensibility) and things in them-selves 
(purely intellectual objects thought by the understanding alone).  
The separation between constitutive a priori principles and merely regulative a priori 
principles is also related to such a distinction. Constitutive principles result from the 
application of purely intellectual representations to our spatio-temporal sensibility and 
yield necessary conditions for all objects of experience – conditions which therefore are 
necessarily realized in experience: 
«[…] Hence, a complete analysis of the conception of matter in general must be laid at its foundation; this 
is the business of pure philosophy, which for the purpose makes use of no special experiences, but only of 
those which it meets with in separate (although in themselves empirical) conceptions, with reference to 
pure intuition is space and time (according to laws, essentially depending on the conception of nature in 
general), thus constituting it a real metaphysic of corporeal nature»18. 
The pure conceptions or categories of the understanding (i.e. substance, causality, and 
community) are necessarily realized in our experience by a system of causally 
interacting conserved entities distributed in space and time. 
«But it is of the utmost importance in the progress of the sciences, to severe heterogeneous principles 
from one another, to bring each into a special system, so it may constitute a science of its own kind, and 
thereby to avoid the uncertainty springing from their confusion, owing to our not being able to distinguish 
of which of the two, on the one hand the limitations, and on the other the mistakes occurring in their use, 
are to be attributed. For this reason I have regarded it as necessary to present in one system the first 
principles of the pure portion of natural sciences (physica generalis) where mathematical constructions 
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traverse one another, and at the same time the principles of the construction of these conceptions»19. 
One of Kant’s main purposes in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science was 
to explain how the general constitutive principles of experience were specified to 
provide an a priori “metaphysical” foundation for the Newtonian model: 
«But all true metaphysics is taken from the essential nature of the thinking faculty itself, and therefore in 
nowise invented, since it is not borrowed from experience, but contains the pure operations of thought, 
that is, conceptions and principles à priori, which the manifold of empirical presentations first of all 
brings into legitimate connection, by which it can become empirical KNOWLEDGE, i.e. experience. These 
mathematical physicists were quite unable to dispense with such metaphysical principles, and amongst 
them, not even with that which makes the conception of their own special subject, namely, matter, 
available à priori, in its application to external experience (as the conception of motion, of the filling of 
space, of inertia, etc.) […]»20. 
In the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant denied scientific status to 
chemistry, as he asserted: “chemistry will be nothing more than a systematic art or 
experimental doctrine, but never science proper, its principles being merely empirical 
and not admitting of any presentation à priori”21. In Kant’s view, chemistry and the 
more empirical sciences, except for Newtonian physics, are not provided with any 
metaphysical foundations. For this reason he invoked the famous doctrine of the 
regulative use of reason. The faculty of reason, unlike the faculty of understanding, 
generates a priori intellectual representations that cannot be fully realized in our spatio-
temporal experience. 
                                                 
19
 Ibidem, p. 143. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., p. 141. 
86 
«But besides the above internal necessity, whereby the metaphysical foundations of the doctrine of body 
are not only to be distinguished from physics, which employs empirical principles, but even from the 
rational premises of the latter, in which the employment of mathematics is to be met with, there is an 
external and, though only accidental, at the same time an important reason, for separating its thorough 
working-out from the general system of metaphysics, and for presenting it systematically as a special 
whole»22. 
As we have seen in the footnote 18, Kant put emphasis on the distinction between the 
pure concepts or categories and the principles of the construction of these conceptions. 
Here we can find one of the meanings as regards the concept of unity: “This separation 
besides the uses already mentioned, has the special charm, which the unity of 
knowledge brings with it, if we take care that the boundaries of the sciences do not run 
into one another, but occupy properly their subdivided fields”23. Nevertheless, this kind 
of unity does not pertain to the idea of unity that Kant mentioned amongst the ideas of 
the so-called regulative use of reason. These include the ideas of God, Freedom, and 
Immortality, and also the systematic unity of all empirical concepts and principles 
already generated by the understanding. 
«For if it be permissible to indicate the boundaries of a science, not merely according to the construction 
of its object, and its specific kind of cognition, but also according to the aim that is kept in view as a 
further use of the science itself, and it is found that metaphysics has engaged so many heads, and will 
continue to engage them, not in order to extend natural knowledge (which could be done much more 
easily and certainly by observation, experiment and the application of mathematics to external 
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phenomena), but in order to attain to a knowledge of that which lies wholly beyond all the boundaries of 
experience, of God, Freedom and Immortality […]»24. 
As Michael Friedman egregiously pointed out, this idea of systematic unity guides our 
process of inquiry in the more empirical and inductive sciences, without constitutively 
constraining it, as we successively ascend from lower level empirical concepts and 
principles toward higher-level concepts and principles. The goal of this process is an 
ideal complete empirical science of nature in which all empirical concepts and 
principles are constitutively grounded in the pure categories and principles of the 
understanding, but this is necessarily an ideal we can only successively approximate but 
never actually attain25. 
Post-Kantian German idealism – as successively articulated by Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel – is characterized by a rejection of Kantian dualism in all its implications. In 
particular, Kant’s doctrine of the regulative use of reason is source of scepticism as 
regards most of the phenomena of nature, as only very few of these phenomena are 
constitutively grounded. As a consequence, it would appear that a great part of natural 
phenomena are not grounded at all. 
For the idealists the conceptual structure of transcendental philosophy must be rejected, 
and with it the distinction between a passive faculty of pure sensibility and an 
intellectual faculty of pure understanding. However, as we have seen, Kant grasped the 
importance of the regulative use of reason under the idea of systematic unity, which 
guides our process of inquiry in the empirical sciences although it never fully attains its 
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goal. For Kant this process is both dialectical and infinitary, and above all is very 
natural once one has abandoned the dichotomy active intellect/ passive sensibility.  
« […] In metaphysics the object is considered merely according to the universal laws of thought, […] but 
in other sciences it must be presented according to data of intuition (empirical as well as pure). Hence the 
former, because the objects must be invariably compared with all the necessary laws of thought must 
furnish a definite number of cognitions, which can be fully exhausted; but the latter because it offers an 
endless multiplicity of intuitions (pure or empirical), and therefore of objects of thought, can never attain 
to absolute completeness, but can be extended to infinity […]»26. 
Here arises the question of how such an infinitary dialectical process may be 
reconceived as an a priori constitution of nature. It is here that Schelling made his 
decisive contribution by sustaining the idea that matter, which appears to be dead and 
inert, is nothing more than an equilibrium of opposed forces. In his Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature from 1797, Schelling argued: 
«In the dead object everything is at rest – there is in it no conflict, but eternal equilibrium. Where physical 
forces divide, living matter is gradually formed; in this struggle of divided forces the living continues and 
for that reason alone we regarded it as a visible analogue of the mind»27. 
Therefore, he opposed to the Newtonian conception of matter as made up of 
impenetrable, inert particles that are acted on by forces external to them. Then, he 
affirmed: “absolute […] inertness is a concept without significance”28. We have to 
remind ourselves that Schelling acknowledged that Kant’s dynamical theory of matter, 
articulated in the Metaphysical Foundations, had already introduced an essentially 
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dialectical element into nature. Indeed, in the Explanation II of the “Metaphysical 
Foundations of Dynamics”, Kant stated: 
«Attractive force is that moving force whereby a matter may be a cause of the approach of others to itself 
[…]. Repulsive force is that whereby a matter can be the cause of repelling others from itself […]. The 
latter we shall also sometimes term driving, and the former drawing force»29. 
It means that the dynamical constitution of matter in general proceeds from the positive 
reality of expansive force (repulsion), through the negative reality of contractive force 
(attraction), to the limitation or balance of the two in the state of equilibrium. By uniting 
the concept of matter in general as conceived in Kant’s original dynamical theory (the 
“dead” matter ruled by a dialectical process) with matter as conceived by 
Naturphilosophie – as an exhaustible source of rational life, Schelling overcame any 
possibility of a sceptical gap between our rational conception of nature and nature itself. 
What Schelling did was to fit Kant’s conception of dynamical matter into the revised 
framework of the Fichtian idealism of his early works. With the term “revised” I mean 
that Schelling’s dynamic conception of nature was no longer that of Fichte’s dialectic of 
subject30 and object, but of his own philosophy of the absolute. Schelling is here 
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returning to the Leibnizean “hylozoism” Kant explicitly rejected. In fact, this essentially 
biological or organic conception of nature then implies the overcoming of all scepticism 
in the sense that transcendental philosophy and Naturphilosophie – spirit and nature – 
are ultimately identical. 
Schelling’s endeavour is of great significance because is a way to show how 
philosophical speculation can interact with scientific discovery. As is known, Kant’s 
concern was to provide chemistry and other natural sciences such as biology with a 
scientific status, which he would never achieve because of their theoretical apparatus31. 
However, Schelling rejected Kant’s dualism, as Naturphilosophie focused on “the story 
of how nature itself successively unfolds or dialectically evolves from the “dead” or 
inert matter considered in statics and mechanics, to the essentially dynamical forms of 
interaction considered in chemistry, and finally to the living or organic matter 
considered in biology”32. But the key to Schelling’s conception, as we have seen, is a 
                                                                                                                                               
not-A was conditioned by the original positing of the A, so that not-self must be conditioned by the 
original positing of the self. 
Fichte next went on to argue that this counterpositing of the not-self by the self in fact leads into 
contradiction as it stands. For if the not-self is posited, the self is negated, but on the other hand, the not-
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negated. A way must therefore be found whereby the positing of the not-self does not absolutely negate 
and eliminate the self, and viceversa. The question therefore is “How can A and not-A, being and not-
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dialectical extension and elaboration of Kant’s original dynamical theory of matter. 
Hence the new electrochemistry, which was developed in the early eighteenth century 
Denmark, was in Schelling’s words the dialectical “middle term” between mechanism 
and biological (ultimately rational) living purposiveness. 
«Therefore, already in the chemical properties of matter there actually lie the first, although still 
completely undeveloped seeds of a future system of nature, which can unfold into the most varied forms 
and structures, up to the point where creative nature appears to return back into itself. Thus, at the same 
time, further investigations are marked out, up to the point where the necessary and the contingent, the 
mechanical and the free, separate from one another. Chemical phenomena constitute the middle term 
between the two. It is this far, then, that the principles of attraction and repulsion actually lead, as soon as 
one considers them as principles of a universal system of nature»33. 
Indeed, as Andrew Wilson34 explained, the naturphilosophisch vision contributed to 
foster the intellectual development of Hans Christian Ørsted, who enthusiastically 
embraced Schelling’s key idea of chemistry as an extension of general dynamics. 
Following Schelling, Ørsted acknowledged the importance of the dialectical 
development of nature as a whole in order to realize its progressive unveiling of a single 
infinite rational life. 
«A clearer perspective soon adds to this that there is nothing dead and rigid in nature, but that every thing 
exists only as a result of a development, that this development [Entwicklung] proceeds according to laws, 
and that, therefore, the essence of every thing is based on the totality of the laws or on the unity of the 
laws, i.e. the higher law by which it has been brought forth. Every thing, however, must again be regarded 
as an active organ of a more comprehensive whole, which again belongs to a higher whole so that only 
the great All sets the limit of this progression. And thus the universe itself would be regarded as the 
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totality [Inbegriff] of the developments, and its law would be the unity of all other laws. However, what 
finally gives the study of nature its highest meaning, so they are in their application identical to thoughts; 
the totality of the laws of a thing, regarded as its essence, is therefore an idea of nature, and the law or the 
essence of the universe is the totality of all ideas, identical with absolute reason. And so we see all of 
nature as the appearance [Erscheinung] of one infinite force and one infinite reason united, as the 
revelation of God»35. 
It is worth noting that Ørsted’s vision originated from the new discoveries in 
electrochemistry, as interpreted, along with Schelling, as expressing the fundamental 
unity of magnetic, electrical, and galvanic forces. 
I would like to point out that Schelling’s primary teaching was to conceive nature as a 
dynamical evolutionary dialectical progression, so that transcendental philosophy and 
Naturphilosophie must ultimately coincide. There is a fundamental unity that appears to 
emerge from the nature outside us. It is this unity that guides the scientist in the process 
of inquiry in the empirical sciences. 
In particular, there is room to sustain that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie provided 
essential philosophical motivation for Ørsted’s scientific discoveries. Nevertheless, it 
was objected that Schelling’s speculative methodology is too abstruse to have exerted 
an influence on the cultural practice of science, and that Kant’s original dynamical 
theory of matter, independently by Schelling, was sufficient to explain the further 
development of Ørsted’s ideas. 
But it is also beyond doubt that Ørsted carried on a metaphysical vision of rational mind 
and external nature as two complementary aspects of a single total organic development 
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unknown to Kant. As he wrote in the “First Introduction to the General Doctrine of 
Nature [Naturlaere]” from 1811: 
«In our knowledge of nature we distinguish between something which comes more immediately from 
reason and something else which rather has its origin in the senses. The two are in the most intimate 
connection with each other. It is the essence of man to present reason in an organic body, not merely in 
one particular form, but in its self-contemplating [selvbeskuende] totality. His sensuous nature, in the 
most exact sense, can only be regarded as the embodiment of this reason. Therefore, the external sense 
organs already receive impressions in a manner which is in the most perfect harmony with it, and an 
unconscious reason in the internal sense impresses in its own stamp even more markedly on these various 
abilities. Imperceptibly, they thus approach the conscious reason which organizes and combines 
everything into even higher units which, step by step, are finally transformed into the remarkable internal 
harmony of the independent reason. Thus, the science of experience (empirical science) comes into 
existence. Reason, on its side, is similar to the internal foundation and essence of nature. In a way, it 
contains the seeds of the entire world and must develop them through its necessary self-contemplation 
[Selvbeskuelse]. Consequently, it starts from the highest to which our spirit can ascend, from the essence 
of beings, the origin of everything. In itself, as a sign of this, it seeks out the various primary directions 
and through them the origin of the essential fundamental forms in the eternal unity. In its own laws it sees 
those of nature, in the variety of its own forms that of the world, and thus it develops and creates from 
itself All. In this way arises speculative natural science, which is also called philosophy of nature 
[Naturphilosophien]»36. 
Then Ørsted came to remark that ”on the empirical path, we are stopped by the 
enormous profusion of objects which our senses offer, in which, however, there is no 
completeness”37, and so he concluded: 
«Speculative natural science seems to lead us more immediately to our goal, but here we would do well to 
bear in mind that the reason which reveals itself in nature is infinite while ours, which must discover it 
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here, is limited, trapped in finitudes. In innumerable spark, reason spreads through mankind. Although a 
reflection of the whole in every individual, it has in each its distinctive direction, which prevents it from 
spreading its light equally clearly and fully in all directions. Only recently shaped in its present form, 
speculative natural science will only approach significant perfection through the combined efforts of 
many thinkers»38. 
Ørsted saw, as Schelling did, nature as a realization of an infinite rational spirit, and 
regarded rational mentality as the evolutionary culmination of an infinite dialectical 
process by which sensible nature itself continually unfolds. For this reason there is, for 
Ørsted, a necessary harmony between speculative and experimental inquiry. 
3.4 An Idealistic Interpretation of Niels Bohr’s Rational Generalization 
Thesis 
It is worth reminding that there is a trend in current Bohr scholarship that tried to make 
sense of Bohr’s claim that classical concepts must be used for an unambiguous 
communication of experimental results in terms of a Kantian or neo-Kantian 
framework. But it’s my aim to sustain an alternative approach.  
A few years ago there was a scholar who wrote: “Bohr’s understanding of physics must 
be related to some kind of metaphysical approach consistent with a Romantic 
philosophical outlook”39. Professor John Honner in his The Description of Nature stated 
that: “microphysics has became, in Bohr’s work, a kind of metaphysics”40. Furthermore, 
Catherine Chevalley has argued that Bohr was much inspired by a range of Romantic 
philosophical writers, focusing on the meaning they ascribed to “symbols”, “which 
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could describe the special kind of knowledge which is not grounded in intuition 
(ordinary space and time)”41. Following these suggestions, I would like to express 
Bohr’s doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts in terms of his belief that 
quantum theory is a rational generalization of classical mechanics, which, in my view, 
is readable through the lens of the Romantic philosophical framework I have so far 
carried on.  
The analogy between Bohr’s doctrine of the indispensability of the classical concepts 
and the neo-Kantian interpretation is based on the consideration that, “the unambiguous 
interpretation of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of the classical 
physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the language of Newton and 
Maxwell will remain the language of physicists for all time”42. But Bohr put forward 
also a second and more subtle meaning of the indispensability of the classical concepts: 
«According to the view of the author, it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the 
atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual 
forms […] No more is it likely that the fundamental concepts of the classical theories will ever become 
superfluous for the description of physical experience. The recognition of the indivisibility of the 
quantum of action, and the determination of its magnitude, not only depend on an analysis of 
measurements based on classical concepts, but it continues to be the application of these concepts alone 
that makes it possible to relate the symbolism of the quantum theory to the data of experience»43. 
It is hence understandable that classical concepts as position, momentum, force, etc. are 
essential for connecting the abstract symbolism of quantum theories to the experience. 
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To return to our analogy, could we claim that classical concepts are equivalent, in 
Kant’s words, to the function of the passive or receptive faculty of pure intuition?  
Before answering this question, I would like to point out that Bohr asserted that the 
discovery of the quantum of action brought about an entirely new situation with respect 
to human inquiry, as it introduced a necessary “individuality”, “unity”, “atomicity”, 
“wholeness” or “indivisibility”44, so that the quantum imposed a limiting condition 
upon classical descriptions. Honner synthesized the question as follows45: 
1. The quantum of action is a discovery which is universal and elementary. 
2. The quantum of action denotes a feature of indivisibility in atomic processes. 
3. Ordinary or classical descriptions are only valid for macroscopic processes, 
where reference can be unambiguous. 
In short, on the classical scale the effects of the quantum of action can be neglected and 
a provisional distinction between observer and observed can function adequately. 
Classical theory can thus be given as a “pictorial” interpretation in which theoretical and 
observational terms can univocally and unambiguously be applied, but such applications 
are invalid in the case of quantum physics, where a sharp distinction between observer 
and observed cannot be drawn. 
However, Bohr’s central idea that observation is possible thanks to the usage of 
classical concepts was motivated as follows: 
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replaced in turn of “indivisibility” and “unity”; Scientific Manuscripts: 20, p. 7 of each draft. 
45
 Cf. HONNER, The Description of Nature (cit. note 38), pp. 82-83. 
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«To clarify the peculiar aspects of the observation problem in this field of experience […] it is decisive to 
recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the 
account of all evidence must be expressed in classical term. The argument is simply that the word 
“experiment” we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learnt 
and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations 
must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical 
physics»46. 
In fact, we cannot delineate the “object” under investigation from the “measuring 
instrument” if object-instrument interaction is described quantum-mechanically. At the 
same time, we can communicate our experience of quantum events only in terms of 
their interaction with measuring apparatus. To this extent we must employ the concepts 
of classical physics, in which the idea of separability is explicitly involved. Moreover, 
this idea is the fundamental condition for observing the electron that can only be 
detected if it possesses an independent dynamic state in order to distinguish it from the 
state of the objects with which it interacts. This is to say that in order to obtain an 
unambiguous description of quantum events, we must refer every new concept to a sort 
of experiential framework expressible through the classical physics. We are again in 
sight of the question about the relationship between the reality and its “pictorial“ 
representation.  
Nevertheless, given that Bohr’s stress was on the usage of concepts rather than on the 
status of the concepts themselves, he came to relate this usage to our participation in the 
world we experience. This seems to introduce a kind of holistic approach, as Honner 
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 BOHR, “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics”, in Atomic Physics 
(cit. note 43, ch. 1), 32-66, p. 39. Reprinted in The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, 4 Vols., Vol. 2: 
Essays 1932-1957 on Atomic Phyics and Human Knowldge (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987), 32-
66. 
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suggested in his The Description of Nature, for which questions about how language 
relates to the world cease to be relevant. But there is a further important step to take: 
from the unambiguous description to a complete and exhaustive description. How can 
we get a complete description of quantum events, if the observations concerning them 
cannot be combined in the usual way of classical physics? 
Following Bohr’s suggestions:  
«The aspects of quantum phenomena revealed by experience obtained under such mutually exclusive 
conditions must thus be considered complementary in a quite novel way. The viewpoint of 
‘complementarity’ does, indeed, in no way mean an arbitrary renunciation as regards the analysis of 
atomic phenomena, but is on the contrary the expression of a rational synthesis of the wealth of 
experience in this field, which exceeds the limits to which the applicability of the concepts of causality is 
naturally confined»47. 
Whereas the indispensability of the classical concepts could be accepted, the old 
cohesion guaranteed by the classical framework was no longer possible because the 
determinist union of causal and space-time accounts was broken. As a consequence, the 
possibility of a single picture universally covering all aspects of observation had to be 
abandoned48. In brief, quantum phenomena cannot be completely reduced in terms of 
classical concepts if we aim at obtaining an exhaustive description of reality, in as much 
as we have to do with the mutuality of observable and observer in the whole process of 
observation. In such an account truth is regarded as entailing “the asymptotic 
convergence of theory and reality”49.  
                                                 
47
 ID., “Biology and Atomic Physics”, in Atomic Physics (cit note 43, ch. 1), 13-21, p. 19. Reprinted in 
The Philosophical Writings, 2 (cit. note 46), 13-21. 
48
 Cf. HONNER, The Description of Nature (cit. note 40), p. 89. 
49
 Ibidem, p. 17. 
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This asymptotic convergence between experience and theory is also consistent with the 
holistic account. Both the principle of correspondence and the concept of 
complementarity are involved in such a convergence, in as much as they are 
underwritten by Bohr’s belief in the infinite and eternal harmony of nature. 
«Likewise we must be prepared that evidence, obtained by different, mutually exclusive experimental 
arrangements, may exhibit unprecedented contrast and even at first sight appear contradictory. It is in this 
situation that the notion of complementarity is called for to provide a frame wide enough to embrace the 
account of fundamental regularities of nature which cannot be comprehended within a single picture»50. 
Thus, complementarity is the framework that makes it possible an exhaustive 
description of new experience. By using a slogan, we could say that complementarity is 
a kind of new causality. However, the concept of complementarity cannot be 
comparable to a new category of understanding, as it expresses “the synthesis of the 
wealth of experience”, i.e. it has to do with phenomena considered in their own 
wholeness. Here once again rises the question of how such a wealth of experience may 
be grasped by “classical” categories. And here once again holists would argue for the 
possibility of scientific thought engaging a real world. This is to say that theory and 
reality are not entirely distinct, as they mutually shape each other, while they are also 
asymptotically convergent. At the same time, we have to point out that Bohr wrote 
about “the never-ending struggle for harmony between content and form” and he added 
that: “no content can be grasped without a formal frame”51. Consequently, as Honner 
noted, Bohr’s holistic approach appears as moderate. 
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 BOHR, "The Unity of Human Knowledge" (cit. note 24, ch. 1), p. 12. Italics of the present author. 
51
 ID., “Discussion with Einstein” (cit. note 46), p. 65. 
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Bohr’s aim was the reconciliation of classical and quantum theories into a rational and 
consistent whole, which his insistence on the wholeness of quantum-theoretical state-
descriptions can give account of. Such a conviction would be sufficient to explain why 
Bohr was critical of Kant’s thesis of a priori knowledge in formulating his own 
philosophy of complementarity52.  
In a similar vein, Shimony wrote that Bohr did not share Kant’s view “concerning the 
structure of human knowledge, like the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments”53.  
If in his “Introductory Survey” from 1929 Bohr referred to space and time as “forms of 
perception” or “forms of intuition”54, which would suggest a link to Kant, on the 
contrary – as it was recently noted – this was a connection Bohr was never explicitly 
acknowledged55. Indeed, Bohr was more inclined to emphasize the point that his own 
view differed from Kant’s56. Bohr’s belief in the unity in nature, as I suggest, rather 
appears to approach a post-Kantian and idealistic conception of nature itself.  
To summarize, Bohr started from a Kantian presupposition of comparing classical 
concepts to forms of intuition, but the conditions for an objective description of 
microcosm brought him to reject the strict Kantian dichotomy between nature and its 
representation. 
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 Cf. FOLSE, “Kantian Aspects of Complementarity”, Kantian Studien, 1978, 69: 58-66 and DAVID 
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Bohr saw the correspondence principle as the tendency to utilize in the development of 
quantum theory every concept of classical theories in order to find a synthesis between 
the thesis of the quantum postulates and the antithesis of the “classical theories” in a 
way that recalls the idealistic conception of reality. And again, we do not have to regard 
Bohr’s conception just as a Hegelian dialectical synthesis, but rather the 
acknowledgement of the progressive rational development of nature that constantly 
shows the harmony among its items and forces, and hence guarantees that the 
asymptotically convergence between theory and reality, language and world, classical 
and quantum physics moves towards the truth, if never arriving at. 
So Bohr went on to remark: “we must continually count on the appearance of new facts 
the inclusion of which within the compass of our earlier experience may require a 
revision of our fundamental concepts”57. 
Nevertheless, the concept of complementarity only apparently recalls a new 
transcendental “tool of reason”: 
«[…] We must realize that the discovery of the quantum of action has thrown new light on the very 
foundation of the description of nature, and revealed hitherto unnoticed presuppositions to the rational 
use of the concepts on which the communication of experience rests»58. 
In fact, if it is true that Bohr evidenced the shape of new rational presuppositions in 
order to grasp the subatomic phenomena, it is also true that he maintained that 
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complementarity is above all a condition exhibited by “atomic objects obtained by 
different experimental arrangements”59.  
At the same time, such a relationship, expressed by the totality of phenomena “exhausts 
the possible information about the objects”60, as though it unfolded “unnoticed” or 
“disregarded”61 presuppositions of the understanding. In this sense there is an 
asymptotic convergence between our categories of understanding and the observed 
subatomic reality to the extent that the Kantian distinction between appearances and 
things in them-selves becomes untenable. 
Furthermore, it is also worth noticing the fundamental divergence between Bohr and 
Kant’s conceptions presented in the Metaphysical Foundations. As we have seen, Kant 
introduced a further distinction between “constitutive a priori principles” and 
“regulative a priori principles” from which he discerned the idea of systematic unity 
that guides our process of inquiry in the more inductive and empirical sciences without 
constitutively constraining it. We are in sight, for Kant, of the empirical hypothesis of 
unity, i.e. the reason’s empirical presupposition of unity. There must be a relation, 
according to Kant, between the subjective, methodological aims, and the objective 
features in order to apply logical principles to nature. For this reason, homogeneity is 
necessarily presupposed in the manifold of the possible experience. 
On the contrary, for Bohr, there are fundamental regularities of nature that must be 
comprehended (communicated). Bohr seems to reverse the question: regularities and 
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unity in nature are not presupposed, as they are just objectively given and they are also 
expressed in the necessary conditions for the possibility of (experiential) knowledge. 
They are objectively given as it is given the unity or wholeness, atomicity, etc. 
introduced by the quantum of action.  
But, on the other hand, such a unity, as we have seen, is also the rationale for the 
acquisition of objective empirical knowledge. In my view, it is this fundamental 
divergence on the idea of unity that makes it the difference with respect to Kant. 
Moreover, unlike Kant, Bohr did not regard the categories of understanding as eternally 
immutable.  
In his concept of complementarity, considered, so to speak, “in quite a novel way”, we 
find a “content/form” interaction that recalls Ørsted’s metaphysical vision of rational 
mind and external nature as two complementary aspects of a single organic 
development. Coherently, Bohr saw science as moving towards, if never arriving at, the 
infinite harmony of nature. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Harmony, Unity and Continuity in Bohr’s 
Philosophical Reflection 
 
4.1 The “Signs” of Bohr’s Philosophical Inclination 
As is known, classical mechanics presents an objective description of the reality, as it is 
based on the use of ideas referring to the events of daily life. But the introduction of 
Planck’s quantum of action revealed in atomic processes a feature of wholeness foreign 
to the mechanical conception of nature.  
Therefore, it became clear that the theories of classical physics are idealizations valid 
only in the description of phenomena sufficiently large to allow the neglect of the 
quantum of action.  
On these premises the debate on the rational generalization thesis became central in 
Bohr’s speculation, but more shall be said about this in the chapters to follow. Now I 
would like to return to Bohr’s insistence both in the eternal harmony of nature and the 
unity of human knowledge, which, as we have seen, brings evidence to his holistic 
outlook.  
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Bohr was used to say that he was interested more in philosophy than in philosophers1. 
In other words, he was attracted by some philosophical themes in the history of 
                                                 
1
 As we will see, Bohr passed the general course in philosophy at the first year of the University with 
Harald Høffding. But beyond the relations with the Danish philosopher and his mentor, Bohr showed 
great interest in many philosophical discussions. In 1926 the “Selskabet for Filosofi og Psykologi” (the 
Society of Philosophy and Psychology) was founded in Copenhagen on Edgar Rubin’s initiative. Here is 
a list of Bohr’s participation in the meetings in this society that Professor Favrholdt has enumerated in his 
Niels Bohr (cit. note 21, ch. 1), pp. 33-34. 
1) On December 7, 1928, he attended a lecture by Jørgen Jørgensen (Professor of Philosophy) on 
“The Geometrical Proof with Special Reference to Kant’s Theory” and took part in the 
discussion afterwards. 
2) On November 28, 1929, he himself gave a lecture: “Some Remarks concerning the Attitude to 
the Law of Causality in Recent Physics”. 
3) On March 27, 1930, he attended a lecture by Poul Tuxen (Professor of Indian Philology) on 
“Indian Considerations concerning the Validity or Non-validity of Knowledge” and again took 
part in the discussion after the lecture. 
4) On November 4, 1932, he attended Rudolf Carnap’s lecture: “Über den Charakter der 
philosophischen Probleme” (On the Character of the Philosophical Problems) and this time too 
participated in the discussion. 
5) From February 16, 1933 to March 28, 1936, there were lectures by, among others, Louis 
Hjelmslev, Edgar Rubin, Wolfgang Köhler, Otto Neurath (twice), Viggo Brøndal, Bertrand 
Russel, and Ernst Cassirer. Unfortunately, the secretary of the Society wrote only the date, the 
name, and the title of the lecture, therefore we do not know who was present and who took part 
in the discussions. 
6) On January 29, 1940, the members of the Society were invited by “Fysisk Forening” (The 
Physical Society) to join a meeting where Niels Bohr lectured on “Analysis and Synthesis in Past 
and Recent Physics”. 
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scientific thought, which we can regard as recurrent in his life and works. According to 
Heisenberg, “Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist”2. The validity of 
Heisenberg’s assessment is not given by Bohr’s identification with a specific 
philosophical doctrine but rather by a fundamental concern with the conditions for the 
possibility of experiential knowledge.  
                                                                                                                                               
7) On November 24, 1941, Bohr attended a lecture in the Society of Philosophy and Psychology by 
Edgar Rubin, “On Wonder”, and took part in the discussion after the lecture. 
8) On March 11, 1943, the Society held a meeting on the occasion of Høffding’s centennial. 
Frithiof Brandt (Professor of Philosophy) spoke on “The Discussion about the Philosophy of 
Life 1920-30’ and at the same meeting Niels Bohr read out Høffding’s Autobiography. 
9) On May 31, 1946, Bohr was present and took part in the discussion after André Mercier’s 
lecture: “Natural Laws and our own Theoretical Constructions”. 
10)  On November 8, 1951, the Society celebrated its 25 anniversary. Niels Bohr was appointed 
honorary member together with the psychologist Albert Michotte and David Katz and gave a 
lecture on “The Use of Words”. 
11) In 1953 Gilbert Ryle gave a lecture on “The Concept of Mind”, but the minutes have no date for 
the meeting. However, Professor Favrholdt participated in the conference and reminded that 
Niels Bohr attended the meeting and took part in the discussion. 
12) On May 3, 1956, André Mercier gave a lecture on “Science and Philosophy” (in Danish). Bohr 
was present and here too took the floor in the discussion after the lecture. 
13) On October 23, 1958, Bohr joined a meeting where Bent Schultzer (Professor of Philosophy) 
gave a lecture on “Relativity in a Philosophical Perspective”. Again Bohr took part in the 
discussion with great eagerness. 
 
2
 WERNER HEISENBERG, “Quantum Theory and its Interpretation”, in STEFAN ROZENTAL (ed.), Niels 
Bohr: His Life and Work as Seen by His Friends and Colleagues (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1967), p. 
98. 
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Niels Blædel in Harmony and Unity. The Life of Niels Bohr3 gave an original account of 
Bohr’s philosophical ideas. Blædel wrote that Bohr’s main philosophical idea arose for 
the first time when he saw that Rutherford’s atomic model “could not be married with 
classical physics”. As he realized the inevitability of the break, he had the courage to 
carry it through. He also had “the intuition to make successful guesses” as to achieve 
further progress in the course of time, and – Blædel continued – “his guesses sprang 
from his insight into the germ of the paradox in nature herself”. 
Blædel saw the following quotation from “The Unity of Human Knowledge” as 
indicative of Bohr’s “courage”, i.e. the human means of expression allow the great 
variety of subject matters to find its unity. 
«The aim of our argumentation is to emphasize that all experience, whether in science, philosophy or art, 
which may be helpful to mankind, must be capable of being communicated by human means of 
expression, and it is on this basis that we shall approach the question of unity of knowledge»4. 
Bohr’s approach could be seen as the attempt of understanding the unity of human 
knowledge from the unity of the phenomena of nature, which can be “communicated” 
through the human means of expression. This seems to refer again to the necessary 
condition for an objective description of all experience. 
Both Abraham Pais5 and Blædel have related the following episode that happened 
during the summer of 1942 in the pavilion of Tisvilde, a small town located on the north 
coast of the island Zealand in Denmark. Bohr was preparing the address he was to give 
on the occasion of the tercentenary celebration of Newton’s birth. He stood in front of 
                                                 
3
 NIELS BLÆDEL, Harmoni og enhed (Copenhagen: Carlsbergfondet, 1985). English translation: Harmony 
and Unity (Madison, WI: Science & Tech. Inc., 1988), pp. 186-87. 
4
 BOHR, "The Unity of Human Knowledge" (cit. note 24, ch. 1) , pp. 14-15. 
5
 ABRAHAM PAIS, Niels Bohr’s Time. In Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
p. 10.  
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the blackboard and wrote down some general themes to be discussed. One of them dealt 
with the harmony. So Bohr wrote down the word harmony.  
It looked about as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the discussion progressed, Bohr became dissatisfied with the use of harmony. He 
walked back and forth restlessly, then he suddenly stopped and his face lit up. 
According to Blædel, Bohr exclaimed: “Now I’ve got it. We must change harmony to 
unity”6. So he picked up the chalked again, stood there looking for a moment at what he 
had written before, and made the single change: 
 
 . 
                                                                              
                                                         
 
 
 
 
With one triumphant bang of the chalk on the blackboard. Even though Pais did not pay 
too much attention to the episode, it is sufficient to guess that the theme of unity was 
current in Bohr’s mind and preceded any intention to popularize also the most 
mysterious concepts of quantum physics.  
                                                 
6
 It is worth noticing that in his Niels Bohr’s Time, Pais reported: “Now I’ve got it. We must change 
harmony to uniformity”. But Blædel has confirmed his version. 
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As we know from his philosophical papers, Bohr sought to develop a general 
philosophical point of view, which would revolutionize our understanding of how 
human knowledge relates to the world, which forms its object. He also held that this 
general philosophical outlook taught an epistemological lesson. Nonetheless, the 
relatively small stack of essays prepared for specific occasions, such as addresses to 
various professional audiences, is characterized by the lack of detail and general 
obscurity of the argument behind many of Bohr’s key claim.  
As Jan Faye and Henry J. Folse noted7, partially for this reason, and partially because of 
the plenitude of various “interpretations” of quantum theory, scholars remain deeply 
divided over just what Bohr’s message is. Professor Sandro Petruccioli8 wrote that 
Bohr’s essays often led up to complementarity by way of an historical survey of the 
development of quantum physics.  
Petruccioli emphasized what he called Bohr’s rational reconstruction of the story, in 
which events are selected with the very definite philosophical objective of making the 
complementarity viewpoint appear as inevitable and most satisfying completion to this 
development.  
Ulrich Röseberg9 spoke of “hidden historicity” to show that Bohr’s perception of these 
events shaped his own personal reasoning towards complementarity. In my opinion, the 
above concept of unity is the leitmotiv underlying Bohr’s philosophical and scientific 
thought. It is this concept that shapes Bohr’s personal reasoning giving to it coherence 
and linearity in the context of a general view of the world.  
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 Cf. FAYE, FOLSE (eds.) The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, Vol. 4: Causality and 
Complementarity (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1998), p. 1. 
8
 PETRUCCIOLI Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), pp. 134-172. 
9
 ULRICH RÖSEBERG, “Hidden Historicity: The Challange of Bohr’s Philosophical Thought”, in FAYE, 
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In the first of the two talks given on the Danish Radio, April 1963, Aage Petersen said: 
“Bohr’s philosophy is not built around a principle or a doctrine, as its core is not a 
thesis, but a viewpoint or an attitude, and it is difficult to illustrate this attitude by 
examples for daily life”10.  
Bohr’s inclination towards the concept of unity rises explicitly in the speech addressed 
to the International Congress of Pharmaceutical Sciences, “The Connection between the 
Sciences”, from 1960. In particular, here we find one of the most important definitions 
of unity: 
«In this address I have tried to show how researches into the world of atoms have offered new 
opportunities of tracing that harmony in nature of which Ørsted spoke, but which we perhaps would 
rather refer to as the unity of human knowledge. It is indeed only the appreciation of such harmony or 
unity which can help us to keep a balanced attitude to our position and avoid that confusion which the 
tumultuous progress of science and technology in almost every field of human interest may so easily 
produce»11. 
Bohr started from the elucidation of Hans C. Ørsted’s concept of unity, which was 
regarded as the unification of all physical forces into nature, and then he referred the 
concept of unity to human knowledge. Nevertheless, Bohr and Ørsted’s standpoints are 
compatible, as they consider rational mind and external nature as two aspects of a single 
organic development. In fact, both they share the broader philosophical vision of a 
                                                 
10
 AAGE PETERSEN, “Niels Bohr’s Philosophy”, Two talks given on the Danish Radio on April 1963. The 
transcription of the interview is available at The Niels Bohr Archive. The interview was later published in 
Petersen’s article “The Philosophy of Niels Bohr”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1963, 19: 8-14. But 
the above quoted passage has been omitted.  
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 BOHR, “The Connection between the Sciences”, in Journal Mondial de Pharmacie, 3, Juillet-
Decembre 1960, 262-67, in Essays 1958-1962  (cit. note 24, ch. 1), 17-22. Reprinted in The 
Philosophical Writings, 3 (cit. note 24, ch. 1), 17-22, p. 22.  
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dialectical or evolutionary development of nature in the realization or progressive 
unfolding of a unified and harmonic rational life. 
At the same time, researches in modern atomic physics have shown and confirmed the 
existence of harmony and regularities in nature, to which the unity of knowledge cannot 
be completely reduced. Bohr appears to hint at the interaction nature-reason and 
observable-observer in the attempt to point out the difference between the holistic 
outlook and the reductivist aims of the positivists. 
However, Bohr’s unspoken aim was the heuristic function of the concept of unity that 
also played an essential role in the formulation of the first atomic theory.  
We should hence consider three levels of analysis as regards the concept of unity: the 
asymptotic unity among the sciences, asymptotic unity among science and humanities, 
and asymptotic unity between classical and quantum physics. Here one can identify the 
heuristic function of such a concept.  
The “balance attitude” which Bohr speaks of is the harmony towards which science’s 
progress tends, without ever arriving at, as it helps us in superseding the initial 
incompatibilities among the various scientific and technical disciplines. Such a concept 
is consistent with the definition of continuity theorist, and goes far beyond the apparent 
encyclopaedic meaning that a literal interpretation folds.  
Furthermore, if we look through the previously quoted address, “The Unity of Human 
Knowledge”, we can find also the most evident connection between the concept of unity 
and that of complementarity in the specific context of the rational generalization thesis 
that can give significance to the above-mentioned Bohr’s “courage”: 
«A detailed account on complementarity lines of a new wide domain of experience has been possible by 
the gradual establishment of a mathematical formalism, known as quantum mechanics […]. Just by 
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treating the quantum of action as an element evading customary explanation – similar to the role of the 
velocity of light in relativity regarded as a maximal speed of signals – this formalism can be regarded as a 
rational generalization of the conceptual framework of classical physics»12. 
Bohr went on in emphasizing the considerations as regards the features of wholeness 
consistent with such a position. In the next paragraphs Bohr mentioned again Poul 
Martin Møller’s novel in order to illustrate the issue of both the arbitrary separation of 
the subject-object coupling with respect to quantum physics, and the separation between 
the content of our consciousness and the background loosely referred to as “ourselves” 
with respect to psychology. Bohr came to introduce a new mode of reasoning that 
allows us understanding how poetry, painting and music may “contain possibilities of 
bridging between extreme modes as those characterized as pragmatic and mystic”. And 
again:  
«Conversely, already ancient Indian thinkers understood the logical difficulties in giving exhaustive 
expression for such wholeness. In particular, they found escape from apparent disharmonies in life by 
stressing the futility of demanding an answer to the question of the meaning of existence, realizing that 
any use of the word “meaning” implies comparison; and with what can we compare the whole 
existence?»13. 
Bohr was aware of this new kind of “logic” that he had already found in the reading of 
the Chinese Tao-te-Ching of Lao-Tse since he was a youngster14. Such as the apparent 
disharmonies in life could be avoided if we took on a holistic approach, it seems 
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 ID., “The Unity of Human Knowledge” (cit. note 24, ch. 1), pp. 12-13. 
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 Ibidem, p. 14. Italics are of the present author. 
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 In a letter to a teacher, Svend Hugo Jürgensen, date March 26, 1958, Bohr wrote: «Thank you for your 
letter and the enclosed leaflet on Tao Teh King, which I read with interest. The things you say about 
ancient Chinese philosophy are, I believe, in many ways to the point. In my youth I received a beautiful 
impression of it through Ernst Møller’s book “Oldmester”, and during a visit to China twenty years ago I 
learnt how much the memory of Lao-Tse still is appreciated». From FAVRHOLDT, Niels Bohr (cit. note 21, 
ch. 1), p. 37. 
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reasonable to hold that the apparent disharmonies in the sciences may be superseded by 
adopting a similar outlook. Moreover, it should not prevent to affirm that Bohr had the 
courage to carry through the quantized Rutherford’s model in spite of the apparent 
contradictions because of his characteristic standpoint. I want to highlight that Bohr’s 
stress on the rational generalization thesis pertains both to the concept of 
complementarity and the formulation of the first atomic theory. Whereas it is true that 
Bohr’s enunciation of such a thesis was made only later on15, it is also true that such a 
conception was applied since the early years of his research, as it shall be shown in the 
next chapters. This is to say that Bohr’s scientific and philosophical thought was 
characterized since the outset of his research activity by a general conception of the 
world that historians of science have called with various names: wholeness, harmony, 
homogeneity, totality, uniformity, but, as I see it, they are expression of the condition of 
unity and continuity. 
4.2 Bohr and Logical Positivism 
Bohr’s connection to the logical positivism was seen as an important evidence of his 
general interest in philosophy. In particular, the concept of unity of knowledge allows 
understanding the fundamental difference between Bohr and neo-positivists. As is well 
known, Bohr took part in the “2. International Kongress für Einheit des Wissenschaft” 
held in Copenhagen from June 21 to 26, 1936. Otto Neurath and Jørgen Jørgensen 
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 The first occurrence of Bohr’s formulation of the rational generalization thesis goes back to the 
“Introductory Survey” from 1929, in Atomic Theory  (cit. note 1, ch.1), 1-24, p. 4. Reprinted in KALCKAR 
(ed.), NBCW, 6 (cit. note 1, ch. 1), pp. 279-302: «The endeavours to formulate general laws for these 
possibilities and probabilities by a suitability limited application of the concepts of the classical theories 
have led recently, after a series of phases in its development, to the creation of a rational quantum 
mechanics by means of which we are able to describe a very wide range of experience, and which may be 
regarded in every respect as a generalization of the classical physical theories». 
114 
organized the conference. They were the two among the positivists, together with 
Philipp Frank, with whom Bohr had closest contact16.  
                                                 
16
 At The Niels Bohr Archive, included in Bohr Scientific Correspondence, is available the plentiful 
correspondence between Philippe Frank and Niels Bohr from 1935 to 1962. 
- In the summer of 1935 (?) Frank in Prague writes to Bohr in Copenhagen: he thanks him for the 
letters to the Russian colleagues and has at once sent them off. He expects with great interest 
Prof. Bohr’s report of his lecture in Copenhagen. He thinks it should be very profitable once to 
speak quietly about all these questions. He has the impression that they have still more 
importance for the ordinary understanding of science, but there are still many misunderstandings. 
- 5 July 1935 Bohr in Copenhagen writes to Frank in Prague: Prof. Bohr writes that professor 
Jørgensen some weeks ago has been so kind to show him the article which Frank has written on 
the relations between atomic physics and the ordinary problems of biology and psychology. 
Although Prof. Bohr has been pleased of Frank’s humour, and although he in something agrees 
with Frank, he must confess that on the tendency his endeavours are not quite in agreement. 
Regarding the discussion of the real physical problems has Frank perhaps in the meantime read 
the last article of Einstein and his collaborators, to which Prof. Bohr has just written an answer, 
of which he encloses a copy, and hopes that Frank, although he is not quite satisfied with the 
mode of expression, will content to it. 
- 9 January 1936 Frank in Prague writes to Bohr: Prof. Frank has lately occupied himself in detail 
with the article of Prof. Bohr in the Physical Review “Vollständigkeit der quantenmechanischen 
Beschreibung”, and has given two lectures about the article of Einstein and that of Bohr. He 
writes quite a lot about this and other scientific questions. 
- 14 January 1936 Bohr writes to Frank: Prof. Bohr thanks for Frank’s two letters and was pleased 
to hear that Frank has occupied himself so thoroughly with works of Einstein and himself, and 
he thinks that Frank has quite understood his endeavours. Bohr writes a long letter about the 
scientific questions. He looks forward to see Prof. Frank in Copenhagen this summer and will 
speak with Jørgensen about the questions in Frank’s letter concerning the congress. Bohr has 
already written to Neurath about it. The named article of Jordan Bohr has not seen at all. 
- 1936 Frank in Prague writes to Bohr: Prof. Frank thanks for the kind interest which Prof. Bohr 
has shown in his brochure, which Prof. Jørgensen has shown him. Frank is quite convinced that 
they will agree in all the questions when they some time have the opportunity to speak 
thoroughly about them. Writes about scientific questions. 
- 27 May 1936 Bohr writes to Frank: Prof. Bohr is sorry that he has not been able to send the 
promised draft to his lecture at the Copenhagen congress about causality. He has been occupied 
with urgent duties and was thereafter somewhat overworked, so that he has not come rather far 
with lecture. He writes about the scientific questions, but hopes after Whitsuntide to be able to 
summarize his lecture and to send it to Frank. 
- 21 December 1936 Bohr to Frank: Prof. Bohr sends the manuscript of the lecture he had given in 
the last summer at the Congress in Copenhagen. As Mr Neurath is in USA ate present Prof. Bohr 
also in three weeks goes to America, he sends the manuscript to Prof. Frank asking him to take 
care that it is given in print as soon as possible, so that Prof. Bohr could see a proof before his 
departure. Mr Neurath has proposed that Prof. Bohr’s paper should be published as a special 
publication together with that of Prof. Frank and that of Schlick. But Prof. Bohr does not agree 
with his idea, but thinks it more reasonable that all the lectures are published in the “Erkenntnis”. 
- 26 January 1937 Niels Bohr’s secretary to Frank: A secretary of Prof. Bohr thanks for Prof. 
Frank’s letter which reached him before his departure, he was very happy that Prof. Frank agreed 
with him as regards the publication of the three letters. From the printers Meiner has come a 
proof, of which a copy, as promised is sent to Prof. Frank. Prof. Bohr has only made small 
alterations. 
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Bohr never proclaimed himself a “positivist”, as it is deducible also from a letter quoted 
in the footnote [5th July 1935] that Bohr sent to Frank. Bohr showed his disagreement 
on the discussion of the physical problems with Frank, in particular on EPR’s paradox.  
However, Bohr was invited to write an introductory statement titled “Analysis and 
Synthesis in Science” for the first volume of the International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science edited by Neurath and Jørgensen, in addition to Carnap, and he served on the 
Advisory Committee of the project. A photograph, taken during the conference, shows 
many of the participants sitting in the hall of Carlsberg’s honorary mansion where Niels 
Bohr at that time lived. Among the audience you find Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Carl 
Gustav Hempel (1905-1997) and Karl Popper (1902-1994), but also some of the more 
prominent Danish scientists and scholars whose world views were congenial with the 
logical positivists. In the foreground Jørgen Jørgensen (1894-1964) stands half turned 
towards the photographer, half turned towards the participants whom he is about to 
welcome. Jørgensen was the general secretary of the conference and had been, together 
                                                                                                                                               
- 4 June 1952 Frank in Boston writes to Bohr in Copenhagen: Frank recently studies with great 
interest Prof. Bohr’s discussions with Einstein about the epistemological problems of Quantum 
Theory. Frank is just writing a textbook on the philosophy of science in which he should like to 
discuss the foundations of quantum theory in a way which is a little mysterious as possible. 
Recently the Harvard University Press has planned to publish a series of books on the 
philosophy of the sciences each of which would treat a limited domain. Frank shall be editor of 
the series and the director of the Harvard University Press asked him to make a recommendation 
as to that books it would be wise to publish. He would like to ask Prof. Bohr whether he would 
be interested in the publication of a small book on the philosophical foundations of sub-atomic 
phenomena which would contain his views on the fundamental issues. If Bohr does not like to 
devote much time to it, Frank would try to find a scientist who could put Bohr’s paper together 
with some connecting text by Frank himself, and Bohr would be asked only to look it over and 
indicate what corrections he would like to make. 
- R.S. Cohen in Boston to Bohr (with one enclosure): “Since it is not likely that you can attend the 
dinner for Philipp Frank, may I suggest that a cablegram sent to him to arrive on May 25th at the 
Harvard University Faculty Club would give him great pleasure? 
- 24 may 1962 Bohr to R.S. Cohen in Cambridge (MA.), telegram: “On the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of Philipp Franks’s appointment to the chair of theoretical physics at the Charles 
University I take great pleasure to join his many other friends in conveying our admiration for a 
rich life work devoted to the elucidation of the foundations of science and its place in 
contemporary culture. 
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with Neurath, the primary motor behind the organization of the meeting in Copenhagen. 
Behind Jørgensen, to the right on the first row of seats, is Niels Bohr (1885-1962) 
sitting next to Philipp Frank (1884-1966).  Right behind Bohr is George de Hevesy 
(1885-1966), and again behind him, on the third row, you see Harald Bohr (1887-1951) 
professor of mathematics. On some of the other rows you find Alf Ross (1899-1962), a 
Danish philosopher of law, and Edgar Rubin (1886-1951). 
Many chairs in the first two rows are empty. This may due to the fact that several of the 
invited guests had difficulties getting to the opening of the conference because of the 
political situation in Germany and Austria. Philosophers like Moritz Schlick (1882-
1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), and Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) had all 
expressed their wishes to be in Copenhagen, but various reasons prohibited them from 
coming. Thus, Schlick had been denied a travel permit from Austria which turned out to 
be fatal. A mentally deranged student killed him at June 22 at the steps of the University 
of Vienna. The conference in Copenhagen received the message about Schlick’s death 
with horror. At that time Reichenbach was staying in Turkey as a refugee and could not 
afford the long journey to Denmark. And several of the most prominent members of the 
Circle had fled to America where Herbert Feigl (1902-1988) arrived in 1931 and Rudolf 
Carnap (1891-1970) in 1935 from Prague17.  
It is worth reminding Bohr’s introductory statement to the second volume of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: 
«Notwithstanding the admittedly practical necessity for most scientists to concentrate their efforts in 
special fields of research, science is, according to its aim of enlarging human understanding, essentially a 
                                                 
17
 Cf. FAYE, “Niels Bohr and the Vienna Circle”, in J. MANNINEN, F. STADLER (eds.), The Vienna Circle 
in the Nordic Countries (Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2009), 33-45, p. 33. 
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unity. Although periods of fruitful exploration of new domains of experience may often naturally be 
accompanied by a temporary renunciation of the comprehension of our situation, history of science 
teaches us again and again how the extension of our knowledge may lead to the recognition of relations 
between formerly unconnected groups of phenomena, the harmonious synthesis of which demands a 
renewed revision of the presuppositions for the unambiguous application of even our most elementary 
concepts. This circumstance reminds us not only of the unity of all sciences aiming at a description of the 
external world but above all, of the inseparability of epistemological and psychological analysis. It is just 
in the emphasis on this last point, which recent development in the most different fields of science has 
brought to the foreground, that the program of the present great undertaking distinguishes itself from that 
of previous encyclopaedic enterprises, in which stress was essentially laid on the completeness of the 
account of the actual state of knowledge rather than on the elucidation of scientific methodology. 
It is therefore to be hoped that the forthcoming Encyclopaedia will have a deep influence on the whole 
attitude of our generation which, in spite of the ever increasing specialization in science as well as in 
technology, has a growing feeling of the mutual dependency of all human activities. Above all, it may 
help us to realize that even in science any arbitrary restriction implies the danger of prejudices and that 
our only way of avoiding the extremes of materialism and mysticism is the never ending endeavour to 
balance analysis and synthesis»18. 
In this statement Bohr only apparently seems to outline the methodological manifesto 
for a neo-positivistic research program. In fact, while he shared with them that science’s 
goal is an essential unity that aims at the description of the external world, he also paid 
attention to the inseparability of epistemological and psychological analysis. Why did 
he emphasize this last point? Bohr’s stress on the relations between epistemology and 
psychology is nothing but a differentiation from the previous encyclopaedic enterprise 
that the logical positivists laid down. Bohr’s insistence on the balancing between 
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 BOHR, “Analysis and Synthesis in Science”, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 1938, 1: 
28. Italics are of the present author. 
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analysis and synthesis means that, for him, the intelligibility of the theory counts as 
much in science as the data of experience. 
The logical positivists or logical empiricists’ main purpose was the synthesis of all the 
elements that contributed to a program of making a philosophy scientific. They stated 
five basic goals. 
The first was the goal of eliminating the claim to legitimacy any form of knowledge that 
was neither empirical nor mathematical. According to the second goal, only those 
claims that could be verified on the basis of sensory perception were admissible. Third, 
they took theoretical physics to be the paragon of empirical knowledge. Fourth, all 
genuine knowledge should be unified into a single body of knowledge on the basis of a 
neutral observation language. Fifth, all practical issues (ethics, politics, aesthetics and so 
on) were to be considered as utilitarian matters to be decided on the basis of Bentham’s 
calculus of utility. The unity of science was taken in two different senses: as a logical 
unity and as an “encyclopaedic unity”. According to the first sense (Carnap), whatever 
discipline was to be considered derivable from physics. According to the second sense 
(Neurath), the unity of science was regarded as a commitment to sharing the results of 
scientific investigation both between scientists in different fields and between scientists 
generally and the public. 
As we have seen, Bohr’s concept of unity of knowledge differs from Carnap and 
Neurath’s. In particular, as Faye noted19, Bohr’s concept of unity was not grounded in a 
reductivist approach. Instead, he had the idea that holistic descriptions of an organism, a 
mind, or a culture was not reducible to any common physical-chemical description or 
any other low-level descriptions.  
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 FAYE, “Niels Bohr” (cit. note 17), p. 39. 
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Bohr met Neurath for the first time in 1934, two years before the Second Unity of 
Science Congress in Copenhagen, when Jorgen Jørgensen twice that year invited 
Neurath to Copenhagen. The first time was around April 6, and the second time from 
October 18-24. During the latter visit Neurath gave six lectures on issues concerning 
epistemology. In a letter to Rudolph Carnap on November 14, 1934, he tells Carnap that 
Bohr participated in two of the meetings. He describes the impressions Bohr had made 
on him as follows: 
«Bohr. Idiosyncratic. An intense Man. Came to two lectures and joined the discussion enthusiastically 
[…] Basic line: he does not want to be considered a metaphysician. And he is able to express himself 
relatively non-metaphysically, when he is careful. Yet obviously there lies a certain tendency in the 
selection of problems, insofar as the question of life, etc is discussed, as well as in the stress on 
uncertainty. In addition, his printed remarks are full of crass metaphysics. But he possesses certain basic 
attitudes which agree with mine, e.g., that in science one cannot clear up everything at once, but that the 
individual scientific-logical actions have to pay a price, as it were. An idea of compensation, which with 
him naturally tends to be connected with the uncertainty relation. Obviously tries to come into agreement 
with us. But since his circle confirms him in his habit to express himself somewhat unclearly, one would 
have to be able to work on him for a long time, which he would be prepared to do»20. 
According to some notable interpretations (Faye and Folse), it seems reasonable to 
assume that it was Bohr’s talk about the disturbance of the same object, which Neurath 
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 «[...] Also erst Kopenhagen [...] Bohr. Einzigartig. Intensiver Mensch. Kam zu zwei Vorträgen und 
diskutierte mit vollem Eifer. Und zwar Rede und Gegenrede. Es interessierte alle sehr -- ausserdem 
diskutierte man des Nachts wieder. Grundzug: Er möchte nicht als Metaphysiker eingeschätzt werden. 
Und er kann, wenn er vorsichtig ist, sich relativ metaphysikfrei ausdrücken. Aber offensichtlich liegt in 
der Auswahl der Probleme, soweit die Frage des Lebens usw. erörtert wird, und die Betonung der 
Unbestimmtheit eine Tendenz. Überdies sind die gedruckten Ausführungen voll derber Metaphysik. Aber 
er hat gewisse Grundeinstellungen, die sich mit  meinen berühren, z. B. dass man nicht alles gleichzeitig 
wissenschaftlich aufhellen könne, sondern dass die einzelnen wissenschaftlich-logischen Aktionen 
sozusagen einen Preis zahlen müssen. Eine ‘Kompensations’-Vorstellung, die jetzt natürlich bei ihm 
tendiert sich mit der Unschärferelation zu verbinden. Offenbar bemüht mit uns in Einklang zu kommen. 
Aber, da sein Zirkel ihn in seiner etwas unbestimmten Art sich zu äussern bestärkt, müsste man ihn lang 
bearbeiten können, wozu er sich bereit finden würde.” Letter from Neurath to R. Carnap, November 14, 
1934, RC-029-10-10, University of Pittsburgh. From FAYE, “Niels Bohr” (cit. note 17) p. 34. 
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did not like. Such a way of expressing the matter makes it sound as if the object, 
considered as a thing-in-itself, has some properties which it possesses independently of 
interaction, but which it is not able to show when it appears as a thing-for-us- or a 
phenomenon. It is very likely that Bohr and Neurath discussed about these issues, as 
well as it was just this impression, apparently, which Einstein had received through his 
conversations with Bohr and by reading his papers, and he therefore thought that Bohr’s 
interpretation attempted to cloak an incomplete description of these things-in-
themselves.  
In truth, Bohr sustained that phenomena involve things and there is mutuality between 
observable and observer in the whole process of observation. This is what Einstein 
probably could not accept. Weizsäcker underlined this point as evidence against the 
“charge” of positivist addressed to Bohr: 
«The fact that classical physics breaks down on the quantum level means that we cannot describe atoms 
as “little things”. This does not seem to be very far from Mach’s view that we should not invent “things” 
behind the phenomena. But Bohr differs from Mach in maintaining that “phenomena” are always 
“phenomena involving things”, because otherwise the phenomena would not admit of the objectification 
without which there can be no science of them. For Bohr, the true role of things is that they are not 
“behind” but “in” the phenomena»21.  
Furthermore, Heisenberg recalled Bohr commenting on positivism in 1952 as follows: 
«I can readily agree with the positivists about the things they want, but not about the things they reject 
[…] Positivist insistence on conceptual clarity is, of course, something I fully endorse, but their 
prohibition of any discussion of the wider issues, simply because we lack clear-cut enough concepts in 
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 CARL F. V. WEIZSÄCKER, The Unity of Nature (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1980), p. 185. 
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this realm, does not seem very useful to me – this same ban would prevent our understanding of quantum 
theory»22. 
In fact, Bohr justified the complementary application of otherwise contradictory 
concepts for an exhaustive account of observations at the quantum level. 
As John Honner noted23, it is clear that Bohr cannot be numbered among the 
phenomenalists. In fact, the theoretical framework of complementarity is as essential for 
Bohr as whatever experiential content we may order through it. Moreover, 
complementarity entails at best a very critical phenomenalism, since it insists that one 
set of experiential data is insufficient for a proper account of experience. Similarly, 
Bohr’s account of symbols and visualizables runs counter to reductionist versions of 
positivism. According to this view, theoretical terms have no meaning of their own 
except in so far as they are reduced to observables. While Bohr agrees that descriptive 
terms only acquire their meaning from macroscopic circumstances, he also allows for 
the possibility of using such terms as “abstractions” and symbols. 
Furthermore, according to the instrumentalist refinement of positivism, scientific 
theories do not either explain or describe reality, but merely offer a means of predicting 
results. Bohr’s probabilist interpretation of quantum calculations indicates a measure of 
agreement with the instrumentalist position, but he would not accept the irreconcilable 
separation of theory and reality which instrumentalist implies. 
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 Cf. HONNER, The Description of Nature (cit. note 40, ch. 3), p. 173. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Harald Høffding’s Theory of Knowledge 
 
5.1 The Philosophy of Harald Høffding 
  
The early nineties reached the climax of a debate that arose in Denmark at the end of 
seventies about the historical significance of the cultural relationship between one of the 
founders of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr and his mentor and teacher of philosophy, 
Harald Høffding. 
The debate was not only a historiographical dispute about Niels Bohr’s history and life, 
but also a way to show how philosophical influences, and more in general external 
factors, may shape the scientist’s outlook on the world and consequently the approach 
to his field of studies. 
While Jan Faye argued that Bohr was strongly influenced by Høffding in his work on 
the interpretation of quantum mechanics, David Favrholdt criticized his conclusions. 
Favrholdt admitted Bohr’s cultural debt towards authors such as Poul Martin Møller and 
Hans Christian Ørsted, but he was not inclined to accept Høffding’s influence on Bohr. 
In more general terms, it is my view that Harald Høffding contributed to the creation of 
Bohr’s Weltanschauung, in the light of which his revolutionary scientific research 
program developed. Moreover, it will be shown that Høffding’s philosophy, known as 
critical monism, is hinged on the concepts of unity and continuity, which also represent 
the cornerstone of the idealistic interpretation of Niels Bohr’s philosophy. 
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This chapter is an attempt to provide an overview on Harald Høffding’s thought and 
philosophy.  
Harald Høffding (1843-1931) enrolled at the University in 1861 and he chose theology 
for his subject. He attended the lectures of Frederik Christian Sibbern (1785-1872) on 
logic and psychology and those of Rasmus Nielsen (1809-1883) on a general 
introduction to philosophy. After taking the examination in philosophy in 1862 
Høffding sustained his interest in the subject by attending lectures given by Rasmus 
Nielsen and Hans Brøchner (1820-1875), who was his third teacher of philosophy and 
who succeeded Sibbern as professor in 1870. 
The philosophy of Sibbern was formed in the main by his attitude toward and criticism 
of Hegel’s philosophy. Sibbern aimed at developing a metaphysics, which was an 
alternative to that of Hegel both with respect to his philosophy of nature and his 
psychology. He rejected Hegel’s idea that existence is identical with the absolute spirit. 
In psychology Sibbern’s approach was that of seeing the mind as a totality. Classifying 
mental capacities under the heads of cognition, emotion and will, he believed that mind 
and body were separate effects of one and the same cause. The tripartition of the mind 
and the view of mind and body as two aspects of the same substance or process, at that 
time called the identity hypothesis, were theories Sibbern had passed onto him by his 
teacher Niels Treschow (1751-1833), who had acquired these ideas from Kant and 
Spinoza, respectively. Treschow had regarded the will as the most fundamental and 
original of the three. He had also posited a principle of personality which stated, 
contrary to the ideas of British empiricists, that the mind consists of a nucleus which 
figures in the laws of association. Each person has to be regarded as a unity, according 
to Treschow, a view we encounter in Høffding’s thought. 
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In 1880 Harald Høffding was appointed reader at the University of Copenhagen and 
three years later he was elected as professor of philosophy. Kierkegaard’s thought had a 
great influence on Harald Høffding in a very critical period of his life, when as a student 
he underwent a religious crisis. After a hard struggle he agreed with Kierkegaard that 
the compatibility of science and faith was an illusion as it was not possible to harmonize 
the demands on the individual made by Christianity with a life moulded by family and 
state, art and science1.  
Høffding wrote in his Memoirs:  
«The study of Kierkegaard introduced me to an idea which subsequent philosophical studies led me to 
amplify and give particular application. This was the notion that the formal feature of the life of the mind 
is to be found in the unitary and convergent aspects of its synthesizing of experience. And that the 
measure of an intellectual life resides in the relation between the compass of its content and the dynamism 
with which this is brought into focus»2. 
By the middle of 1870s Høffding reached a position, which he characterized both as 
critical positivism and as critical monism. This position supplied him with a philosophy, 
which could fill in the gaps between science, art and religion. In 1874 he gave a lecture 
as regards the philosophical problems as he saw them at the time. The lecture is a 
philosophical manifesto for Høffding’s future work. He focused on four issues: 1) the 
problem of mind (the psychological problem). 2) The problem of knowledge (the 
logical problem). 3) The problem of existence (the cosmological or metaphysical 
problem). 4) The problem of evaluation (the ethical-religious problem). 
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 FAYE, Niels Bohr (cit. note 27, ch. 1), p. 5. 
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 HØFFDING, Erindringer (Mémoires), (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel-Nordisk Forlag, 1928), p. 
51. 
 125 
Høffding deemed that these four problems were the same aspect of one, which he 
identified as the relation between unity and plurality, connection and singularity, or 
between continuity and discontinuity. This conception derives from Kierkegaard’s 
principle of personality and the tradition of Comte and Spencer. Kierkegaard 
characterizes the mind as unification of experience and emotion, whilst for Comte and 
Spencer the nature of mental process is that of aiming at synthesis. Cognition tends to 
harmonize the maximum number of phenomena with respect to a certain principle or 
theory. Ethics aims to create a stable personality in harmony with the demands of 
common good3. 
From 1875 to 1887 Høffding worked on psychology and ethics, from 1887 to 1895 on 
the history of philosophy, and after 1895 on the philosophy of religion and 
epistemology. Psychology was the first fundamental problem to which he applied 
himself from 1875 to 1882, when he published a survey of psychology entitled 
Psykologi i Omrids på Grundlag af Erfaringen (An Outline of Psychology on the Basis 
of Experience). It was translated in the course of the following years into German, 
French and English.  
It is worth noticing that even though Høffding based his exposition on experience he 
was very critical of the use of the experimental methods in psychology, holding that the 
experimental set-up intrudes too much upon the subject of investigation. Moreover, 
Høffding regarded associationist psychology with scepticism, opposing, for instance, 
any attempt to reduce associations of similarity to association by contiguity. He 
anticipated, maintaining this view, Gestalt psychology. In his “law of relation” he stated 
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that every element and every state of the mind is determined by the connections into 
which it enters together with other elements or states of the mind. 
In the same year of the Outlines’ publication he spoke in “Studentersamfundet”, the 
newly founded society of students, giving a talk entitled “Om Realisme i Videnskab og 
Tro” (On Realism in Science and Faith), which was later published in the collection 
Mindre Arbejder (Minor Works), part I. Here Høffding seems to embrace realism, 
which he defined as the principle of natural causes. Such a realism always deduces 
certain phenomena of nature from other phenomena of nature, the more complex 
phenomena from the more simple. Realism in this sense claims “that true knowledge 
does not consist of accumulated experience but is insight into the interrelationships 
between experiences”. This assumption brings realism closer to idealism, according to 
Høffding, since one of the essential ideas behind idealism is that we must not accept 
phenomena as single, isolated facts but that we have to find a bond which brings 
connectedness and unity. 
Høffding’s second main work, Etik. En Fremstilling af de etiske Principper og deres 
Anvendelse paa de vigtigste Livsforhold (Ethics. An exposition of the ethical principles 
and their application to the chief circumstances of life), was published in 1887. 
Between the years 1887-1895 Høffding carried on the studies of the history of 
philosophy. His main work is Den nyere Filosofis Historie. En fremstilling af 
Filosofiens Historie fra Renaissancens Slutning til vore Dage (A history of modern 
philosophy. A sketch of the history of philosophy from the close of the Renaissance to 
our own day), which was published in two volumes in 1894-1895. 
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From 1895 onwards Høffding devoted himself to the philosophy of religion and 
epistemology. His most important book on religion, Religionsfilosofi (The philosophy 
or religion), was published in 1901. 
In 1902 Høffding was elected vice-chancellor for the following year at the University of 
Copenhagen. In the same year he published his first major work on epistemology, 
Filosofiske Problemer (The problems of philosophy). 
Høffding’s last major work was Den menneskelige Tanke, dens Former and dens 
Opgaver (Human Thought, Its Forms and Its Tasks), published in 1910. 
Høffding attempted to create unity and harmony between opposing views and this 
position was a reflection of his own personality and character. Moreover, Høffding 
distinguished himself not much for the originality of his ideas, but rather for the 
eclecticism of his philosophy and for his personal interests in all kinds of philosophical 
problems. As a result Høffding contributed to the consolidation of philosophy as a 
discipline among Danish scholars and scientists. 
5.2 The Centrality of Unity and Continuity in Høffding’s Theory of 
Knowledge 
According to Høffding’s account that arises from The Problems of Philosophy of 1902, 
there is an intimate connection between personal life and scientific inquiry. This 
connection appears more clearly as we approach the problems of human knowledge, i.e. 
the problems of philosophy.  
The purpose to investigate things is pursuable through “the striving after consistency 
with one’s self under all one’s manifold and changing experiences”4. 
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As the theory of knowledge pertains to the validity of our understanding, here arises the 
problem of the relation between continuity and discontinuity. Høffding noted that what 
we understand depends not only on the constitution of phenomena, but also on our 
intellectual organization: 
«There is a certain type for all principles and hypotheses, which finally refers back to the innermost 
nature of consciousness, and here, once more, one comes back to the necessity of unity and continuity»5. 
By unity and continuity Høffding means something like the connectedness of 
phenomena in forming a unified conception of nature as a whole. 
As Kant had shown, all categories can be traced back to the need of unity and 
continuity. All fundamentals doctrines of natural sciences and logical principles hinge 
on such a concept.  
That demand for unity may have answer in many ways: the only necessary requirement 
is that the assumptions, which the understanding of the datum calls for, shall be in 
harmony with the general laws of conscious life. 
Professor David Favrholdt pointed out to me that Niels Bohr’s conception of nature, i.e. 
his conception of subatomic phenomena was characterized by discontinuity, because of 
the quantum leaps, rather then continuity. Therefore, the alleged philosophical similarity 
between Bohr and Høffding could not hold water. 
As I see it, we are facing a double level of analysis: on the one hand, an essential aspect 
of quantum theory is discontinuity or rupture and it pertains to the very “physical level” 
of analysis. In fact, quantum postulates express an essential discontinuity, or rather 
individuality, foreign to the classical theories and symbolized by Planck’s quantum of 
                                                 
5
 Ibidem, p. 74. 
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action. On the other hand, Høffding was dealing with the general problem of human 
knowledge, which depends on our faculty to grasp the interconnections of phenomena 
in a unified conception of the whole. This is what Høffding meant when he treated the 
concept of unity and continuity.  
Hence, I am convinced that the principle of unity (and continuity), according to the 
second, gnoseological, level of analysis, is consistent with Bohr’s decision to carry on 
his program in spite of the contradictions with the classical physics in the attempt to 
reach a unity behind the diversities. At this stage (1912-13), such a concept inspired 
more Bohr’s method of scientific inquiry rather then his conception of subatomic 
phenomena. A similar interpretation of Bohr’s program was proposed some years ago. 
Ulrich Röseberg noted that if we assume that the physical description of the world of 
atoms and molecules cannot be based on Newtonian mechanics and Maxwellian 
electrodynamics, we need a new mechanics and a new electrodynamics. It entails that 
we will try to find the new theories (quantum physics) by using the well known ones 
(classical physics) so long as possible. In the meantime we will make only the minimum 
assumptions, which cannot be formulated in agreement with those theories. According 
to this interpretation, the philosophy behind Bohr’s research program can be 
characterized in terms of Høffding’s as a philosophy of continuity6. Furthermore, the 
way in which Bohr used the classical physics and the idea of some correspondence 
relation with the new ones expresses the concept of continuity.  
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 Cf. RÖSEBERG, “Hidden Historicity” (cit. note 9, ch. 4), p. 331. 
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Bohr himself in 1929 wrote that the correspondence principle is “our endeavours to 
utilize all the classical concepts by giving them a suitable quantum-theoretical re-
interpretation”7.  
Röseberg stressed the concept of continuity without paying enough attention to the fact 
that, according to Høffding, continuity is the condition to get the unity of human 
knowledge.  
The forms of perception and the categories of cognition together form the requirement 
of continuity. As a matter of fact, one of the main themes in Høffding’s philosophy was 
a dualism of continuity and discontinuity, which he claimed underlies every 
philosophical problem. In his A History of Modern Philosophy, when writing about 
Kant, Høffding gave a characterization of the law of continuity: 
«The law of continuity (which includes within both the laws of continuity of space and degree and the 
law of the causal relations of all phenomena) is valid for all phenomena, because it formulates the general 
conditions under which we can have real experience (as distinguished from imagination). […] Only as a 
condition of experience has the law of continuity (including the causal law) validity»8. 
Høffding criticized Kant for making a sharp demarcation between the forms of intuition, 
the categories of understanding and the ideas of reason, affirming that 
«[…] continuity, causality, time and space – as conceived by Kant – possess an ideal perfection to which 
there is no corresponding experience. Continuity is an idea to which experience only gives us 
approximations. What Kant calls forms are, as a matter of fact, abstractions and ideals which, in 
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 BOHR, “Introductory Survey” (cit. note 1, ch. 1), p. 8.  
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 HØFFDING, Den nyere Filosofis Historie. En fremstilling af Filosofiens Historie fra Renaissancens 
Slutning til vore Dage (Copenhagen: Det Nordisk Forlag, 1894-95), translated from the German edition 
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accordance with the nature of our knowledge, we set up and use as measures and rules for our inquiries»9. 
Moreover, Høffding appeared to anticipate Bohr’s conception of quantum of action 
when he gave a definition for the items, or phenomena, which are ordered 
spontaneously in and for our mind in intuition. Just here one can attain a form of 
wholeness in intuition. In other words, the phenomena are things or events, physical or 
mental, which are experienced as immediately given wholes.  
Such a whole forms the content of perception in Høffding’s view.  
Considering the relation between the categories of cognition and such items, Høffding 
came to regard truth not as a correspondence between certain ideas on the items in the 
external world and these items themselves.  
«Truth cannot be defined as the agreement of our thoughts with reality. We only have knowledge of 
reality through continual efforts to make the items conform to our forms of thought. Reality, the truth of 
the items, already consists in practice, for the sound human intellect, in a close connection between as 
many accurately comprehended items as possible»10. 
He rather figured the truth, i.e. the validity of knowledge, as the greatest possible degree 
of unity among our representations and the external world in a dynamical and mutually 
shaping relation. 
In his lecture at the Jowett Society in Oxford on November 26, 1904, he expressed his 
thought on the concept of truth as follows: 
«The right to establish something as a principle is founded on the claim that it leads to the recognition of 
a connection between our observations which would otherwise be obscure and sporadic. The truth of 
principles, then, does not consist in their conformity to an absolute order of things: - an order of things we 
                                                 
9
 Ibidem, p. 58. 
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 HØFFDING, Den menneskelige Tanke, dens Former og dens Opgaver (Human Thought, Its Forms and 
Its Tasks), (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1910), p. 132. 
132 
do not know of before findings – with the help of these principles – a connection between our 
observations.  We ourselves produce the truth, when we find the principles, which can connect items to 
the greatest extent and to highest degree. A critical or dynamical concept of truth is in the making, 
opposed to the dogmatic concept of truth, which can be designated as static, since it presupposes a given 
quiescent order of things which is then to be produced in thought. This is nothing new for the 
philosopher. Critical philosophy had already postulated a dynamical concept of truth, when it pointed out 
that objective validity consists in the lawful connection of our observations»11. 
By the term “critical philosophy” Høffding refers to Kantian doctrine. Nevertheless, as 
we have seen in Bohr’s conception, Høffding started from a Kantian postulation to 
arriving at a criterion of reality as the greatest lawful connections between our 
impressions and our ideas, or as “the constant connection between our observations”. 
Høffding’s concept of truth is termed as “dynamical” as it emerges from the activity of 
the intellect that would never be able to reach a point at which our cognition of the 
items and the items themselves could be compared. As the same Bohr would later agree 
because of the element of unity introduced by the quantum of action, foreign to the 
classical description, whose character of indivisibility is established only insofar as the 
classical concepts are applied in the description of atomic phenomena. In the lecture 
given at Harvard University, when he visited William James in 1904, Høffding stated: 
«At the present time there is a growing consensus that the significance of scientific and philosophical 
principles consists in the guidance they give us in our striving towards understanding. Their truth is their 
validity, and their validity is experienced through their capacity to guide us in our intellectual endeavour. 
A principle is true if it can be used, that is, if we can work with it to gain knowledge with its aid»12. 
In other words, Høffding regarded the usefulness of scientific principles and theories as 
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 ID., “On Analogy and Its Philosophical Importance”, Mind, 1905, 14: 199-209, p. 199. 
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 ID., “En filosofisk Bekendelse”, in Mindre Arbejder III (Copenhagen: Det Nordisk Forlag, 1913), p. 
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the ultimate criterion of their validity. Their usefulness is revealed by their capacity to 
bring together as many phenomena as possible in an invariant way. Moreover, he 
seemed to have found the right balance between the truth-as-coherence and truth-as-
usefulness. In fact, Høffding was able to combine the idea of the truth of individual 
statements with a pragmatic theory of truth. If for the former theory we produce truth 
when we coherently unite as many as individual statements as possible, at the same 
time, for the latter we produce truth whether the principles are scientifically fruitful.  
One of the main points in common between Høffding, idealism, and Bohr’s conception 
of nature is the so-called criterion of reality. Such a criterion consists in the “lawlike 
connection” between our observations, which can only be demonstrated if it can be 
established that there exists a causal connection. The problem emerges as Høffding 
sometimes refers the concept of “lawful connections” to the nomological laws of a 
theory, and sometimes to the laws of nature themselves. Nevertheless, Høffding thought 
that causality is reflected in consciousness as a real unity and there it creates uniformity 
and continuity between apparently diverse phenomena. The point is not the concept of 
causality, but rather that Høffding might have conceived a concept whose existence is 
real and it emerges from the phenomena of nature with the aim to grasp unity among 
them.  
Høffding makes a distinction between the concept of causality and the principle of 
causality. 
The concept of causality is intimately connected with the intrinsic functioning of the 
mind and it expresses its search for connectedness and unity by relating impressions and 
ideas. In particular, the concept of causality imparts to the knowing subject a form of 
thought, which, combined with other concepts dealing with the items existing for 
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consciousness, gives rise to a stable and continuous connection between observations, 
and this connection constitutes the criterion of reality.  
On the other hand, the principle of causality (“that everything has its cause”) concerns 
the universal applicability of the concept of causality and is thus the intellectual 
expression of the need for continuity. Nevertheless, the principle of causality has not a 
universal applicability because it is causality as a concept the criterion for what is real.  
In the previous chapters I have shown how Bohr’s conception of subject/object 
interaction is consistent with an idealistic and holistic view. As it is evident, we can find 
such features of holism also in Høffding’s philosophy. As a matter of fact, Høffding 
rejected a representational theory of knowledge, as he claimed that the nature of reality 
is determined by the entire theoretical description of our immediate experience at any 
given time. Moreover, since his The Problems of Philosophy of 1902, is worth 
reminding Høffding’s stress on an irrational relation that permanently persists between 
the concepts created by our consciousness and reality itself.  
In other words, Høffding was aware of the gap between our experience and the ideal of 
cognition, which is not able to achieve the universal unity and connectedness of all 
items. This is to say that there are some individual items, which fail to fall within a 
causal description of relations between the whole and its parts so that the condition of 
continuity is no more guaranteed. But Høffding succeeded also in overcoming this 
difficulty thanks to his conception of nature and knowledge that reveals both epistemic 
and metaphysical elements of holism. 
Professor Faye shed light on an unnoticed dualism as regards the concept of unity in the 
light of Høffding’s holistic account that emerges from his work of 1917, Totalitet som 
Kategori. 
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Faye argued that Høffding distinguished two different applications of the concept of 
wholeness. 
1. The concept finds a use when the conception of a unity is regarded as the aim of 
science, in virtue of its search for interconnections between different series of 
causal connections. After the process of reflection has separated the immediately 
given, i.e. the items or the phenomena, into their various elements, it synthesizes 
them once more into new wholes, which until then may have been 
unapprehended.  This happens every time reflection brings about the 
subsumption of the elements into lawful connections or by articulating universal 
laws, which may explain singular causal connections. Thus, new items will 
continually present themselves to thought, creating new task for the cognitive 
faculty. It is a process which will never come to an end, for what has hitherto 
been synthesized with new elements. In this context we are using the concept of 
whole as an idea in the Kantian sense of the world. Høffding holds that this 
sense is not applicable to what exist in intuition or perception or what can be 
grasped with any finality in thought. Nevertheless, the concept of totality in this 
sense is a borderline concept. This may not merely be characterized as a specific 
category or form of thought but as a feature, which belongs to each of our 
categories of cognition or forms of thought. 
2. The other use of the concept of whole applies to what exists in intuition as 
immediately given items. In that case it is not the work of reflection, which 
produces the idea of wholeness, but certain items themselves which invariably 
appear to us as immediately given wholes prior to any work of reflection. 
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Høffding believes that we do find reference to such items in the field of 
psychology, biology and sociology13. 
Returning to Bohr, I would like to call attention to the double meaning that he himself 
ascribed to the concept of unity. In particular, on the one hand is worth reminding 
Bohr’s belief in the unity and harmony of nature as a condition for objective 
knowledge: it could be compared to Høffding’s concept of causality, which was 
regarded as a unity among apparently diverse empirical items. This pertains also to the 
aim of science as explained above at point 1, and it exerts a heuristic value. 
On the other hand, as we have already noticed, like Høffding, Bohr spoke of unity as 
wholeness or atomicity of an objectively given item, i.e. the quantum of action, 
perceived by an observing subject. Such a meaning is strictly related to Bohr’s 
conception of subatomic phenomena as it has been already shown on chapter 3. 
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 FAYE, Niels Bohr (cit. note 27, ch. 1), p. 91. 
 137 
 
Chapter 6  
 
Niels Bohr’s Cultural Milieu  
 
6.1 Niels Bohr’s Family and the Years of His Youth 
Niels Bohr descends from a family of a high intellectual standing. He was also a fourth 
generation university man. Peter Georg Bohr (1776-1847), Niels Bohr’s great-grand-
father, was first a teacher at the Grammar School in Elsinore and later at the Grammar 
School in Nakskov. In 1818 he was appointed head-master of the Grammar School in 
Rønne. He also became candidatus theologiae and wrote some essays on history, a 
Latin textbook and some occasional poems. His son, Henrik Georg Christian Bohr 
(1813-1880), became candidatus theologiae in 1837 and in 1844 headmaster of the von 
Westen Institute in Copenhagen, a private Grammar School. After his retirement in 
1844, he was appointed professor in Copenhagen1. Furthermore, Niels Bohr’s father, 
Christian, was professor of physiology at the University of Copenhagen. Christian 
distinguished himself for his scientific achievements and was one of the pillars of 
intellectual and cultural life in Copenhagen at the turn of twentieth century. Moreover, 
he founded the Akademisk Boldklub, the university football club, and thus contributed 
to spread football as the national sport of Denmark. In 1880 he obtained the doctoral 
degree and after some years as an assistant professor he became professor of physiology 
in 1890. 
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In politics he was a liberal in his view: in 1884’s parliamentary elections he supported a 
liberal candidate instead of the conservative, his maternal uncle, Christian Rimestad. He 
also strongly advocated equality for women. Christian Bohr married Ellen Adler (1860-
1930) in 1881.  
Ellen Adler was the daughter of D. B. Adler, a banker and a financier who had founded 
the Commercial Bank of Copenhagen and been an initiator of the Jutland Provincial 
Credit Association. He was interested in politics and been elected to parliament as a 
member of the National Liberal Party2. Christian and Ellen lived at first in the Adler 
town house, 14 Ved Stranden, next to Christianborg Palace, the seat of the Danish 
Government. Here in the heart of Copenhagen the Bohrs’ first child, a daughter Jenny 
was born, and on October 7, 1885, their first son Niels Henrik David, and two years 
later their second son Harald. At the side of Christian Bohr Ellen became the centre of 
the constantly growing circle of intellectuals who were guests in their lovely home in 
the old surgical academy in Bredgade, where the Bohrs moved in and took up the 
residence when Christian became professor of physiology, as did all Danish professors 
in order to stay in a house adjacent to their own laboratory and classrooms3. At the time 
of Ellen’s death, Niels Bohr’s close friend from his childhood, Ole Chievitz, later 
professor of surgery at the University of Copenhagen, described her as follows: 
«And Ellen Bohr’s lovable personality cast its warm glow over everything, for this was the essence of her 
nature. It was so great that I can imagine that people who met her for the first time through it must be an 
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 Cf. ROZENTAL, “Childhood and Youth”, in Niels Bohr, His Life (cit. note 2, ch. 4), pp. 12-13. 
3
 Cf. RUTH MOORE, Niels Bohr: The Man, His Science, and the World They Changed (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1966), p.8. 
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affectation; but one did not have to be with her many times to discover that like everything else about 
Ellen Bohr it was genuine, honest and strong. It was an unselfishness second to none […]»4. 
At the age of seven, the age at which all Danish children entered school, Niels went to 
the Gammelholm School. At the time, school was disciplined and formal, as Niels 
Bohr’s class was still subjected to the old “Education Act” that was replaced only in 
1903. Notwithstanding the educational severity, school presented no problem for the 
young Niels, who could also benefit from his father’s teaching and education. It is 
beyond doubt that Niels and Harald Bohr grew up in a home that was distinguished in 
outlook, humanity and of course in intellectual qualities. Christian Bohr took care of his 
children’s education and wanted to make certain that they appreciated the beauties of 
nature. He recalled an episode in one of their walks they were used to make. He called 
Harald and Niels’ attention to a tree-see how beautifully the trunk divides into branches 
and the branches into twigs and how the leaves bud at the end of the twigs. Niels listed 
intently and answered: “Yes, but if it weren’t like that it wouldn’t be a tree”5.  
Harald Bohr was generally regarded as the brighter of the two boys, but Niels was “the 
special one of the family”, as Christian expressed it, and from his earliest youth Harald 
agreed with this.  
Harald became an almost internationally famous among mathematician as Niels was 
among physicists. However, through the reminiscences from Niels’ childhood emerges 
like a leitmotiv the inseparability between the two brothers.    
Returning to Professor Christian Bohr, he was also a disciple of Goethe and could recite 
whole sections of Faust from memory. Niels, as he walked at his father’s side or sat at 
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140 
his feet on long winter evenings, learned Goethe almost by absorption. To only a 
slightly lesser degree, Professor Bohr admired Shakespeare and Dickens and frequently 
gathered the children around him to hear these authors6.  
The children also had the opportunity of an early exposure to the best scientific and 
philosophical thought of Denmark. As a member of the Royal Danish Academy of 
Sciences and Letters, Professor Bohr, together with the professors Harald Høffding and 
Christian Christiansen, later Niels’ teacher in physics at the University, formed the habit 
of stopping at a café to continue the discussions of the meeting or to discuss their own 
deep interest in the relation to science to life. As the first meetings take place in cafes, 
the three professors soon decided to shift to their homes for dinner every other Friday 
night. It was when the famous philologist Vilhelm Thomsen joined the trio. Harald 
Høffding mentioned these meetings in his Memoirs: 
«Now at some point in the period I have been talking about [around 1893] regular gatherings began to 
take place which I have taken and still take great pleasure in. It all started through my habit of joining the 
physiologist Christian Bohr after the meetings in the Royal Academy, often continuing my conversation 
with him in a café where we had supper. I had already been in touch with Bohr earlier, who at that time 
had learned that I was working on a treatise on psychology in which I intended to incorporate as many 
physiological views and results as possible. He offered his assistance by reading the relevant part. These 
evening visits which were thus initiated were followed by many more. In his and his wife’s beautiful 
home in the stately residence of the professor of physiology I have spent many interesting and enjoyable 
evenings. Being a follower of the Leipzig scientist Ludwig, Bohr belonged as a physiologist to the 
movement which strongly insists on physical-chemical methods in physiology. […] Before long the 
physicist Christiansen was also one of the party at our café life, and so it was that we in turn went back to 
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the home of one of us those Friday evenings when meetings in the Academy were held. Furthermore we 
gained a fourth member in person of the famous linguist Vilhelm Thomsen»7. 
The gatherings began to take place around 18938, when Niels Bohr was eight years old. 
In his commemorative speech on Høffding, in 1931, Bohr junior mentioned those 
evening’s meetings at Bohrs’ home, when he and his brother Harald were given the 
opportunity to participate in as listeners: 
«My first recollections of Høffding stem from some evening gatherings – described by himself in his 
Memoirs – when a small circle of scientists about a generation ago met regularly in each other’s homes to 
discuss all kinds of questions which had caught their interest. The other members of this circle were close 
friends of Høffding’s from their student years together, Christian Christiansen and Vilhelm Thomsen, 
plus my father who was a good deal younger, but whose friendship for Høffding over the years increased 
in intimacy. From the time that we were old enough to profit from listening to conversations and until 
these gatherings in our home came to an end upon the early death of my father, we children were allowed 
to be present when the meetings were held at our house, and they left us with some of our earliest and 
deepest impressions. During the discussions, which were often very lively, Christiansen especially would 
tease Høffding in his typically good-natured way about philosophy’s general aloofness from the world; 
but like everyone else present he was well aware of exactly to what extent Høffding’s ability to 
understand and the impetus he had towards forming a general synthesis of differing points of view was, 
so to put it, the nourishing soil from which the ideas of the others sprouted, though marked by their 
diverse academic backgrounds and views of life»9. 
It seems that Christian Bohr continued to take part in these meetings until he died, in 
1911. From the last quotation we also get the impression that Høffding occupied a 
leading role in directing the discussions. 
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A second allusion to these meetings is to be found in Niels Bohr’s paper, “Physical 
Science and the Problem of Life”, written in 1957. In this paper he dealt with the 
complementarity of mechanical and teleological considerations in biology. 
«I have quoted these remarks which express the attitude in the circle in which I grew up and to whose 
discussions I listed in my youth, because they offer a suitable starting point for the investigation of the 
place of living organisms in the description of nature»10. 
The quote Bohr refers to in the passage above was of his father’s paper, published in the 
Festschrift of the University of Copenhagen. According to the previous quotation, the 
group used to debate mechanism and vitalism in biology. It is also worth remarking that 
Høffding believed that biological organisms possess individuality or a wholeness, which 
could not be explained by reducing this totality to the sum of all its elements. 
Høffding considered biology to be another field of science where the object is 
experienced as a whole, as can be deduced from his essay published in 1925, “The 
Theory of Knowledge and Apprehension of Life” concerning the problem of description 
in biology: 
«From the aspect of epistemology, in my opinion, the matter is such that no limit can be set once and for 
all to the use of physical and chemical points of view in the organic field, but then such an application 
cannot in fact be carried out. The problem of the relation of an organic whole to its conditions, to the 
individual processes, on whose collaboration the life of the whole exists, can neither be solved by 
proclaiming mechanism as the solution to all riddles, nor by letting the whole “itself” intervene as a deus 
ex machina»11. 
                                                 
10
 ID., “Physical Sciences and the Problem of Life”, in Atomic Physics (cit. note 43, ch. 1), 94-101, p. 96. 
Reprinted in The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, 2 (cit. note 46, ch. 3), 94-101. 
11
 HØFFDING, “Erkendelsesteori og Livsopfattelse” (The Theory of Knowledge and Apprehension of 
Life), Det Kgl. Danske Vid. Selsk. Filosofiske Meddelelser II, 1925, 1, p. 3. Cf. FAYE, Niels Bohr (cit. 
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Even though from the historical sources it is difficult to say exactly who influenced 
who, a conceptual symmetry is perceivable between Bohr senior and Høffding 
respective positions on biology.  
6.2 The Biological Conceptions 
Christian Bohr’s untimely death at the age of 56, in 1911, was a great loss for the 
Danish intellectual community. Høffding gave a commemorative speech, which was 
published in the journal Tilskueren (The Spectator): 
«This man was carried off while at the height of his powers. Shattering and overwhelming was the news 
of his death. It was a happy death, indeed; he had just returned from work and went to the bed which was 
within a few hours to become his deathbed. To fall asleep in this way after a day’s work is what many 
people could wish for. But in this case the words of the poet hold no value, “He fell asleep like the sun 
sets in fall”. For it was not fall, not autumn, for him yet. He was not yet one of the veterans. He was as yet 
in the summer of life, still displaying in the searching ingenuity of his mind and the energy present in all 
his labour that he was first in rank among Danish scientists and with many years of fruitful work in 
prospect. If it has fallen to my lot to speak here, it is not because I was a fellow-worker in his field. But I 
have followed the course of his work over a number of years with profit and admiration. He offered me a 
helping hand when I needed assistance for my own work from a specialist in his field, and it was this that 
first brought us closer together. Later I had the opportunity to follow his work over a number of years in 
the Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters. Whenever he began to speak, the evening became a festive 
one, all absorbed by the account of his new discoveries, the difficulties which he had overcome and the 
new problems which had emerged for him. For many years his research traced a singled fixed line. In one 
of the most central areas of research, that organic life, it was his task to investigate the boundary between 
life and the forces of inorganic nature – to discover whether the boundary was unmovable, and if so, 
where it was located. And for such an investigation the physiology of respiration was especially fitted. 
Bohr stands out as an independent figure in the era of the history of physiology of respiration which was 
founded by Johannes Müller and his disciplines in Germany, and by Claude Bernard in France, and 
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whose program was to trace the general effects of natural forces as far as possible in the process of 
organic life. Bohr brought to light a provisional limitation of their action by showing that respiration was 
not entirely determined by the influence of external conditions. The enigma turned out to be located 
further back than the conflicting parties believed. There was a time when Bohr complained of his position 
being misunderstood, it being thought that he wanted to regress to so-called vitalism. But his opinion was 
merely that a new chain of investigation had to be established, especially on the influence of the nerve 
system on the processes in the lung cells. His position here shows something of his character as a 
scientist, and in his last dissertation, published in the Festschrift of the University, he presents a clear 
exposition of his view. The premium he set on thought shows itself in his critical grasp of a range of 
problems, paying attention to the vast horizons which in the wake of every new chain of investigations 
are revealed to the true scientist – but at the same time with the firm conviction that only one road is 
given along which progress in the new areas can be made: unrelenting work, faithful to the spirit of 
stringent science. His vocation could have as a motto Lotze’s dictum, “Only exhilarated by the great, but 
faithful to the small”. He was for us all an instructive example, not only in virtue of the results his 
research brought forth, but more especially through his stature as a scientist. 
He has done honour to his country. May our flag not be flown victoriously in the strife of the world 
powers, but may it be proudly flown above works of the mind, above achievements of thought, and may it 
be lowered at his bier. 
I have been requested by the president of the Royal Academy and the vice-chancellor of the University to 
express our deceased colleague for everything he has meant to the scientific community at home and to 
the training of scientists. He was a colleague whose words had weight. His acute intelligence penetrated 
many obscure connections and his unfailing common sense was often salutary. The status of science at 
home was close to his heart. He had a sharp eye for the dangers which might menace within the limited 
horizons of a small country and for the rise of popularization which often lets undigested knowledge 
come to the fore as allegedly true knowledge. In his own untiring work he set a living example of combat 
against such dangers. 
For those who were not colleagues but had the pleasure to be his intimates, his personality in private life 
displayed the same qualities as those which characterized him as a scientist. His free and vigorous mind 
often grappled with paradoxes, and he displayed his wit; facing his criticism, friends often could find 
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themselves in a purgatory, but behind his criticism lay a respect for serious work and great fidelity in 
friendship. He was not of their number who allow themselves to be overwhelmed by feelings, or who 
offer or expect declarations of friendship, but such reticence gave force to the effect of a warm glance and 
his firm handshake. Neither was he of their number who make a habit of speaking about their philosophy 
of life and destiny. Deep within him lay a view which could be said to bear a resemblance to Goethe’s 
lofty view of life, at once both naturalistic and idealistic, in which all that was petty and bitter faded into 
far horizons. There were few who knew their Goethe as he did. The lines of Mephestole were perhaps 
those he most often quoted; behind them lay an aspiration like that Faust, only with the difference that he 
did not, unlike Faust, relinquish the work with flasks, levers and screws (Helbeln und Schrauben); the 
path to truth for him was not to be found outside the scientific laboratory. 
Now we shall no longer see his bright eyes and fine, intellectual forehead which distinguished his sturdy 
figure; or listen to his instructive expositions or to his wit and sharp criticism. 
His loss is a great one for science at home and abroad and for the circle of friends and colleagues. But we 
to whom he meant so much, however, turn now to the one and to those for whom he meant most. His 
personality pervaded his beautiful home through his life and his interests, and those to whom he opened it 
will understand how great the loss there must be felt. There he found love and understanding. In this as in 
other things he was a happy man. Not least in the pleasure he had of seeing young, capable persons 
develop in just those areas of scientific work in which he was to have a happy working evening of life 
together with his ambitious sons and with the comfort of all the love which surrounded him at home. But 
it was not be so. 
But from the thought of the suddenness of the loss and of all which the loss implies we return again to the 
memory of his personality and his stature as a scientist. 
Honoured be the memory of Christian Bohr»12. 
Christian’s Bohr paper, which Høffding is speaking of is the very same essay that Niels 
Bohr cited in 1957. It was Bohr senior’s aim, as a follower of Johannes Müller and 
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Claude Bernard, to use mechanical ideas as far as possible in the description of living 
organisms.  
Christian Bohr claimed, as did Høffding also, that the nature of living organisms could 
not be explained only in terms of a mechanical description. Niels considered this period 
as essential for his education as the frequent references to biology in his later 
philosophical writings clearly show. 
The discussions which Niels and his brother Harald were allowed to listen to were the 
occasion in which both they absorbed an interest in the debate over mechanistic versus 
vitalistic descriptions13. As we have seen, Bohr recalled these discussions in the paper 
“Physical Science and the Problem of Life” from 1957, after quoting a passage from the 
introduction to his father’s paper “On the Pathological Lung Expansion”, which 
appeared in the anniversary publication [Festschrift] of the Copenhagen University in 
1910.  
Here Christian Bohr14 sustains the heuristic value of teleological considerations in 
addition to purely mechanical considerations in biology. 
«[…] The a priori assumption of the purposiveness of the organic process is, however, in itself quite 
natural as a heuristic principle and can, due to the extreme complication and difficult comprehension of 
the conditions in the organism, prove not only useful, but even indispensable for the formulation of the 
special problem for the investigation and the search of ways for its solution. But one thing is what may be 
conveniently used by the preliminary investigation, another what justifiably can be considered an actually 
                                                 
13
 As it is known, Aristotle started to discuss the problems related to the characteristics and the 
explanation of life. The development of mechanics in the 17th century reduced these problems to the 
question of whether or not life could be explained in terms of mechanics. The term “mechanicism” or 
“mechanism” meant that living organisms were nothing but complicated mechanical machines. 
Mechanism of today, in the light of the development of physics and chemistry, is the view that life can be 
explained exhaustively in terms of these two disciplines. 
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 Christian Bohr had been taught Kant’s view on teleology and causality at the “Filosofikum”. His 
teacher, the professor of philosophy, Rasmus Nielsen, was at the time very interested in precisely these 
ideas. 
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achieved result. As regards the problem of purposiveness of a given function for the maintenance of the 
whole organism, such a result can, as stressed above, be secured only by a demonstration in detail of the 
ways in which the purpose is reached»15. 
Nevertheless, Christian Bohr’s position on the uniqueness of life science and its 
irreducibility to physical and chemical sciences also found empirical evidence in his 
physiological research. Bohr senior made the firm claim that lung tissue plays an active 
part in the gas exchange in the lungs, and that this exchange is not a simple diffusion 
process. On the basis of experimental work, Christian Bohr concluded, in a detailed 
review article published in 1909 that “a specific cell activity in the gas exchange in the 
lungs has been established beyond doubt”. He interpreted this finding to mean that the 
behaviour of lung tissue was regulated according to the needs of the organism as a 
whole. Lung tissue’s behaviour could therefore only be understood in relation to the 
function to keep the organism alive.  
Niels Bohr regarded his father’s position and the general attitude of the circle in which, 
as Bohr himself admitted in the 1957’s lecture, grew up as a starting point for the 
investigation of the place of living organisms in the description of nature. Bohr’s initial 
standpoint on the controversy over mechanism versus vitalism was finally upheld by the 
modern development of atomic physics, which revealed the limitation in principle of the 
mechanical conception of nature. 
As Harald Høffding was the philosophical prime mover within the circle, it is worth 
noticing the conceptual parallelism between the way he had analysed the problems of 
description in biology and Bohr’s later formulation of complementarity with respect to 
biology. Høffding believed that life is a feature, which characterizes organisms as 
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indivisible whole. The relation between the whole and its parts cannot be reduced to a 
merely sum or aggregation of the elements of the whole.  
In the above quoted article, “The Theory of Knowledge and Apprehension of Life”, 
Høffding made clear that the problem of the relation of the organic whole to its 
conditions cannot be solved by proclaiming mechanism as the solution to all riddles as 
far as the analysis of wholeness is irreducible to an analysis of the causal interrelations 
among the components of the system. For this reason there exists an antinomy between 
the immediate understanding of the organism in experience as a whole and the organism 
regarded as description of the causal relations among its parts. Consequently, the 
understanding of biological organisms can be achieved on premises other than 
psychochemical ones. 
In 1932 Bohr gave for the first time an account of the application of complementarity to 
biology in an address called “Light and Life” at the International Congress of Light 
Therapy in Copenhagen. Here Bohr regarded the revision of the foundations of 
mechanics not only as essential for the full appreciation of the situation in atomic 
theory, but also as a background for the discussion of the problems of life in their 
relation to physics. 
«In no way does this mean that in atomic phenomena we meet with features which show a closer 
resemblance to the properties of living organisms than do ordinary physical effects. At first sight, the 
essentially statistical character of atomic mechanics might even seem to conflict with the marvellously 
refined organization of living beings. We must keep in mind, however, that just this complementary mode 
of description leaves room for regularities in atomic processes foreign to mechanics but as essential for 
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our account of the behaviour of living organisms as for the explanation of the specific properties of 
inorganic matter»16. 
As it is evident, Bohr’s interest in biology originated from his youth, but where did the 
idea of application of complementarity to biology derive from? Was it part of 
Høffding’s cultural legacy or did Bohr develop it autonomously? 
It is beyond doubt that much of what Bohr said about biology sounds like an echo of 
Høffding: 
«[…] if we were able to push the analysis of the mechanism of living organisms as far as that of atomic 
phenomena, we should not expect to find any features foreign to matter […] however […] the conditions 
holding for biological and physical researches are not directly comparable, since the necessity of keeping 
the object of investigation alive imposes a restriction on the former which finds no counterpart in the 
latter […] On this view, the very existence of life must in biology be considered as an elementary fact, 
just as in atomic physics the existence of the quantum of action has to be taken as a basic fact that cannot 
be derived from ordinary mechanical physics»17. 
As a matter of fact, Bohr too regarded the existence of life as an elementary fact as well 
as the quantum of action with respect to physics. Considered the existence of such 
irrational element, from the point of view of classical mechanics, would not be possible 
to reduce biology to the physical or chemical explanation.  
«Indeed, the essential characteristics of living beings must be sought in a peculiar organization in which 
features that may be analysed by usual mechanics are interwoven with typically atomistic features to an 
extent unparallel in inanimate matter»18.  
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A non-causal feature of wholeness thus characterizes both living organisms and the 
quantum of action. Certainly, here, “atomistic feature” does not refer to certain 
properties of atomic systems but to traits of individuality or wholeness, which are also 
seen in the quantum of action.  
As a consequence, mechanistic considerations cannot replace teleological ones, as the 
vital functions are un-analysable in terms of physical and chemical descriptions. Bohr 
added: “The concept of purpose, which is foreign to mechanical analysis, finds certain 
fields of application in biology”19. Moreover, the experience of living organisms as 
wholes demands the use of finalistic concepts in the description of their behaviour. 
Since the presuppositions underlying teleological and mechanistic descriptions are 
mutually exclusive, the two types of description cannot be simultaneously sustained and 
thus do not come into conflict with each other. In this sense Bohr held that the finalistic 
mode of description is complementary to the physical mode of description, in virtue of 
the fact that the observational conditions required for each, taken individually, are 
mutually incompatible. Or, as one might also put it, since the property of life applies to 
the object taken as a whole whereas a mechanistic description applies merely to the 
object considered as a consisting of the sum of its parts, mechanistic and teleological 
descriptions are mutually exclusive and yet may be deployed complementarily. 
According to Bohr, biological organisms display such holistic characteristics, e.g., self-
preservation and reproduction, that they seem inaccessible to an unambiguous causal 
mode of description, even though a far-reaching understanding of the chemical and 
physical aspects of many typical biological reactions has been achieved by now.  
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«In fact, we are led to conceive the proper biological regularities as representing laws of nature 
complementary to those appropriate to the account of the properties of inanimate bodies, in analogy with 
the complementary relationship between the stability properties of the atoms themselves and such 
behaviour of their constituent particles as allows of a description in terms of space-time coordination»20. 
As Christian Bohr and Harald Høffding had remarked yet, so Niels too sustained a 
viewpoint lying equally distant from vitalism and mechanism. In “Light and Life” Bohr 
deemed untenable the understanding of the essential aspects of life in purely physical 
terms. As well as he held that it was hard to disambiguate the vitalistic view, which 
presupposed the existence of a vital force unknown to physics.  
Conversely, no result of biological investigation can be unambiguously described 
otherwise than in terms of physics and chemistry. Therefore Bohr’s idea to apply the 
complementary view to the long-lasting controversy between mechanism and vitalism 
derived from an analogy he drew between the concept of life as an elementary fact, in 
biology, and the existence of quantum of action as a basic fact that cannot be derived 
from ordinary mechanics, in physics. In “Light and Life” as well as in “Biology and 
Atomic Physics” Bohr used the concept of complementarity in the description of living 
organisms in a way similar to Høffding’s.  
The corresponding viewpoint between Bohr and Høffding is confirmed by the fact that 
Høffding sustained that no limit can be set to the use of physical and chemical points of 
view in the organic field. Therefore, mechanism cannot be regarded as the solution to all 
riddles. The concept of holism cannot be used to give scientific explanation of whatever 
holds the individual parts together, because “that would be to explain idem per idem”. 
However, because of the unity and coordination of life, it is necessary to take account of 
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the viewpoint of holism for an understanding of the relation between the individual 
processes and the life of the organism as such. Also in Høffding’s view life is the factor 
that makes biology unidentifiable on the basis of chemical and physical concepts. 
Høffding expressed his view as follows: 
«The more rational and formal is our knowledge, the more it can advance through definitions and 
deductions so that all transactions are made with intuitable necessity. Empirical or actual knowledge, on 
the other hand, must often halt at facts that could indeed be described and analyzed but not defined and 
derived from other facts. On such fact is life, and thus biology belongs under, and will probably always 
belong under empirical knowledge»21. 
As it is evident, the holistic view is regarded as a regulative principle. Hence Høffding 
wrote: 
«The viewpoint of the whole is thus not in absolute contradiction to the mechanical conception. They 
stand in relation to each other as synthesis and analysis. And the one cannot exclude the other […]»22. 
Høffding reputed as necessary to adopt holistic or teleological considerations in addition 
to mechanical ones for living organisms.  
Furthermore, the concept of life as an elementary fact gives rise to another 
consideration: the necessity to maintain life in the object under observation implies a 
significant limitation to our possibilities for investigating these functions. There are two 
main reasons which could explain why. First of all, every experimental arrangement, 
utilized for studying the behaviour of the atoms constituting an organism, precludes the 
possibility of keeping the organism alive. Following Joseph Needham, we may call this 
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argument the “Thanatological Principle” (from the Greek word for death: Thanatos)23. 
In his later writings Bohr was explicit in holding that the impossibility of keeping a 
certain organism alive in the course of a process of investigation is rather a matter of 
empirical fact. But in his 1932 and 1937 articles Bohr stressed the argument that the 
observational conditions necessary for a purely mechanistic definition of the vital 
functions are incompatible with those necessary for the manifestation of life24. 
Second, the incessant exchange of matter inside the living beings does not make 
possible to regard them as well-defined systems of material particles like those 
considered in atomic physics.  
David Favrholdt called it the “Metabolism Argument”25. From this point of view, it is 
meaningless to speak about which atoms form part of the living organism and which do 
not. Considering an organism as a whole, we deal with observational situations, which 
do not allow a sharp demarcation between the organism and its surroundings. On the 
contrary, if we wish to investigate the organism in physico-chemical terms, we need to 
isolate it from its environment. In the course of time Bohr had realized that both the 
Metabolism Argument and the Thanatological Principle must be revised even though he 
did not give them up completely26. 
Henry Folse too has pointed out that in his earliest essays on biology, Bohr disregarded 
the fact that in quantum physics the impossibility of separating the states of two 
interacting systems is a physical consequence of the functions of a certain organism in 
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physical terms and keeping that organism alive as an experimental problem which 
might be overcome by refined techniques.  
Consequently, Folse argues, Bohr did not recognize until much later that the recourse to 
complementary description is made when we are allowed to describe biological 
phenomena on two distinct levels27. If this claim is true it looks very much as if in the 
thirties Bohr’s conception was characterized by the same ambivalence we observed in 
Høffding, in the beginning, as to the impossibility of an exhaustive physical description 
of living things. Folse is correct insofar that in his early essays Bohr did not directly 
endorse what he explicitly stated in his 1960 article, that 
«The basis for the complementary mode of description in biology is not connected with the problems of 
controlling the interaction between object and the measurement toll, already taken into account in 
chemical kinetics, but with practically inexhaustible complexity of the organism»28. 
As is known from the quantum physics, observing and observed systems form an 
interacting whole with respect to which we can only draw an arbitrary division between 
subject and object. It is this fact which, for Bohr, requires the complementaristic 
account in quantum physics.  
One therefore naturally gets the impression that Bohr saw a similitude between physics 
and biology in the sense that he believed there was a similar argument in favour of 
complementary descriptions in biology29. There is not such argument in Bohr’s 
conception on biology.  
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It is the concept of life as an irreducible and unitary element what allows Bohr to draw a 
parallelism between quantum physics and biology. 
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Chapter 7  
 
The Ekliptica’s Years: Between Friendship and 
Cultural Dedication 
 
7.1 The “Ekliptica Circle” Origin 
Niels Bohr was enrolled at the University of Copenhagen in 1903, when he began 
studying physics under Professor Christian Christiansen. In 1909 he received his 
master’s degree in physics and two years later he completed his Ph.D. Then he spent a 
year in England doing a post-doctoral research in Cambridge and Manchester. 
At the time, all students had to attend a year-long propaedeutic course in philosophy, 
called in Danish Filosofikum, that was usually taken during the students first year at the 
University. Bohr attended the mandatory course in 1903 with Professor Høffding.  
Since 1905 Bohr began to meet regularly a group of students that was used to discuss on 
various subjects. In the Niels Bohr Archive, among Bohr’s Scientific Manuscripts1, 
there is a sheet of paper on which somebody has drawn a hepta-pointed star, in each 
point of which a name and an address have been written. Five of the names belong to 
members of Ekliptica. The group was called Ekliptica because the initial number of 
members was twelve: apart from the Bohr’s brothers there were Peter Skov (jurist, later 
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Danish Ambassador in Moscow, Ankara, Warsaw and Prague), Edgar Rubin (the 
psychologist), Poul Nørlund (the historian), Niels Erik Nørlund (the mathematician), 
Vilhelm Slomann (the art historian), Kaj Henriksen (the entomologist), Einar Cohn 
(later permanent under-secretary), Lis Jacobsen (the etymologist), Viggo Brøndal (the 
philologist), Astrid Lund, who later became Lunding by marriage2. The two names, 
which were not included among the previous Ekliptica members, are those of Gudmund 
Hatt (the ethno-geographer), and Elias Lunding (the agronomist). Bohr’s address 
mentioned in the paper is “Gersonsvej 55”, Hellerup, in the suburbs of Copenhagen, 
where he lived until 1921, when he moved to the Niels Bohr Institute in “Blegdamsvej 
17”. So the gatherings, which the sheet of paper refers to, took place around 1916-17. 
Except for the period September 1911- July 1912 and 1914-16, when Bohr was in 
England, he continued to participate in the meetings at least until 1917. 
Our first knowledge about the group derives from Vilhelm Slomann, who wrote about 
the club in a newspaper article in 1955, thanks to which we know the exact starting date 
of the club meetings: 
«From 1905 and on, Edgar Rubin, later a Professor of Psychology, for a number of winters gathered 
twelve students of the same age for meetings of the type students usually hold – consisting of a lecture, a 
cup of tea at a restaurant or a boarding-house and a considerable consumption of tobacco. The natural and 
social sciences, geography and the traditional humanistic subjects – philosophy, literature, linguistics, 
archaeology and history – were represented here, and the various interests of the twelve students were 
manifested in the pompous name of the club: Ekliptica. Rubin was permanently the vigilant and natural 
centre in this circle, whose members in due course became professors or in other ways had the 
opportunity to carry out scientific work. Niels and Harald were frequently present and listened attentively 
to the various lectures and discussions. When the discussions were dragging to their close, one of them 
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would say a few generous words about the lecture and continue in a low voice at a furious pace and with 
vigorous intensity, but would often be interrupted by his brother. Their way of thinking seemed to be 
coordinated; one would improve on the other’s or his own expressions, or in a heated, yet at the same 
time good-humoured manner defend his choice of words. Ideas changed their colour and became 
polished; it was not a question of defending preconceived opinions, but of something new coming into 
being. This way of thinking à deux was so deeply ingrained in the brothers that nobody else could join in. 
The chairman used to put his pencil down quietly and let them carry on; but when everybody moved in 
closer to them, he might say ineffectively, “Louder, Niels”»3. 
Among historians the idea is quite widespread that the circle has been of great 
importance for the formation of Niels Bohr’s method of work. Slomann described a 
picture that calls to one’s mind the way in which Bohr developed his thoughts. Bohr 
needed to create a feeling with the person he talked to, while Harald, his brother, 
preferred to work alone. For Bohr it was necessary to feel on common ground with 
those who became his most intimate collaborators in solving scientific and social 
questions, as it happened with Hendrik Anthony Kramers and Léon Rosenfeld.  
Bohr could not work if he did not find in his closest environment the most complete 
harmony and understanding and he began to experience it since the period of Ekliptica 
meetings. 
To go beyond the considerations on the methodicalness, i.e. the quality of appreciating 
Bohr’s method and system of work, Slomann also tell us that all natural and human 
sciences were represented in the circle, and Edgar Rubin was its prime mover. But there 
is no mention about how did they know each other. Peter Skov gave another report on 
Ekliptica that may shed some light on this issue: 
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«After leaving school (1901) I began the study of law, partly in order to please my father, partly because I 
was attracted by so many others subjects, such as literature, art, philosophy, that I could not make up my 
mind which to choose. My studies allowed me plenty of leisure. For several years I attended Høffding’s 
seminars. Here I met a group of friends who formed a small circle consisting of 12 members. Hence, the 
name “Ekliptica”. Of their number were the Bohr brothers, the Nørlund brothers, Edgar Rubin, Brøndal 
and others who later became professors. Quorum minima pars fui. I have always associated with those 
from whom I could learn»4. 
As Skov states that he met the club’s members at Høffding’s seminars, most part of the 
historians supposes that Ekliptica started for the purpose of discussing the topics of 
Høffding’s propaedeutic course on philosophy. But such an interpretation is not the only 
possible because Lis Jacobsen had already passed her examination in propaedeutic 
philosophy in 1901. Peter Skov in 1902; Astrid Lund in 1903; Niels Bohr, Einar Cohn 
and N. E. Nørlund in 1904. Harald Bohr, Edgar Rubin, Slomann and Hatt in the summer 
on 1905 by one of the other two professors of philosophy, Kristian Kroman. Viggo 
Brøndal passes his examination with Høffding in 1906. Henriksen and P. Nørlund in 
19075. Furthermore, there were very close familiar relations among the members: 
Bohr’s brothers and Nørlund’s brothers would become related through Niels Bohr’s 
marriage with Margrethe Nørlund, their sister, in 1912. Lis Jacobsen was a Rubin, a 
cousin of Edgar, so was E. Cohn because his mother was their father’s sister. N. E. 
Nørlund and E. Cohn were class-mates at Søro Academy, a highly prestigious boarding 
school. Rubin and Slomann took their studentereksamen at Slomann’s school in 1904. 
Rubin was also Niels Bohr’s half-cousin. Edgar Rubin is unanimously considered the 
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Ekliptica founder and he was the one of the group for whom philosophy was the main 
occupation: when he started his studies at the University he was enrolled in philosophy 
because an independent course of psychology was established only later on. So the 
reasons, which brought so many students with different cultural backgrounds together, 
were their friendship and a common interest in philosophy quite beyond the pleasure to 
discuss their academic and propaedeutic subjects. In fact, Skov’s statement did not refer 
to Høffding’s introductory course, but to his advanced seminars.  
In the last session of the interview with Thomas Kuhn and Erik Rüdinger in 1962, Bohr 
explained that he took a great interest in philosophy in the years after his high school 
student examination and he came especially in close connection with Høffding. He also 
added: “at that time I really thought to write something about philosophy […]. I felt that 
the various problems in psychology, which were called big philosophical problems, of 
the free will and such things, that one could really reduce them when one considered 
how one really went about them”6. 
So it is very likely that Bohr attended Høffding’s seminars on Kierkegaard, Spinoza’s 
Ethica, his lectures on his own philosophy, ethics, theory of knowledge and maybe on 
Kant’s Kritic der reinen Vernunft, which Høffding taught in that period according to the 
Yearbooks of the University, all on subjects which the other members of Ekliptica too 
must have felt attracted to.  
7.2 Harald Høffding as a Mentor 
In the Niels Bohr’s private library, the Niels Bohr Archive, there is a collection of 
papers and booklets on philosophical issues, which Høffding sent Bohr with a personal 
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dedication and they confirm Bohr’s cultural and philosophical orientation within the 
span of thirty years7. It is plausible that Ekliptica was the place where to deepen and 
compare dialectically one’s points of view on various subjects, not least philosophy. 
Georg and Naphtali Cohn were law students with a great interest in philosophy, they 
also attended Høffding’s advanced seminars as did the members of Ekliptica, even 
though it is difficult to say if they joined the club because it seems they were not related 
to Einar Cohn. 
Georg Cohn wrote an article in 1933 that gives a very interesting picture on the 
atmosphere he felt at Høffding’s lectures. 
«[…] There was something Socratic about the whole of Høffding’s appearance. With the greatest patience 
and with truly lively interest he listened to the questions of young students and to their early trials in 
coming to grips with philosophy. He let himself engage in discussions with them about their views and 
was able to awaken their philosophical interest and personal confidence. The students went to him as one 
they trusted when subject to doubts and scruples, for instance, with regards to religious questions, about 
which they may even have avoided talking to their close relatives. Professor Høffding has several times 
related such incidents and has also written about them in his Memoirs. It was at these more intimate 
gatherings that his talents as a teacher and one able to inspire others truly came to the fore. In his Memoirs 
he tells us that to him it was a source of great happiness to have been a teacher at the University. He 
appreciated the constant interaction between the study and the lecture hall. He further recalls the fact that 
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17) Saertryk af Nordisk Tidsskrift for Filologi, (Plato and Democritus). 
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where the students were concerned one generally found oneself touching on or talking about all that 
which constitutes one’s main interest in life – truly the fact of having intercourse with young people at the 
age when their intellectual and spiritual foundations are being formed – all this makes life rich»8.  
Viggo Brøndal sent Høffding an interesting letter on March 9th 1913 on the occasion of 
the celebration of Høffding’s birthday. The letter gives a further account of the students’ 
devotion for their teacher: 
«Dear Professor Høffding, the newspapers announce that you will be celebrating your birthday on 
Thursday and give an account of all that will be done to honour you and to pay tribute to you on that 
occasion. 
Allow me too, though at present abroad and no longer a member of the group whose custom it was to 
meet to discuss philosophical questions with you, to send you my heartfelt congratulations. 
What makes you the teacher to whom I shall continue to owe most – although the subject I chose was not 
yours – is the high standards of scholarship and the kind interest you have always shown young students. 
Such standards have never repelled, nor was your interest ever narrow. One could confide in you about 
personal matters and projects which were remote from your own. This can be said of very few; there are 
only few to whom we, as young students, owe a debt of gratitude of such a degree. You have no equal as 
a teacher for the academic youth of Denmark. 
I have no greater wish for you than that you for many years to come may continue to be vitalized by, and 
find pleasure in, intercourse with the coming generations of students that appear like blossom each year. 
Yours sincerely, Viggo Brøndal»9.  
Brøndal’s statement “though at present abroad and no longer a member of the group 
whose custom it was to meet to discuss philosophical questions with you” gives rise to a 
double interpretation for which either Høffding himself participated in the Ekliptica’s 
meetings or these discussions may have occurred during Høffding’s seminars. 
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 GEORG COHN, “Harald Høffding og hans Filosofi” (Harald Høffding and his Philosophy), Tilskueren, 
1933, 50: 103-17. From FAYE, Niels Bohr (cit. note 27, ch. 1), p. 28. 
9
 From FAYE, Niels Bohr (cit. note 27, ch. 1), p. 29. 
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Considered the particular dedication from Høffding to his students, that Bohr himself 
certainly experienced, in addition to Høffding’s friendship with Niels’s father since the 
years of his youth, one can infer that Bohr was strongly drawn towards philosophy and 
here Høffding played a guiding role in directing and encouraging his interests in 
philosophy. I would like to quote an emblematic passage from the public statement 
Bohr pronounced on the occasion of Høffding’s 85th birthday, on March 11th 1928, 
published in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende: “Høffding has not only guided us into 
the sublimities of philosophy […], but his unfailing freshness and openness of mind 
towards every new advance, the development of which, even the most recent, he has 
kept in every field, has if possible strengthened our confidence in him and won for him 
the affection of all”. 
Moreover, we cannot pass over the fact that Bohr chose Harald Høffding as his teacher, 
while he could attend also Kristian Kroman’s propaedeutic course. Even though this last 
solution would have been unnatural because of Høffding’s friendship with Bohr’s 
father. 
The preparation of Høffding’s examination consisted in a set of books written by 
Høffding himself: Kort Oversigt over den nyere Filosofis Historie (Outline of the 
history of modern philosophy), published in 1898, Psykologi i Omrids paa Grundlag af 
Erfaring (An outline of psychology on the basis of experience) from 1882, Formel 
Logik (Formal Logic). It was published in 1889, and reprinted in 1889, 1894, 1903, 
1907 and 1913. The course lasted two terms, including four hours per week and an oral 
examination at the end. In the interview with Kuhn quoted earlier, Bohr spoke about an 
error he had found in Høffding’s book on formal logic: “That was just a minor thing, 
but I pointed out to him that there were some errors, actually there were many errors, in 
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his formal logic. He took that to heart, and there came out a new edition, where he says 
that he has got some various help from one of his students....”. In a new edition 
Høffding corrected the mistake and in the preface mentioned that one of his former 
students had observed it. By comparing the two editions, the one from 1903 and the 
other from 1907 it is possible to make out what the mistake was. In the edition from 
1903, Høffding exemplifies the principle of duality or excluded middle and writes that: 
“a concept (B) must either contain another concept (A) or its negation (a)”. Here 
“either-or” is used in the exclusive sense. Bohr obviously had pointed out that a concept 
could contain both another concept and this other concepts negation as well. In the 
edition of the logic from 1907, the principle is stated as follows: “The concept A must 
either be connected with B”. The example given is: “A vertebrate is either a mammal or 
not a mammal.” But, Høffding adds: “In the case where B is not a necessary trait of A 
both AB and Ab [b being the negation of B] may occur – under different circumstances 
and at different times. Thus the vertebrate-type can occur as well in mammals as in non-
mammals, for instance in the horse as well as in the eagle”10. 
7.3 Edgar Rubin: The Key Person to Understand the Bohr-Høffding 
Relationship 
Edgar Rubin played a pivotal role in the “Ekliptica club” for at least three main reasons: 
he was the organizer; he studied philosophy and psychology and kept up relations with 
Høffding. 
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 Cf. FAVRHOLDT, “The Cultural Background of the Young Niels Bohr”, Rivista di Storia della Scienza, 
1985, 2: 445-461, p. 448. 
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The very first references to the circle omitted two names that were included in the 
hepta-pointed star indicating seven names and addresses of the remaining members: 
Gudmund Hatt and Elias Lunding, who became Astrid Lund’s husband. 
We are interested particularly in Gudmund Hatt and his connections with the club since 
he fell into oblivion when he went to America just after the foundation of the Ekliptica 
and many years later he was accused by some members of being sympathetic towards 
the Germans during the Second World War. Professor Jan Faye found and translated 
various letters from Rubin and Hatt to Høffding, which confirm the central role that 
Rubin played among the group’s members and Professor Høffding. 
On June 28, 1906, Rubin sent Høffding the following letter about Hatt: 
«Professor Høffding, from a friend of mine, A.G. Hatt, I have received the enclosed letter which he asks 
me to pass on to you with a letter testifying to my acquaintance with him. His father is a teacher in 
Holbæk and is, as far as I understand, a rather peculiar man who has brought Hatt up with an ardent 
enthusiasm for science. Both the peculiarity and the enthusiasm he has inherited; but his ultimate aim, 
which is closest to his heart, is to do something in art […]. I became acquainted with him here at the 
University, when we started as students here at the same time and met each other at the seminars on 
“Modern philosophers” given by the professor. […]. The people, whom he had spoken to, think, he 
writes, that an introduction to William James from yourself would prove useful to him. Since I have faith 
in him and believe that he is made of the right stuff I hope that his request may be granted. As far as I 
know, Professor Hans Olrik knows him and his family well, and takes an interest in him. Yours sincerely, 
Edgar Rubin»11. 
From the letter we deduce that Rubin introduced Hatt to Høffding because: 1) Hatt was 
a friend of him as they met each other at the seminar on “Modern philosophers”; 2) 
Rubin was in close relations with Høffding as a mentor as it is confirmed by the fact 
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that Professor Høffding accepted Hatt’s request, as we can see from a letter from Hatt, 
dated Dorchester Mass., February 15, 190712. Furthermore, as Hatt was attending both 
Høffding’s series of lectures and seminars in the spring of 1905 (The psychology of free 
will, Philosophical theories, Lectures on Kierkegaard), Rubin asked him to join the 
Ekliptica. 
Hatt returned to Denmark during the summer of 1907, most probably because of the 
expenses of studying at Harvard. From another letter to Høffding, dated Holbæk, 
November 26, 1907, we know that Hatt was once again attending some of Høffding’s 
lectures, even though he had also started studying geography. He then thanks Høffding 
for the undeserved help he has received, adding that the sympathetic understanding he 
has met with him has been most helpful and profitable for a young man. Such friendship 
connected Høffding to several other members of Ekliptica, and in all cases the 
friendships continued until Høffding’s death. 
Returning to Rubin (1886-1951), I think he is reputable to be the very key person to 
prove the special relationship, which connects Bohr to Høffding’s philosophy. 
According to tradition, it was Theodor Fechner who in “Elemente der Psychophysik” 
(1861) laid the foundations of experimental psychology. For more than fifty years, 
psychologists believed that mental phenomena consisted of a limited number of 
elements. Consequently, they considered it their task to discover these elements and the 
laws relating to their combination or association. Experimental psychologists envisaged 
these laws as analogous to the laws governing mechanical mixtures or chemical 
compounds. 
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Edgar Rubin’s teacher, Alfred Lehmann, was even proponent of this experimental trend 
in psychology. However, during three years (1911-14) of research work in Göttingen 
under the guidance of the experimental psychologist, G. E. Müller, Rubin became aware 
of the limits of the analogy between psychology and physical-chemical disciplines. 
Rubin became professor of experimental psychology in 1922, after having taught at the 
University as a reader in philosophy from 1918. He carried on experiments on visual 
perception, namely on the perception of figures and grounds, which was published in 
his doctoral dissertation of 1915.  
Figure-ground is a type of perceptual organization in vision that involves assignment of 
edges to regions for purposes of shape determination, determination of depth across an 
edge and the allocation of visual attention. Figure-ground is a critical process in 
perception because of its profound consequences for shape perception.  
His thesis for the doctorate, “Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren. Studien in 
psychologischer Analyse” (Visually Experienced Figure. A study of psychological 
analysis), was one of several treatises, anticipating what in Germany it was called 
“Gestaltpsychologie”, in France “La psychologie de la forme”. In a lecture “Über 
Gestaltwahrnehmung”, delivered at “The Eight International Congress of Psychology” 
(1927), Rubin gave an outline of his psychological methodology, and called his basic 
view “aspective psychology”. 
Rubin’s studies resulted in a new understanding of the conditions under which the same 
stimuli brought about different states of awareness. The switch in perception from 
background to figure, and vice versa, and furthermore, the conditions under which 
different stimuli afforded states of awareness of the same kind in form of colour 
constancy, constancy of forms, constancy of size, etc. remind us of Høffding’s ideas of 
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totality. Rubin considered the mind as an integrated totality and the various aspects of 
the mind must be regarded as a whole that cannot be described in isolation. 
Rubin acknowledged his cultural debt towards Høffding on various occasions. In the 
preface to a collection of scientific papers entitled Experimenta Psychologica, Rubin 
cited just Høffding’s lectures and seminars and in particular a paper on patriotism he 
had written many years before, which recalls the topics of Høffding’s philosophy: 
«The paper, which comes first, concerns my view on problems similar to those with which my 
contemporaries among the Gestalt psychologists were occupied. In this connection it was interesting for 
me to find some notes for a paper on patriotism read in 1905 or 1906 to one of the classes of my teacher, 
Harald Høffding. Having explained that patriotism is a unitary feeling I said: “With the special name it 
follows that this feeling is kept separated from the others, but it is just this barrier which I will try to break 
and show its connection with various other types of feelings. In order to do this we must look at the 
various aspects of patriotism one after the other. I say “aspects” and not “elements” so that you are not led 
to believe that patriotism results from a combination of three aspects (or elements). Throughout the 
following considerations you must keep in view that patriotism is a fact, and that it is within this one fact 
that I examine the importance of the individual aspects”. One will see that the aspective view of wholes, 
which is advanced in the first paper, can already be traced here»13. 
Rubin makes use of patriotism as an example of the antinomy between analytic and 
synthetic activity of the mind introduced by Høffding, that is not consistent with the 
conception of the mind as an integrated totality. Hence, he emphasizes that patriotism is 
a unitary feeling, not a mere combination of elements. Beyond doubt, Rubin’s quotation 
pertains to Høffding’s definition of the nature of consciousness that arises from the 
well-known Outlines of Psychology of 1882: 
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 EDGAR RUBIN, Experimenta Psychologica (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1949), p. II. 
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«We must admit that the idea of self cannot be derived from immediate perception, but must be obtained 
by inference from the general nature and conditions of conscious life. This is a necessary consequence of 
the fact that it is based on an activity, always (i.e. so long as consciousness lasts) continued and repeated; 
on the synthetic activity which all consciousness presupposes. In each individual state we have the 
product of this activity, but not the activity itself. It is a fact connected with this, that we can never be 
fully conscious of our self. For the very state in which we think of our self, is conditioned by synthesis; 
self-consciousness just as every other kind of consciousness, is possible only by its means. The synthesis, 
the inner unity in us, always hides itself, however deeply we try to penetrate into consciousness; it is the 
constant presupposition»14. 
Rubin seems to be sceptical about Høffding’s conception of synthesis, even if in another 
passage of the same preface he writes explicitly:  
«I might add that already in my first year as a student I was critical of Høffding’s “synthesis”. Regarding 
the problems with which I was occupied, the “mental synthesis” of Høffding seemed to me to be a 
makeshift introduced in order to build up the wholes, which had been broken by “analysis” which led to 
“sensations”. I considered that by not breaking up the wholes and by keeping to them and their aspects in 
my investigations I could save using this makeshift»15. 
In fact, we have to notice that Høffding, since the Outlines of Psychology and still in 
The Problems of Philosophy, affirmed that consciousness and personality “come into 
being through a perpetual synthesis of elements” although he was aware that “mental 
synthesis” contradicts the concept that the whole and the parts mutually determine one 
another: 
«Here crops out an antinomy, which is closely connected with the existence of consciousness, and it is 
peculiar to the concept of personality. Consciousness and personality can, as little, be explained as the 
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products of previously given elements, as organic life can be explained as the product of unorganic 
elements. On the other hand, consciousness and personality, just like organic life, come into being 
through a perpetual synthesis of elements not originally begotten by themselves. It is this antinomy which 
makes the genesis of life and of personality so great a riddle»16. 
Rubin was referring to such an antinomy when he wrote that “mental synthesis” seemed 
to him a makeshift taken in order “to build up the whole”. Rubin confirmed such a 
position in a lecture on the state of psychology at the end of twenties, published some 
years later (1956) in “Edgar Rubin in Memoriam”. 
«Firstly, one can have one’s doubt in this direction and secondly, it is possible that the victory to a great 
degree must be regarded as a Pyrrhus victory, even if one disregards this doubt. In a certain way, 
Høffding was aware of this. Because he understood that there was a peculiarity with his proposed 
solution. He sustained that when one goes deeper into the relation between the synthesis and the elements, 
one realizes that there is an antinomy between the synthesis and the elements, which is closely tied up 
with the essence of the life and sole. For him there was something fundamental and important in this. He 
was, of course, attracted by the continuous discussion of the problem, but from a more general scientific 
standpoint, one can perhaps regard a solution that leads to antinomies as a less than a good solution. It 
seemed to me as something like a smashed vase, which pieces one tried to put together again»17. 
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 RUBIN, “Bemærkninger angaaende psykologisk Metode”, in Til Minde om Edgar Rubin, ”Nordisk 
Psykologi Monograph Series”, 1956, 8, p. 24. Danish version: «For det første kan man have sine Tvivl i 
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at sæte den sammen igen». The translations from Danish are those of Mrs Felicity Pors (Niels Bohr 
Archive) in collaboration with the present author. 
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But, at the same time, Rubin was convinced that “Høffding had held of something 
central” when he used, as Kierkegaard as his predecessor, “synthesis” in the treatment 
of those problems that concern the building up of personality18. 
I sustain that Høffding at the time (1882-1902) did not develop yet the concept of 
wholeness as regards the problems of consciousness and personality as far as he had 
elaborated his theory of knowledge on the basis of the principle of unity.  
As Rubin studied thoroughly Høffding’s philosophy, he understood that Høffding had 
already found the solution to work out the antinomy between synthesis and analysis 
with respect to psychic experiences: if the conditions of unity and continuity allow 
describing the phenomena of nature as a unified conception of the whole, the same 
conditions should permit the psychic experiences to be described in terms of unity as 
regards the formation of personality. In this sense Rubin affirmed, in the foreword to 
Experimenta Psychologica: “Høffding had realized something very important for 
psychology of perception when he spoke about synthesis”19. We have also to recall that 
Høffding began to elaborate the category of totality since early 1910s, as we deduce 
from his private correspondence with Emile Meyerson20.  
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 FRITHIOF BRANDT, HANS HØFFDING, JEAN ADIGARD DES GAUTRIES, Correspondance entre Harald 
Høffding et Emile Meyerson (Copenhagen: Einar Munskgaard, 1939), pp. 2-3. In particular, we would 
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interesting clue about the origin of the concept of totality within his philosophy: 
«Mon travail philosophique a eu un certain caractère encyclopédique qui est en partie provoqué par les 
conditions où se trouve la philosophie dans un petit pays comme le mien, où la division du travail ne peut 
être aussi complète que dans le grands pays. J’ai commencé avec la Psychologie pour passer de là à la 
Morale et à la Philosophie de la Religion. M’étant ainsi orienté sur des problèmes qui m’avaient intéressé 
depuis ma première jeunesse, où j’étais sous la profonde influence de Kierkegaard (sur lequel M. 
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livre La Pensée humaine une recherche sur les fondaments et les relations réciproques des problémes 
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But when Høffding published The Problems of Philosophy in 1902, his view on the 
theory of knowledge and ontology were in all essential fully developed. Furthermore, 
many of Høffding’s basic suppositions can even be traced back to the early 1880s. 
Høffding’s teaching was not confined to the cultural aspect but became part of his 
students’ life. Rubin expressed publicly his feelings, gratitude and cultural debt once 
again shortly after Høffding’s death. 
«Those of us, now advanced in years, who have worked in the field of philosophy and psychology were 
in close contact with Harald Høffding. He was our teacher, and he influenced us perhaps more than we 
were aware of. In cases where we developed independent opinion and positions, these came into being 
due to the fact that, to no negligible extent, we held our ground in the face of his view»21. 
The passage quoted from Rubin’s commemorative speech confirms how Høffding 
influenced his students and how his philosophy was determinant in the development of 
their scientific speculation. 
As it is my purpose to demonstrate how Høffding’s teaching may have inspired Bohr’s 
view on reality and his method of scientific inquiry, I will show that Bohr was deeply 
involved in such philosophical subtleties thanks to his friendship with Edgar Rubin. 
Since there are no minutes or manuscripts about the Ekliptica’s meetings, all we have as 
regards the details concerning their cultural and philosophical discussions is the 
correspondence between Bohr and Rubin. 
                                                                                                                                               
philosophiques, en insistant particulièrement sur la théorie des catégories. Les livre sur la conception de la 
totalité est un supplément à la Pensée humaine».  
We have to notice that the book Høffding is referring to, concerning the conception of totality, was 
published in 1911 as a supplement to La Pensée humaine. 
21
 RUBIN ET ALIA, Harald Høffding in Memoriam. Fire taler holdt paa Københavns Universitet paa 
Harald Høffdings 89 Aars Dag 11. Marts 1932, (Four speeches made at the University of Copenhagen on 
Harald Høffding’s 89th Birthday March 11, 1932), (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1932). 
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In the Niels Bohr Archive there are letters concerning the private correspondence 
between the two authors in the period 1909-1955, out of which the more interesting are 
those written between 1912 and 1915 when Bohr was in Manchester. As we know, that 
period was very crucial for Bohr’s scientific production: he was writing his “Rutherford 
Memorandum” which would lead him to the famous trilogy “On the Constitution of 
Atoms and Molecules”. Bohr has travelled a very long way from the electron theory of 
metals of 1911, when he defended his doctoral dissertation. He has chosen an atom 
model, justified its use, and selected a quantum condition to ensure its stability. In the 
Memorandum he immediately proceeded to investigate its power in application. There 
is a letter, dated May 15, 1912, in which Rubin thanks Bohr for a postcard. Bohr was 
very busy and, in the card, he regrets not having enough time to write. As in other 
letters, Rubin utilizes his correspondence with Bohr to elucidate him about his studies 
by using samples of theories in order to explain general concepts of common language: 
“As an example I can mention an investigation of retroactive restriction. When one 
learns a series of meaningless letters “by heart”, it appears that one at a later stage can 
repeat many fewer, when one just after the learning has started on difficult mental work 
than when one has just relaxed. When one now – instead of requiring repetition, say a 
series of old and new letters – asks the test person to say which he recognises and those 
he doesn’t, it turns out that the retroactive restriction caused by difficult mental work 
has no effect on recognition”22. Just a few days later Bohr answered Rubin. The letter is 
dated May 20: 
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«Dear Edgar, forgive me for disturbing you once again with my nonsense; I do not at all have time for it 
myself either; but my mind will not be at rest until I have asked you whether it makes any sense at all to 
say something like this: recognition (which according to its nature is purely qualitative; and where there is 
a new external impression to break down inhibitions) depends primarily only on the state at the 2 points 
in time, and only secondarily on the state in between (via conditioned or natural effacement); whilst 
reproduction (which perhaps is more quantitative (selective) ??? and where inhibitions must be broken 
down “from within”) primarily depends both on the state at the point in time of the impression and on 
inhibitions brought about by the state at the moment of reproduction and the time in between. 
(Reproduction can, of course, be facilitated by stimulants such as alcohol or hypnosis (in such cases 
where recognition would take place???). Dear Edgar, you must not think that I do not understand that 
such things only can be said with a chance of it being correct or coherent after a veritable study and 
critique or that I have become a wild and raving dialectician […]»23. 
The letter testifies once again Bohr’s involvement in Rubin’s studies as they were used 
to discuss about such arguments from time to time. Hence, Bohr admits “the truth is 
rather that it is such a long time since I have had the opportunity to speak about such 
things […]”. 
Another letter from Rubin to Bohr concerning philosophical arguments is dated 
September 30, 1915; it contains a reference to the Kantian antithesis between the 
phenomena (the reflected image) and the thing in itself (the reflected object). 
«The similarity between the reflected image and the reflected object can certainly be very great, but on 
the other hand the difference between our conduct, when we have to do with reality, or a reflected image 
is very great.  
It is interesting to realize how apparently futile are the very different criteria we utilize, and the difference 
between their particular nature and the abstract “correlations” one usually applies in such cases. 
                                                                                                                                               
række nye og gamle stavelser, skal meddele hvilke han genkender og hvilke ikke, saa viser det sig, at den 
fra det anspændte aandeligt arbejde udgaaende tilbagevirkende hemning slet ikke har nogen indflydelse 
paa genkendelsen». 
23
 FAVRHOLDT (ed.), NBCW, 10 (cit. note 25, ch. 6), p. 575.    
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It is also very interesting how these criteria can work quite causally, so we do not realize at all from 
where we know that we are dealing with a reflected image or as a logical basis; there is here an area 
where it is very difficult to keep logical basis and cause apart from each other separated»24. 
The passage above seems also to introduce the need to deepen the debate on sciences’ 
foundation. Furthermore, Rubin depicts a sort of complementary view when he talks 
about the difficulty of keeping “logical basis and cause apart from each other 
separated”.  
There is a common line of thought that emerges from Rubin, Høffding and Bohr’s 
conceptions with respect to psychology: that it is not possible to regard ideas/ thought as 
isolated parts.  
Professor David Favrholdt points out that Bohr’s concern as regards psychology was the 
conditions for the description of mental events and/or the description of the brain 
processes corresponding to them. He also mentions that such a thesis contradicts 
Høffding’s view presented in the Outlines of Psychology, namely the conception of 
“association-psychology”. Apparently, Favrholdt is unaware25 that Høffding, in The 
Problems of Philosophy of 1902, already had distanced himself from such a conception: 
“There is always a tendency – the livelier the consciousness, the stronger the tendency – 
toward a rounding out or widening, by means of which the single ideas enter into 
                                                 
24
 NIELS BOHR ARCHIVE, Bohr Private Correspondence. Danish version: «Ligheden mellenr Spejlbillede 
og det afspejlede kan jo vaere meget stor, man paa den anden Side en Forskellen i vor opførsel om det er 
med Virkeligheden eller et Spejlbillede vi har at gøre meget stor. Det er interessant at gøre sig klart hvor 
tilsyneladende intetsigende de højst forskelliger Kriteria vi anvender er og hvor langt der er mellem deres 
specielle Karacter og det abstracte Kriterium ”Sammenhaeng” man plejer at anføre i saadenne Tilfelle. 
Det er ogsaa ganske interessant hvorledes disse Kriteriar kan virke enten ganske kausalt saa vi slet ikke 
gør as klart hvorfra vi ved at vi har med et Spejlbillede at gøre elen som en logisk Begrundelse; der en her 
et Omraade hvar det er meget vanskeligt at hvold logisk Ground og Aarsag ude fra hinanden». 
25
 FAVRHOLDT (ed.), NBCW, 10 (cit. note 25, ch. 6), p. XLIV: «This was the view of the associationist 
psychologists at the end of the 19th century and the view Høffding presented in his Outlines of 
Psychology». Favrholdt did not mention, in any of his writings, Høffding’s critical positions with regard 
to association psychology. 
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combination with other ideas according to fixed laws. The so-called association-
psychology (among whose adherents I have sometimes been unjustly numbered) 
conceives the single ideas as independent atoms, which in a purely external, mechanical 
fashion are brought into combination”26.  
Høffding recognized that in the process of association it is the connected whole that 
exercises its power over the single ideas. Høffding was aware, as Rubin and Bohr too, 
that the ideas never appear in a complete isolation in conformity with the concept of 
unity and the category of totality. 
In 1961 Bohr wrote an important article on the unity of human knowledge that seems to 
be his cultural testament. The paper draws the ideal line between Bohr’s early interests 
in philosophy since the years of the Ekliptica’s gatherings and the concept of 
complementarity developed later on. 
«In particular, the conditions of analysis and synthesis of so-called psychic experiences have always been 
an important problem in philosophy. It is evident that words like thoughts and sentiments, referring to 
mutually exclusive experiences, have been used in a typical complementary manner since the very origin 
of language. In this context, however, the subject-object separation demands special attention. Every 
unambiguous communication about the state and activity of our mind implies, of course, a separation 
between the content of our consciousness and the background loosely referred to as “our self”, but any 
attempt at exhaustive description of the richness of conscious life demands in various situations a 
different placing of the section between subject and object»27. 
In the last quotation Bohr starts from the conditions of analysis and synthesis of psychic 
experiences to affirm that different mental activities exclude others in a complementary 
way. In this like in other philosophical papers, Bohr extends, in an analogical or 
                                                 
26
 HØFFDING, The Problems of Philosophy (cit. note 28, ch. 1), p. 19. 
27
 BOHR, “The Unity of Human Knowledge” (cit. note 24, ch. 1), p. 16. 
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metaphorical way, the physical notion of complementarity to other fields of human 
knowledge (psychology, biology, political science). As far as the psychological field is 
concerned, it is Bohr’s suggestion that thought and feeling seem to exclude each other. 
Namely, emotional aspects are excluded by very deep concentration of thought that, 
vice versa, is excluded by great emotional excitement. One can find a similar 
complementarity in perception: the emotional experience of a piece of music excludes 
conscious analysis of it, whereas analysis of the music excludes emotional experience. 
Both approaches are necessary for our understanding of what music is28. Another 
example is the perception of ambiguous pictures. It is not surprising that in Rubin’s 
doctoral thesis defended in 1915 was presented the famous figure, “Rubin’s vase”, 
which may be perceived as a vase or as two profiles, the one perception excluding the 
other. Bohr and Rubin independently of one another developed similar conceptions of 
complementarity in different fields of study. As Bohr never acknowledged Rubin’s 
precedence as regards complementarity, there must be some “genetic” connection 
between the two conceptions for giving account of such a striking similarity. Høffding’s 
theory of knowledge, based on the concept of unity and continuity and the category of 
totality, is the key to decipher this common “genetic matrix”. Rubin’s role is essential to 
support the claim of Bohr’s debt towards Høffding. In fact, as we have seen, Rubin 
developed his “aspective psychology” following Høffding’s theory of knowledge, 
which Bohr himself was well aware of.  
                                                 
28
 Cf. FAVRHOLDT (ed.), NBCW, 10 (cit. note 25, ch. 6), p. XLVI. 
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Moreover, the legacy of Høffding’s teaching in Bohr’s mind took the form of a deep 
comprehension of the unity and harmony of nature such as of “the unity in all human 
searching for knowledge”29. 
                                                 
29
 Cf. ROZENTAL, “Childhood and Youth” (cit. note 2, ch. 6), p. 13.  
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Chapter 8  
 
Atomic Models and Quantum Hypothesis 
 
8.1 At the Origin of Bohr’s First Atomic Model 
Niels Bohr’s first atomic model was presented in 1913 in a long article published in 
three parts in volume 26 of the Philosophical Magazine. The article, titled “On the 
Constitution of Atoms and Molecules”, provided theoretical foundations for the 
Rutherford atomic model of 1911. Bohr’s approach adopted in the paper was considered 
as original because of the successful use of quantum concepts in the solution of 
problems concerning the constitution and physical problems of the atoms. As a matter 
of fact, until 1910, most part of physicists (with the exceptions of Einstein, Von Laue 
and Ehrenfest) was convinced that Planck’s constant h was characteristic only of the 
problem of heat radiation. Therefore, Bohr’s work assumed a two-fold importance in the 
history of 20th century physics. On the one hand it would represent the first attempt to 
elaborate a consistent theory on the constitution of the atom, on the other hand, it would 
stand as a decisive progress of quantum conceptions by establishing their high level of 
generality. Nevertheless, Bohr’s attempt concretized itself in a research program having 
the purpose of expanding the knowledge of atomic phenomena, and, at the same time, 
of revising the foundations of physics. This research program, as it has been noted, 
lasted until 1927, when Bohr himself provided a physical interpretation of quantum 
mechanics based on the principle of complementarity.  
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As Professor Petruccioli noted, Bohr’s paper of 1913 is situated in a historical 
perspective extending far beyond the role it played on its first appearance with regard to 
the internal questions of a certain domain of physics, i.e. those concerning the nature 
and the observable behaviour of microscopic objects. Only in this broader context is it 
possible to reconstruct the complex network of conceptual and methodological relations 
stretching from the appearance of Planck’s first quantum hypothesis to the 
establishment of the new mechanics during 1920s. In fact, as Bohr later pointed out, 
some 30 years of research were needed to unveil the real physical significance and bring 
out all the conceptual implications of Planck’s idea, according to which the quantity of 
energy exchanged between a field of radiation and an oscillator of frequency ν (a charge 
oscillating around a position of equilibrium) is not the result of a continuous process but 
rather one dependent on distinct events, each involving a finite and indivisible quantity 
of energy. This interpretation of Planck’s ideas was to remain controversial for many 
years, especially with regard to the inevitable, disastrous consequences for classical 
electrodynamics supposedly deriving from the concept of discontinuity. Planck’s 
original formulation of black-body theory had, in fact, employed quantization as a 
hypothesis regarding the way in which the total energy of a system may be distributed 
among N oscillators of differing frequency. That is, it was used as a basis for certain 
probability calculations required to obtain the value of the entropy of the system and, at 
least until 1908, was not regarded by Planck as interpretable from a physical point of 
view as an application of the concept of discontinuity to atomic processes. Moreover, it 
did not was a process lying beyond the interpretative scope of 19th century 
electrodynamics, i.e. a non-classical process. The conviction that the quantum should be 
associated with the idea of discontinuity was to take gradual hold only later, even after 
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the first demonstrations that the quantization of energy was applicable to other sectors 
of experience (e.g. in Einstein’s interpretation of the photoelectric effect)1. 
As a result, the quantum h acquired a far deeper physical meaning than Planck 
originally wanted to assign to it2. 
Einstein’s theory of relativity and Planck’s quantum theory emphasized the limits of the 
foundations of classical physics so to encourage the scientific community to revise the 
whole sector of science. With such a scientific background, Bohr’s attempt to elaborate 
the quantized atomic model would appear justifiable and rational legitimate. Namely, 
the acceptance of the Rutherford model composed of a positively charged nucleus and a 
number of electrons moving freely in predetermined orbits; and the recognition of the 
limitations of classical electrodynamics in accounting for the radioactive stability of 
electrons; and finally the application of Planck’s hypothesis to the model, which would 
give rise to the following assertions: 
1. The electrons can only occupy discrete orbits to which is associated a value of 
energy derivable from the so-called quantum condition for stationary states. 
                                                 
1
 Cf. PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), pp. 37-38. 
2
 «Even when Einstein’s reputation grew, as it quickly did, his views on the necessity of the quantum 
discontinuity remained suspect because they were repeatedly coupled with the generally rejected light-
quantum hypothesis. If the physics profession was to recognize the challenge of Planck’s law, better 
established figures would need to be persuaded that it demanded a break with classical physics. In the 
event, several of them quickly were. During 1908 Lorentz produced a new and especially convincing 
derivation of the Rayleigh-Jeans law. Shortly thereafter he was persuaded that his results require his 
embracing Planck’s theory, including discontinuity or some equivalent departure from tradition. Wien 
and Planck quickly adopted similar positions, the former probably and the latter surely under Lorentz’s 
influence. […] These are the central events through which the energy quantum and discontinuity came to 
challenge the physics profession». From KUHN, Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 
1894-1912 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 189. This Kuhn’s thesis has been object of 
criticism. In particular, Martin Klein (“Paradigm Lost? A Review Symposium, Isis, 1979, 70: 429-34) 
challenged the historiographical accuracy of one of the main theses of Kuhn’s work, i.e. that Planck’s 
original derivation of the law of distribution of radiation is firmly anchored within the classical tradition 
and that  the notion of discontinuity plays no role therein. It is, for that matter, known that Kuhn himself 
described the work as a historiographical heresy.  
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2. The atom emits and absorbs energy in the form of radiation not continuously but 
in quanta – to each process of radiation emission there corresponds the transition 
of an electron from one stationary state to another, from one orbit to another of 
different value of energy. 
Nevertheless, as it will be shown, the originality of Bohr’s work does not boil down to 
the application of Planck’s hypothesis to the problem of atomic constitution. As a 
matter of fact, in this as in other cases, the development of knowledge is not 
characterized by phases of sudden discontinuity; such steps were consequences of the 
concrete problems with which Bohr was dealing with. 
«This seems to be nothing else than what was to be expected, as it seems to be rigorously proved that the 
mechanics is not able to explain the experimental facts in problems dealing with single atoms. In analogy 
to what is known for other problems it seems however to be legitimate to use the mechanics in the 
investigation of the behaviour of a system, if we only look apart from questions of stability»3. 
Bohr motivated his recourse to the hypothesis by explaining that the ratio between the 
kinetic energy and the frequency of an atomic electron always has a definite value.  This 
was the first attempt at the quantization of the model of the atom and the hypothesis is 
contained in a memorandum delivered to Ernest Rutherford in the summer of 1912 
(between June and July) at the end of his studies in England, in which Bohr outlined the 
plan of a subsequent paper on molecular structure and stability. In his view, this was a 
solution that seemed “to offer a possibility of an explanation of the whole group of 
experimental results” and to confirm, to some extent, Planck and Einstein’s conceptions 
                                                 
3
 Cf. “Rutherford Memorandum”, in ROSENFELD, HOYER (eds.), NBCW, 2 (cit. note 34, ch. 2), pp. 136-
58. The quotation is taken from the note on p. A2 of the manuscript. 
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of the mechanism of radiation4. It is worth remarking that there was nothing really new 
in the conviction that the answer to the many problems encountered in the study of 
matter and involving direct reference to the atom’s internal constitution were to be 
found in some non-mechanical hypothesis. As it shall be shown in the chapters to 
follow, what was really new in Bohr was the way in which he dealt with classical 
physics in the study of the new sector of phenomena by using a new hypothesis. Other 
physicists had proposed to use non mechanical hypothesis without success, and Bohr 
had himself been gathering significance evidence in this sense ever since his doctorate 
thesis (1911) on the possible developments and the degree of generality of the electronic 
theory of metals formulated by Lorentz in 1905. In particular, while Bohr recognized 
that Lorentz’ theory was mathematically perfect, he suggested that the physical 
assumptions on which it was based was not valid. The aim of Bohr thesis was to attempt 
to carry out the calculations for the various phenomena that were explained by the 
presence of free electrons in metals in as great generality as possible. In fact, Bohr tried 
to extend Lorentz’ theory to explain problems such as heat radiation and magnetism by 
assuming:  
1. that free electrons are present in any piece of metal, their number depending on 
the nature and temperature of the metal, but their kind being the same in all 
metals. 
2. That mechanical heat equilibrium will exists between the free electrons and the 
atoms in a homogeneous piece of metal of uniform temperature and not 
subjected to external forces. 
                                                 
4
 Ibidem. 
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3. In addition to the above general assumptions, he supposed that the properties of 
the individual atoms of the metal are, on the average, the same in all directions, 
and that this isotrony will remain, independently of the presence of external 
forces5. 
Thus, Bohr was able to show that the electronic theory of metals was not a solid basis to 
derive the explanation of the fundamental properties of matter from the conceptions of 
classical physics. In more general terms, it was demonstrated the insufficiency of 
electromagnetism to express the real physical nature of microscopic objects. 
8.2 The English Period 
In the autumn of 1911 Bohr arrived in Cambridge, where he vainly tried to bring his 
ideas on the electron theory of metals to John Joseph Thomson’s attention6. Moreover, 
The Cambridge Philosophical Society found the English version of his thesis too long to 
be published7. It was in the middle of March 1912 that Bohr moved to Manchester, 
where, working at Rutherford’s laboratory, he found the congenial atmosphere his 
sensitive nature required. In this period he published a paper on the decrease of velocity 
                                                 
5
 Cf. BOHR, Studier Over Metallernes Elektrontheori (Copenhagen: PhD Dissertation, 1911); in 
ROSENFELD, RUD NIELSEN (eds.), NBCW, 1 (cit. note 17, ch. 1), pp. 299-300. Bohr officially presented his 
thesis on May 13, 1911 and discussed it with mathematician P. Heegaard and physicist C. Christiansen. 
6
 In a long letter to his brother Harald dated October 23, 1911, Bohr spoke of the difficulties he had 
encountered in interesting Thomson in his work: «In fact, Thomson has not so far been as easy to deal 
with as I thought the first day. He i san excellent man, incredibly clever and full of imagination (you 
should hear one of his elementary lectures) and extremely friendly; but he is so immensely busy with so 
many things, and he is so absorbed in his work, that it is very difficult to get to talk to him. He has not yet 
had time to read my paper, and I do not know if he will accept my criticism». Nevertheless, from their 
brief conversations Bohr got the impression that Thomson did not agree with the conclusions of his work: 
«[…] he thinks that a mechanical model can be found which will explain the law of heat radiation on the 
basis of the ordinary laws of electromagnetism, something that obviously is impossible, as I have shown 
indirectly […]». From NBCW, 1 (cit. note 17, ch. 1), p. 527. 
7
 With regard to the problems encountered in publishing his doctorate thesis, Bohr informed his brother 
that he had had discouraging news from Larmor about the prospects of his request to the Royal Society: 
«[…] he thinks it will be impossible, not because it has been published in Danish, but because it contains 
criticism of the work of others, and the Royal Society considers it an inviolable rule not to accept 
criticism that does not originate in its own publications». From NBCW, 1 (cit. note 17, ch. 1), p. 529. 
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of charged particles on passing through matter, from which he obtained further hints for 
his approach to the problems of atomic structure8. 
The studies carried on during these months were at the origin of the so-called 
memorandum Rutherford, where Bohr indicated what should constitute the 
methodological basis for the rational foundation of atomic physics: 
1. The use of classical mechanics to study the behaviour of atomic systems. 
2. The necessary choice of hypotheses conflicting with the classical mechanics. 
It is exactly the methodological path that Bohr decided to follow, starting from the 
above epistemologically risky assumption, which will be interesting to shed light on. 
Although, at the same time, Bohr himself regarded this assumption as imposed by 
empirical data and by the more probable atomic structure deriving from it. 
The study of the structure of the atoms was a new sector of research in physics. In fact, 
only after the turn of the century the idea became central in physical research that atoms 
were complex physical objects endowed with an internal structure. In 1897, J. J. 
Thomson’s measurements provided empirical justification for the hypothesis that 
electrons were present within atoms and that they were situated in a state of elastic 
linkage forming a system of oscillating charges or charges rotating on particular orbits. 
In December 1903 Thomson proposed a model in which “the atoms of the elements 
consist of a number of negatively electrified corpuscles enclosed in a sphere of uniform 
positive electrification”9. 
                                                 
8
 BOHR, “On the Theory of the Decrease of Velocity of Moving Electrified Particles on Passing through 
Matter”, Philosophical Magazine, 1912, 25: 10-31. Reprinted in NBCW, 2 (cit. note 34, ch. 2), pp. 18-39. 
9
 JOHN J. THOMSON, “On the Structure of the Atom – An Investigation of the Stability and Periods of 
Oscillation of a Number of Corpuscles Arranged at Equal Intervals around the Circumference of a Circle; 
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The discovery of the atomic nucleus, as is known, may be dated from 1910, when 
Rutherford was pondering over the unexpected occurrence of large angle scattering of 
α-particles from metal plates. In the famous paper of 1911 on the scattering of α and β-
particles by matter and the structure of the atom, Rutherford quoted an article of 1904 
by the Japanese physicist Hantaro Nagaoka10.  
In this study11 Nagaoka considered under the name of “Saturnian system” a model of 
the atom consisting of a positively charged central particle surrounded by rings of 
electron rotating with a common angular velocity. Nagaoka’s concern was to account 
both for the optical spectra and the radioactive emission of β-particles by heavy 
elements. He tried to ascribe the origin of the spectral lines to oscillations of stable ring 
configurations without knowing that J. Perrin had anticipated him yet in 1901, when he 
suggested that a “structure nucléo-planétaire” of the atom would provide room both for 
radioactive instability and for stable configurations of different chemical velocities. 
Nagaoka’s attempt at interpreting spectral lines on the basis of his “Saturnian model” 
was taken up and elaborated by J. W. Nicholson in a series of papers between 
November 1911 and September 1912. Nicholson was interested in the unidentified lines 
appearing in nebular spectra and in the spectra of the solar corona, although no relation 
                                                                                                                                               
With Application of the Results to the Theory of Atomic Structure”, Philosophical Magazine, 1904, 7: 
237-65. 
10
 ERNEST RUTHERFORD, “The Scattering of α and β-Particles by Matter and the Structure of the Atom”, 
Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, 1911, 55: 18-20 (abstract of the 
paper). And “The Scattering of α and β-Particles by Matter and the Structure of the Atom”, Philosophical 
Magazine, 1911, 21: 669-88 (paper). The articles have been reprinted in The Collected Papers of Lord 
Rutherford of Nelson, 3 Vols, Vol. 2 (New York: Interscience, 1962), 212-13, 238-54. 
11
 HANTARO NAGAOKA, “Kinetics of a System of Particles Illustrating the Line and the Band Spectrum 
and the Phenomena of Radioactivity”, Philosophical Magazine, 1904, 7: 445-455. 
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can be traced between his work and Rutherford’s discovery12. Rutherford arrived at the 
following conclusion: “In order to explain these and other results, it is necessary to 
assume that the electrified particle passes through an intense electric field within the 
atom. The scattering of the electrified particles is considered for a type of atom, which 
consists of a central electric charge concentrated at a point and surrounded by a uniform 
spherical distribution of opposite electricity equal in amount”13. On the basis of this 
model, Rutherford obtained the formula for the scattering of α-particles and the angular 
dependence of the distribution observed. It is worth noticing that, at the time, 
Thomson’s model was still the reference point for those physicists who tried to 
determine the relation between the number of electrons and the atomic weights of the 
elements and to provide an explanation of their physical and chemical properties in 
relation to their position in the periodic table. For this reason Rutherford’s new model 
was not seen as self-evident as one would now expect. 
Bohr’s arrival in Manchester after his period in Cambridge was preceded by great 
expectations as he could give important contributions to the researches inaugurated by 
the new model. As is known, the problem of the orbital instability was the weak point of 
the model. However, this question did not preoccupy Bohr, given his conviction that 
this was a symptom of the already known impossibility of treating the investigation of 
atomic structure with classical tools. For this reason the procedure of quantization was 
not aimed at providing a consistent solution to this problem, but it was a consequence of 
the impossibility of describing the orbital motion of charged particles with the Maxwell-
Lorentz laws of electrodynamics. 
                                                 
12
 Cf. ROSENFELD, “Introduction” to BOHR, On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules (Copenhagen: 
Munksgaard, 1963), pp. XI-XII. 
13
 RUTHERFORD, “The Scattering” (cit. note 10), pp. 18-20. 
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As it was noted, in those years the question of radioactive instability was, unlike that of 
mechanical instability, not a criterion discriminating between one picture of the atom 
and another, given that the same instability affected any model containing electronic 
charges in motion14. 
It should be pointed out that Planck’s concept of the quantum of action was not a simple 
makeshift to work out the problem of the stability, but rather a sign of Bohr’s conviction 
that physics had moved definitely beyond the scope of classical theory and that a new 
system of conceptual reference was therefore required15. 
As Petruccioli noted, the stability that Bohr sought to restore to Rutherford’s model of 
the atom so as to demonstrate its definitive superiority to Thomson’s is closely 
connected with a difficulty encountered in the application of mechanical considerations 
to the study of the electron configuration: knowledge of the intensity of the central 
charge and of the number of electrons contained in a ring provides no useful 
information as to the frequencies of movement of the electrons themselves. In fact, all 
that can be derived from such considerations is the relation (e2/a2)X = ma(2piν)2 between 
the frequency ν of revolution and the radius a of the ring, which says nothing about the 
possible states of oscillation of the electronic particles since with the varying of an 
infinitely great number of frequencies may be obtained16. 
                                                 
14
 HEILBRON and KUHN (cit. note 43, ch. 2, p. 241) have stressed the error often found in the literature 
and manuals arising from the attribution of a crucial role in the development of the first theory of the 
atom to radioactive instability. Against such views [e.g. ROSENFELD, “Introduction” (cit. note 12)] they 
object that “radioactive, unlike mechanical, instability does not distinguish Rutherford’s atom from 
Thomson’s” and that “the problem of radioactive instability was well known and seems to have caused 
little concern”.  
15
 This is the view expressed by Bohr himself, see infra. 
16
 PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), p. 43. 
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Given this state of things, it was clear that only a non-mechanical hypothesis would be 
able to account for the stability characteristic of atoms existing in nature and to suggest 
a rigorous criterion to distinguish out of all the mechanically possible states those 
physically admissible. The idea that Bohr put forward in the memorandum was that the 
latter satisfied the condition whereby the ratio between an electron’s kinetic energy and 
its frequency assumes a definite value, which he posited as equal to constant K. It is 
interesting to note that in the memorandum the formulation of the K hypothesis made no 
explicit mention of the quantum of action. Whereas Rosenfeld sustained that there is no 
doubt that Bohr had fully realized that the stabilizing element of atomic structures on 
the Rutherford model had to be sought in the quantum of action, Petruccioli pointed out 
that little remained in this condition of Planck and Einstein’s quantum hypotheses. In 
fact, in this case not only had any procedure for the quantization of the oscillator’s total 
energy disappeared to be replaced by a simple dependence of frequency on kinetic 
energy, but the constant of proportionality appearing in the latter relation was by no 
means reducible to some multiple or significant sub-multiple of Planck’s quantum of 
action. There is evidence to believe that when Bohr wrote the memorandum he was still 
in the dark about the value of K, and that he did not make any progress on this point 
until he attacked the problem of the hydrogen spectrum. As Rosenfeld pointed out, the 
numerical value 1.3 · 10-11 erg, ascribed at the end of the memorandum to the quantity 
denoted by A, is different from that which would correspond to the choice K = 1/2 h. 
For the quantity A may be identified with W0 (h/2K)2, where W0 denotes the atomic 
energy unit 2pi2e4m/h2, numerically equal to 2.0 · 10-11 erg; and the estimated value for K 
is about 0.6 h17. 
                                                 
17
 ROSENFELD, “Introduction” (cit. note 12), pp. XXX-XXXI. 
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Despite these conceptual and formal obstacles, Bohr was convinced that he had found 
out something about the structure of atoms and managed to get hold of a little bit of 
reality18. 
On March 6, 1913 Bohr sent Rutherford the first part of the paper on the constitution of 
atoms and molecules. Bohr’s standpoint on the whole question showed a profound 
change from the solutions sketched out in the memorandum. The procedure of 
quantization was different and there appeared a problem which had been overlooked in 
the earlier memorandum and which entailed the redefinition of the theory’s very 
objectives: “I have tried to show that from such a point of view it seems possible to give 
a simple interpretation of the law of the spectrum of hydrogen, and that the calculation 
affords a close quantitative agreement with experiment”19. This change was influenced 
by comparison with Nicholson’s theory, which suggested alternative solutions for the 
quantization of a Rutherford’s model of the atom and by Bohr’s “discovery” of the 
empirical laws of atomic spectroscopy20. In particular, as Bohr wrote in a letter to 
Rutherford dated January 31st 1913, he had been struck by some articles of the 
astrophysicist Nicholson: 
«In his calculations, Nicholson deals, as I, with systems of the same constitution as your atom-model; and 
in determining the dimensions and the energy of the systems he, as I, seeks a basis in the relation between 
the energy and the frequency suggested by Planck’s theory of radiation»21. 
Nevertheless, Nicholson’s reference to Planck remained only a vague analogy, as he 
obtained for the ratio between the electron’s total energy and their frequency a series of 
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 Letter from Niels to Harald Bohr, June 19, 1912, in NBCW, 1 (cit. note 17, ch. 1), p. 559. 
19
 Letter from Bohr to Rutherford, March 6, 1913, in NBCW, 2 (cit. note 34, ch. 2), pp. 581-83. 
20
 See infra Bohr’s discovery of Johann Balmer’s formula. 
21
 Letter from Bohr to Rutherford, January 31, 1913, in NBCW, 2 (cit. note 34, ch. 2), pp. 579-80. 
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values approximating closely to whole multiples of the constant h. As it will be shown 
below, Bohr pointed out to Rutherford that the differences between the two theories 
were justified by the fact that Nicholson was mainly concerned with the spectra emitted 
by certain gases present in the solar corona and hence with highly unstable states of the 
atom in which an element may emit radiant energy. 
He concluded: 
«I must however remark that the considerations [regarding Nicholson’s theory] play no essential part of 
the investigation in my paper. I do not at all deal with the question of calculation of the frequencies 
corresponding to the lines in the visible spectrum. I have only tried, on the basis of the simple hypothesis, 
which I used from the beginning, to discuss the constitution of the atoms and molecules in their 
permanent state»22. 
However, such as Bohr was aware, the weak point of Nicholson’s theory coincided with 
the core of his revolutionary proposal that for reasons of its own internal consistency 
required the search for solutions, which would justify the simultaneous use of the tools 
of analysis and description provided by classical mechanics and quantum-theoretical 
hypotheses. 
This was Rutherford’s reaction: 
«Your ideas […] are very ingenious and seem to work out very well: but the mixture of Planck’s ideas 
with the old mechanics makes it very difficult to form a physical idea of what is at the basis of it all. 
There appears to me one grave difficulty in your hypothesis, which I have no doubt that you fully realise, 
namely, how does an electron decide what frequency it is going to vibrate at when it passes from one 
stationary state to the other? It seems to me that you have to assume that the electron knows beforehand 
where it is going to stop»23. 
                                                 
22
 Ibidem. 
23
 Letter from Rutherford to Bohr, March 20, 1913, in NBCW, 2 (cit note 34, ch. 2), pp. 583-84. 
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Even Rutherford, as is evident, grasped the weak point of Bohr’s proposal that imposed 
to operate in the context of classical approach and, at the same time, the theory needed 
hypotheses, which violated common sense and imposed a limit to the formation of 
classical ideas: as it was for the electrons which decided and knew beforehand the 
evolution of the process. 
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Chapter 9  
 
From Bohr’s Trilogy to “On the Spectrum of 
Hydrogen” 
 
9.1 The Foundation of a Research Program 
The first part of the trilogy “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules” opens with 
an introduction in which Bohr recalled the difference between Thomson’s model and 
Rutherford’s as regards the mechanical stability of the orbits. 
«In the attempt to explain some of the properties of matter on the basis of this atom-model we meet, 
however, with difficulties of a serious nature arising from the apparent instability of the system of 
electrons: difficulties purposely avoided in atom-models previously considered, for instance, in the one 
proposed by Sir J. J. Thomson […]»1. 
Soon afterwards, Bohr made the point on the development of the theory of the energy 
radiation in light of the most recent experiments as regards different phenomena such as 
specific heats, photoelectric effect, Röntgen rays. Furthermore, he supported such 
considerations with a reference to the proceedings of the first Solvay Conference held in 
Brussels in November 1911, where the subject of the discussion was just the different 
procedures of quantization. In fact, Arthur Erich Haas had carried out yet one of the 
                                                 
1
 BOHR, “On the Constitution” (cit. note 34, ch. 2), pp. 1-2. 
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main attempts at the quantization of the atom’s model in 1910. Arnold Sommerfeld 
during the Solvay Conference referred explicitly to Haas’s hypothesis and stressed the 
importance of the existence of some connection between the constant h and the atom’s 
dimensions. 
Therefore the general state of the research suggested Bohr to modify the approach to the 
problem of the model’s stability through the introduction of a quantity foreign to 
classical electrodynamics such as the quantum of action. 
It is worth noticing that the use of the quantum of action was regarded as required by 
the new theoretic approach independently of the equations of motion of the electrons, 
which could be derived from either model. Therefore, the question of the mechanical 
stability of the orbits had no importance in the choice of atomic model, as on the 
contrary had it at the time of the Memorandum Rutherford. As Bohr himself noted:  
«By the introduction of this quantity the question of the stable configuration of the electrons in the atoms 
is essentially changed, as this constant is of such dimensions and magnitude that it, together with the mass 
and the charged of the particles, can determine a length of the order of magnitude required»2. 
The above mentioned statement is full of consequences as the introduction of the 
constant h can help to work out the weakest point of Rutherford’s model: the 
impossibility of determining the order of magnitude of the atom’s linear dimensions. In 
fact, by the comparison of Thomson’s model with Rutherford’s, the latter do not allow 
the obtainment of the dimensions of the system through simple mechanical calculations. 
Following these premises, Bohr introduces the objectives he intended to achieve with 
his work: 
                                                 
2
 Ibidem, p. 2. 
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«The paper is an attempt to show that the application of the above ideas to Rutherford’s atom-model 
affords a basis for a theory of the constitution of atoms. It will further be shown that from this theory we 
are led to a theory of the constitution of molecules. 
In the present first part of the paper the mechanism of the binding of electrons by a positive nucleus is 
discussed in relation to Planck’s theory. It will be shown that it is possible from the point of view taken to 
account in a simple way for the law of the line spectrum of hydrogen»3. 
We can also synthesize the goals of Bohr’s program as follows: 
- It is possible to construct a consistent theory of the atom’s constitution by 
application of quantum ideas to Rutherford’s model. 
- This theory can be seen as a generalization of Planck’s theory and permits to 
illustrate the mechanism binding the electrons around the nucleus. 
- The theory should offer an interpretation of the line spectrum of the hydrogen 
atom as the Balmer’s formula may be derived from the theory itself. 
We have to remind ourselves that the general theoretical problem of the program was to 
find an acceptable theoretical explanation of the atom’s stability. What did induce Bohr 
for the time being to derogate from such a priority? 
Among historians of science the idea is widespread that Bohr’s program was based on 
some conceptual assumptions and methodological precepts. These principles are not 
backed by unquestionable results but they arise from judgements or rather personal 
convictions as to the potential for development possessed by classical conceptions and 
conceptual implications of quantum physics4. Bohr was aware that classical 
electrodynamics was not applicable to the description of the behaviour of atomic 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (ct. note 6, ch. 1), p. 52. 
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systems. For this reason it was legitimate to adopt hypotheses which were not 
compatible with classical theory. Nevertheless, the determination of the characteristics 
of electron orbits was made possible only by the formal tools of classical mechanics. 
It might seem that Bohr was obliged to follow the procedure he did as both the 
insufficiency of the classical mechanics and the introduction of a new hypothesis were 
universally admitted as well as, at the same time, the only formal tools at his disposal 
were those of classical mechanics itself. 
But the explanation cannot be so banal if Albert Einstein wondered about it as Georg de 
Hevesy reported in a letter to Bohr dated September 23, 1913: 
I have no time yust [sic] now to write you in detail about my experiences here at Vienna Congress but I 
have to writte [sic] you some very favourable news. I spoke this afternoon Einstein, I asked him first 
about his formula and he agreed that is hopeless to find differences by diffusion in water, than [sic] I 
asked him about his view of your theorie [sic]. He told me, it is a very interesting one, important one if it 
is right and so on and he had very similar ideas many years ago but had no pluck to develop it. I told him 
that is established now with certenety [sic] that the Pickering-Fowler spectrum belongs to He. When he 
heard this he was extremely astonished and told me: “Than [sic] the frequency of the light does not 
depand [sic] at all on the frequency of the electron” – (I understood him so??) And this is an enormous 
achievement. The theory of Bohr must be then wright [sic]. I can hardly tell you how pleased I have been 
and indeed hardly anything else could make me such a pleasure than this spontaneous judgement of 
Einstein5. 
As we will see later, Bohr succeeded in deriving from the traditional procedure of 
energy quantization the physical condition enabling him to get round the obstacles of 
classical electrodynamics and to determine in quantitatively rigorous fashion the 
permitted energy levels of any atomic element. At the same time, we cannot pass over 
                                                 
5
 ROSENFELD, HOYER (eds.), NBCW, 2 (cit. note 34, ch. 2), p. 532. 
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the fact that there remained the problem of the internal consistency of a theory 
employing classical means in a phenomenal context at variance with the assumptions of 
the classical theories. The fact did not escape Einstein and this explains the reasons of 
his surprise.  
I intend to analyse the so called two versions of Bohr’s theory in order to show the 
reasons that conducted him to carry on his research program despite the striking 
contradictions he had to face, which probably would discourage any other scientist. 
Bohr emphasized the continuity between quantum and classical mechanics, as it was a 
personal conviction. It is my aim to demonstrate that such emphasis on continuity is 
twofold. On the one hand, together with the concept of unity, it played a heuristic role 
for theory construction in its double role of protective mechanism and guiding principle. 
On the other hand it was an essential condition of the proper understanding of the 
quantum theory. Which is to say: the key to a harmonious incorporation of the quantum 
postulate into classical mechanics, to which the next chapter will be devoted. 
9.2 A Heuristic for the Construction of the First Atomic Theory 
As Bohr himself admitted, “the inadequacy of the classical electrodynamics” is evident 
if we try to account for “the properties of atoms from an atom-model as Rutherford’s”. 
Considering “a simple system of a positively charged nucleus of very small dimensions 
and an electron describing closed orbits around it”, the following hypotheses are 
introduced6: 
1. The mass of the electron is negligibly small in comparison with that of the 
nucleus. 
                                                 
6
 BOHR, “On the Constitution” (cit. note 34, ch. 2), p. 3. 
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2. The velocity of the electron is far below the speed of light, which makes it 
possible to rule out possible relativistic effects. 
3. The electron orbiting around the nucleus radiates no energy. 
In this particular case, the electron describes elliptical orbits and, denoting the charge of 
the electron and of the nucleus by -e and E respectively and the mass of the electron by 
m, it is possible to get the value of the frequency of revolution: 
 (9.1) 
   
together with the length of the major axis a of the orbit 
 
        (9.2) 
Both the equations are functions of Wn, which is the energy necessary to remove the 
electron from the orbit under consideration to an infinitely great distance from the 
nucleus. 
The laws of electrodynamics are proved to be inadequate as the problem of the 
instability rises again if we eliminate the third hypothesis: 
«Let us now, however, take the effect of the energy radiation into account, calculated in the ordinary way 
from the acceleration of the electron. In this case the electron will no longer describe stationary orbits. W 
will continuously increase, and the electron will approach the nucleus describing orbits of smaller and 
smaller dimensions and with greater and greater frequency; the electron on the average gaining in kinetic 
energy at the same time as the whole system loses energy»7. 
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In the next step Bohr puts it that, according to Planck’s theory of radiation, “the energy 
radiation from an atomic system does not take place in the continuous way assumed in 
the ordinary electrodynamics”8, on the contrary it takes place in distinctly separated 
emissions. The total amount of energy radiated out from an atomic radiator is equal to 
nhν, where n is an entire number and h is a universal constant. 
Thus Bohr assumes that the electron, at the beginning of the interaction with the 
nucleus, is at great distance from it, and he also postulates that the electron, after the 
interaction has taken place, has settled down in a stationary orbit around the nucleus. 
What are the values of the energy of the stationary states? 
In order to obtain such values, Bohr has to assume that the process of emission of the 
radiation is always accompanied by the ionization of the atom. As the case under 
examination regards the hydrogen, the electron is found after the process of interaction 
in a bound state n and describes an orbit that is assumed as circular, with ω = ωn and 
with fixed energy Wn. 
In this case, the electron loses a quantity of energy equal to the energy of ionization, 
which, on the basis of the characteristic of the atomic spectra, is homogeneous. 
As Bohr kept the distances from Nicholson’s hypothesis of regarding the electrons 
disturbed during the process of recombination as responsible for the radiation emitted, 
he had to introduce a further assumption. The last hypothesis resorted to by Bohr – 
referred to henceforth as the “1/2 hypothesis”9 – is the first conceptual break in the 
framework of classical physics because it is the definite renounce to the existence of an 
immediate relation between optical and mechanical frequencies. 
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 Ibid., p. 4. 
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 PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), p. 54. 
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The “1/2 hypothesis” states that the homogeneous radiation emitted is “equal to half the 
frequency of revolution of the electron in its final orbit”10. From Planck’s theory we 
may expect that the amount of energy emitted by the process considered is equal to nhν, 
and according to the last assumption ν = (1/2)ωn, consequently we obtain: 
(9.3) 
which is the condition sought for the energy of the stationary orbits. 
The equations (9.1), (9.2) and (9.3) make it possible to get: 
  
(9.4a) 
      
(9.4b) 
      
(9.4c) 
By assigning different integers to n (1, 2, 3…) we obtain a series of values for Wn, ωn 
and 2a corresponding to a series of configuration of the system, of states in which there 
is no radiation. 
Furthermore, Bohr puts in the above expressions n = 1 and E = e, and assigns the 
known values to e, m and h for confirming the compatibility of the theoretical 
predictions with experimental values. Hence he gets: 
 
       (9.5) 
 
                                                 
10
 BOHR, “On the Constitution” (cit. note 34, ch. 2), p. 4. 
Wn = nh
ωn
2
,
Wn =
2pi 2me2E2
n 2h 2
,
ωn =
4pi 2me2E2
n3h 3
,
2a = n
2h2
2pi 2meE
.
2a = 1.1X10−8 cm,
ω = 6.2X1015s−1,
W = 13eV.
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After the introduction of the so called “1/2 hypothesis” Bohr devoted some comments to 
Nicholson’s theory, who in an article published at the end of 1912 had shown the 
possibility to account for “lines on hitherto unknown origin in the spectra of the stellar 
nebulae and that of the solar corona, by assuming the presence in these bodies of certain 
hypothetical elements of exactly indicated constitution”11. 
The atoms of these elements are supposed to consist of a ring of a few electrons 
surrounding a positive nucleus of small dimensions. Nicholson showed that the ratios 
between the wave-length of different sets of lines of the coronal spectrum can be 
accounted for by assuming that the ratio between the energy of the system and the 
frequency of rotation of the ring is equal to an entire multiple of Planck’s constant. 
Despite the excellent agreement between the calculated and observed values, serious 
problems might be raised against Nicholson’s theory. As Bohr pointed out, in 
Nicholson’s theory the frequency of lines in a line spectrum was identified with the 
frequency of vibration of a mechanical system in a distinctly indicated state of 
equilibrium. According to Planck’s theory, we might expect that the radiation is sent out 
in quanta, but systems like Nicholson’s, in which frequency is a function of the energy, 
cannot emit a finite amount of homogeneous radiation. 
Following the digression on Nicholson’s theory, Bohr motivated his “ideas on which the 
written formulae rest” with the introduction of the two momentous postulates12, which 
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 Ibidem, p. 6. 
12
 In the 1913 article, Bohr introduced the two postulates upon which he was to found his quantum theory 
of atomic structure and the process of radiation as “principal assumptions”. He explicitly recognized them 
as postulates from 1921 onwards (Bohr, “Zur Frage der Polarisation der Strahlung in der 
Quantentheorie”, Zeitschrift für Physik, 1921, 6: 1-9). The content of these postulates underwent 
continual modifications and conceptual improvements as a result of development of his theory, and 
especially on the basis of the principle of correspondence. 
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synthesizes and restates what he had already dealt with in the previous passages of the 
article. 
The assumptions used are: 
1. That the dynamical equilibrium of the systems in the stationary states can be 
discussed by means of the ordinary mechanics, while the passing of the 
systems between different stationary states cannot be treated on that basis. 
2. That the latter process is followed by the emission of a homogeneous 
radiation, for which the relation between the frequency and the amount of 
energy emitted is the one given by Planck’s theory. 
Since the hypotheses are concerned with the possible extension of Planck’s ideas, Bohr 
has to recognize that to each state corresponds the emission of a different number of 
quanta and, at the same time, there is an unusual relation between the frequency of the 
radiation and that of the electron. 
The first assumption is the confirmation of the limits of the ordinary mechanics, 
although it holds “in calculations of certain mean values of the motions of the 
electrons”13.  
The second assumption is in contrast to the ordinary electrodynamics, but, as Bohr 
admits, is necessary for accounting for experimental facts. 
Bohr was aware of the logical inconsistencies of his arguments, that is why at the end of 
the first paragraph he tries to get around them by introducing the next section with a too 
much optimistic statement: “We shall, therefore, postpone the discussion of the special 
assumptions, and first show how by the help of the above principal assumptions, and of 
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 BOHR, “On the Constitution” (cit. note 34, ch. 2), p. 7. 
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the expressions [9.4] for the stationary states, we can account for the line-spectrum of 
hydrogen”14. 
As it will be explained in a few lines, the assumptions required [1/2 hypothesis] for 
deriving the expressions [9.4] contradict the content of the postulates. For this reason 
Bohr tries to justify the “1/2 hypothesis” with the following observation: 
«If we assume that the radiation emitted is homogeneous, the second assumption concerning the 
frequency of the radiation suggests itself, since the frequency of revolution of the electron at the 
beginning of the emission is 0»15. 
It can only have meant that the well-known dependence of the optical frequency on the 
frequency of the oscillator was to be replaced by a new relation in which the frequency 
of radiation would prove equal to the average of the frequencies of motion of the 
electron in the initial (ω = 0) and final (ω = ωn) states of the process of recombination16. 
Nevertheless, in the light of the quantum conceptions of the time, such hypothesis could 
not follow at all from the homogeneous nature of the radiation involved. We deduce that 
Bohr’s choice can be accounted for an ad hoc solution regarding the determination both 
of the atom’s energy levels and of the frequencies of the radiation emitted. As a result, 
this stratagem enabled Bohr to get a quantitative agreement between mathematical 
formulas and experimental results.  
In this sense, he corrected the initial formula by a factor of ½ when he noted that his 
calculations did not agree with the experimental values17. 
                                                 
14
 Ibidem, p. 8. 
15
 Ibid., p. 5. 
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 PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), p. 56. 
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 The critical literature has been variously occupied with this problem and formulated a number of 
different hypothesis: cf., for example, T. Hirosige and S. Nisio, “Formation of Bohr’s Theory of Atomic 
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Furthermore, it is also possible to raise a more serious objection: even though the “1/2 
hypothesis” was self-evident – as Bohr wants to make us believe: “the second 
assumption concerning the frequency of the radiation suggests itself” – it would be 
necessary to recognize its inconsistency with the above two postulates. In fact, in these 
postulates Bohr speaks of generic transitions between stationary states associated with 
the emission of homogeneous radiation. Conversely, the “1/2 hypothesis” would 
continue to hold if and only if the averaging procedure remained valid even when the 
initial frequency is not zero. This condition would be in contrast to any evidence and 
even to the reasons presented by Bohr: “since the frequency of revolution at the 
beginning of the emission is zero”. In other words, the extension of the condition [9.3] 
i.e. “1/2 hypothesis” to the determination of the stationary states is possible only if it is 
admitted that the energy radiation appearing in it is exactly equal to the mechanical 
energy of a state. But this can be true only if the energy required to remove the electron 
from that state to an infinitely great distance from the nucleus is found in the form of a 
field of radiation. 
When one speaks of emission via transitions between any stationary states, it does not 
mean a simple generalization of that condition but rather a conceptual leap, which 
entails the departure from the physical and theoretical conditions required by the 
procedure of quantization with which Bohr intended to take up Planck’s theory. 
                                                                                                                                               
Constitution”, Japanese Studies in the History of Science, 1964, 3: 6-28, which see this procedure as 
having been suggested by the operation of averaging the energies of the oscillators introduced by Planck 
in the last formulations of his theory. This interpretation is criticized by Heilbron and Kuhn, “The Genesis 
of the Bohr Atom” (cit. note 43, ch. 2) who take up Rosenfeld’s view and maintain that the idea derives in 
some way from the fact that in his memorandum Bohr had already obtained a value very close to this; 
which does not prevent it from looking like “an ad hoc rationalization, designed to preserve the 
parallelism between Bohr’s radiator and Planck’s” (ibid. 271-272). 
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If we want to obtain Balmer’s formula for the hydrogen spectrum from [9.4a], we have 
to calculate the difference between the energies of the two states (n1 and n2) and divide 
it by Planck’s constant: 
   
 (9.6)     
 
if we put n1 = 2, we get the series in the ultra-red observed by Paschen and previously 
suspected by Ritz, which was derived empirically by Balmer: 
 
(9.7) 
As Bohr observes, the values of the constants of proportionality appearing in the two 
expressions are equal, within the range of experimental error. 
This is a very crucial passage of Bohr’s article and some considerations are hence now 
required: 
a. The “1/2 hypothesis” is important for the economy of Bohr’s theory to the extent 
that its generalization entails the equivalence between the energy of radiation 
and the mechanical energy of the state. 
b. Bohr introduces it for getting a quantitative agreement between the energy 
values of the stationary states and the experimental results, and consequently the 
forced analogy with Planck’s oscillator. 
c. The analogy with Planck’s oscillator entails the establishment of a quantitatively 
rigid relation between the energy of the radiation and the frequency of 
oscillation of an electron. 
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d. Therefore, the maintenance of the ½ factor is the condition for getting a direct 
grafting of Planck’s ideas onto Rutherford’s atomic model, which is to say the 
road map to establish continuity between quantum theory and a classical-
mechanical model as Rutherford’s. 
e. As I see it, the establishment of such continuity represents the heuristic of the 
whole Bohr’s program, viz. the precondition for what we have termed above the 
potential for development possessed by classical conceptions and conceptual 
implications of quantum physics.  
As Heilbron and Kuhn have shown, the derivation of Balmer’s formula from [9.4a] 
contains a conceptual trap: “To reach the Balmer’s formula Bohr will ultimately change 
this interpretation, saying instead that equation [9.3] represents the emission of a single 
quantum with frequency τωτ/2”18. Bohr’s interpretation says that the energy released in 
radiation by an atomic system of frequency ω is nhω, and that this emission of energy is 
the result of distinct and separate elementary processes. Now, by maintaining a strict 
analogy with such an hypothesis, the energy of each stationary states of the atom should 
be regarded as composed by indivisible and separate n quanta each possessing hωn/2 
energy. Moreover, it should be claimed that in each process of radiation this energy is 
emitted through n distinct and separate successive processes, each of which brings one 
quantum of energy into play. For this reason, as Bohr hypothesis states, to each 
stationary state of the atom is associated a different number of quanta, which therefore 
represents the essential condition for a direct application of Planck’s theory to the case 
of the states of the atom. 
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 HEILBRON, KUHN, “The Genesis of the Bohr Atom” (cit. note 43, ch. 2), p. 270. 
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In order to derive Balmer’s formula it must be supposed that:   
(9.8) 
Where ν is the frequency of the radiation emitted when the electron passes from n1 to 
orbit n2, respectively of energies Wn1 and Wn2, with Wn1 > Wn2. 
According to experience and Bohr’s second postulate: 
1. The line observed at frequency ν(n1, n2) corresponds to a homogeneous radiation 
and it can only be produced by the emission of a single quantum hν. 
2. Therefore, hypothesis [9.8] indicates that, according to the mechanism 
underlying the atom-radiation interaction, independently of the quantity of 
energy involved in the process, the energy itself is always released in the form of 
a single quantum. 
3. Ergo this clearly contradicts Planck’s hypothesis and therefore also Bohr’s. 
To summarize, it was after Bohr got acquainted with Balmer’s formula that the rigid 
equivalence between the energy of radiation and the energy of oscillation of an electron 
proved to be fruitful despite the evident logical and conceptual shortcomings. 
As a matter of fact Bohr found:  
1. A theoretical value comparable with Rydberg’s constant. 
2. The explanation of the differences between the spectra of an element observed in 
laboratory conditions and those observed in the celestial bodies. 
3. The attribution of some lines of the spectrum of the star ζ-Puppis to ionized 
atoms of helium.  
hν = Wn1 − Wn2.
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Nevertheless, since the empirical confirmations represented very important results for 
the theory, they rather emphasized the logical contradictions inherent in the analogy 
with Planck’s oscillator.  
I would not regard such logical inconsistencies as a trivial matter because the change of 
Bohr’s interpretation concerning the equation [9.3] for getting the Balmer’s formula 
should entail radical modifications of his personal convictions on the relations between 
quantum and classical physics. On the contrary, as we will see in a few lines, Bohr 
maintained the analogy between Planck’s theory and Rutherford’s, although on a formal 
level. Indeed he assumed that if there exists no evident and immediate relation between 
optical and mechanical frequencies then the objections to which the previous procedure 
is open can be avoided by abandoning the physical analogy with Planck’s oscillator and 
adopting a formal analogy with it. 
What did lead Bohr to persist in his original conceptual assumptions despite he had to 
modify the fundamental interpretation on the emission of radiation on the basis of a 
conceptual trap? I think that the only possible answer is to regard the procedure adopted 
by Bohr as a heuristic that would have produced results in the subsequent development 
of the theory. 
The next step consists in introducing the second version of the quantum theory of the 
atom contained in the trilogy and will show once again the heuristic power of Bohr’s 
conceptions. 
Bohr opens the third paragraph of the first part of the trilogy with an unequivocal 
judgement on the untenable nature of some of the hypotheses introduced in the 
simulated derivation of Balmer’s formula. 
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«We shall now return to the discussion (see p. 7) of the special assumptions used in deducing the 
expressions [9.4] on p. 5 for the stationary states of a system consisting of an electron rotating a nucleus. 
For one, we have assumed that the different stationary states correspond to an emission of a different 
number of energy-quanta. Considering systems in which the frequency is a function of the energy, this 
assumption, however, may be regarded as improbable; for as soon as one quantum is sent out the 
frequency is altered. We shall now see that we can leave the assumption used and still retain the equation 
[9.3] on p. 5 and thereby the formal analogy with Planck’s theory»19. 
By retaining the analogy on a purely formal level, Bohr intends to establish a simple 
proportional relation between his model and Planck’s resonator: 
   
(9.9) 
where f(n) is a certain function of the whole variable n to be determined (in the first 
version, f(n) assumed the value ½); relations analogous to [9.4] are thus obtained: 
.
)(2 33
42
nfh
me
n
pi
ω =                                                                                      (9.10) 
By utilizing the hypothesis implicit in [9.8], simple substitution gives: 
  
                                                                       (9.11)         
   
Although it implies a drastic reduction of the theory’s potential, Bohr describes the next 
step as follows: “We see that in order to get an expression of the same form as the 
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Balmer’s series we must put f (n) = cn”20, with c the constant to be determined. 
Evidently, since [9.11] and               
 
     (9.12) 
 
are formally analogous, the unknown f must be a linear function of the discrete variable 
n. However, in this way the theory abandons all claims to deduce Balmer’s formula and 
to give it a physical interpretation in terms of the mechanism of radiation. On the 
contrary, the formula is assumed as true since it makes possible to correlate with great 
precision the numerical data relative to the frequencies of the lines and therefore, once 
the impossibility of obtaining the conditions of state of the atomic system through a 
Planck-type quantization procedure has been established, is the only tool remaining to 
determine properties of formal type21. 
Now the problem consists in the determination of the value of the constant c, for which 
Bohr takes in consideration a transition of the electron between two contiguous 
stationary states, characterized respectively by the whole numbers N and N – 1. From 
[9.11] it follows that this transition involves the emission of radiation of frequency 
ν =
pi 2me4
2c 2h 3
2N −1
N2(N −1)
.                                                                 (9.13)  
For these two states it is also possible to determine the values of the electron’s 
frequencies of revolution before and after the emission of radiation: 
                                                 
20
 Ibidem, p. 13. 
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 PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), pp. 60-61. 
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            (9.14) 
whose ratio is given by: 
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                   (9.15) 
 
If N is great – i.e. when the states considered are characterized by low frequencies – the 
ratio between the frequency before and after the emission will be very near equal to 1; 
and, Bohr observes, according to the ordinary electrodynamics we should therefore 
expect that the ratio between the frequency of radiation and the frequency of revolution 
also is very nearly equal to 1. This condition will only be satisfied if c = ½. From [9.9] it 
thus follows that the quantum condition for the permitted levels of the hydrogen atom is 
Wn = nh(ωn/2), which is exactly the same as the [9.3] already obtained by Bohr with 
“1/2 hypothesis” and the rigid application of Planck’s hypothesis to Rutherford’s model. 
Bohr developed a procedure valid for the region of high quantum numbers and made 
possible solely by acknowledgement that, in the presence of transitions between states 
characterized by a high value of ν, the correspondence between optical and mechanical 
frequencies, not found in other areas of the spectrum, is re-established. As we have 
suggested earlier, the claim is, in itself, anything but obvious, if it is true that a formal 
analogy with Planck’s theory led Bohr to re-propose the possibility of the orbiting 
electron behaving like a Planck’s oscillator after he had previously ruled it out in the 
physical analogy22.  
                                                 
22
 Petruccioli noted that Bohr extended to the considered case the well-known theoretical result obtained 
in the study of heat radiation as regards the agreement of classical electrodynamics with experimental 
ωN =
pi 2me4
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This fact is crucial because it is an example of the heuristic power either of a personal 
conviction or of a general judgment on the state of physics, not backed by empirical 
results but rather in contrast to the fundamental premises of the theory. It follows that 
the heuristic is able to shape the development of the theory itself. 
It is worth remarking that the argument of the limiting region gave no grounds for 
assuming that the typical discontinuous pattern underlying the mechanism of atomic 
radiation would disappear in the region of large n. On the contrary, Bohr confirmed the 
quantum character of the process, but he added that the classical predictions are 
identical to quantum-theoretical predictions from the numerical point of view when the 
electron, in two continuous stationary orbits, is subjected to motions differing very little 
one from the other. What we have to stress again is the analogy with a classical theory – 
in this case of heat radiation – for asserting that optical frequencies tend to assume the 
same value as mechanical frequencies.  
A few years later (1918) Bohr was to formalize and generalize considerations of this 
type in the principle of correspondence. Many authors, such as Heilbron, Kuhn and 
Rosenfeld tended to see in this procedure the anticipation or embryo of the principle of 
correspondence. 
As I see it, this interpretation is plausible if we regard such a procedure as guided by a 
heuristic, which hence underlies the correspondence principle itself. 
                                                                                                                                               
data in the low-frequency region of the black-body spectrum. Here Planck’s formula became equivalent 
to the classical Rayleigh-Jeans law and the quantized oscillator returned to rigorously classical behaviour. 
Nevertheless, Petruccioli recognized that the analogy with the Rayleigh-Jeans law could not be stretched 
completely to Bohr’s case because the law for the density of energy of temperature radiation, as a 
function of wavelength, agrees with experimental data only in the region of very low frequencies, and that 
it leads to error if used for high frequencies, where the so-called ultraviolet catastrophe takes place. 
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9.3 Bohr’s Self-Criticism as Regards the Analogy with Planck’s 
Resonator 
Bohr had the opportunity to draw up the balance sheet of a year of work in a speech 
delivered before the Danish Physical Society on December 20, 1913 in Copenhagen. In 
that occasion he gave a glimpse of the state of contemporary physics, by regarding this 
as a phase of transition, where new discoveries seemed to cast doubts upon consolidated 
scientific ideas. His judgments were very prudent. Some of them in particular help us to 
a better understanding of the main reasons for his change of attitude with regard to the 
Planckian approach and the reasons, methodological and otherwise, that led him to 
present on that occasion a new version of the quantum theory of the atom. 
«The discovery of these beautiful and simple laws concerning the line spectra of the elements has 
naturally resulted in many attempts at a theoretical explanation. […] Not one of the theories so far 
proposed appears to offer a satisfactory or even a plausible way of explaining the laws of the line spectra. 
Considering our deficient knowledge of the laws which determine the process inside atoms it is scarcely 
possible to give an explanation of the kind attempted in these theories. The inadequacy of our ordinary 
theoretical conceptions has become especially apparent from the important results, which have been 
obtained [with the theory] of temperature radiation. You will therefore understand that I shall not attempt 
to propose an explanation of the spectral laws; on the contrary I shall try to indicate a way in which it 
appears possible to bring the spectral laws into close connection with other properties of the elements, 
which appear to be equally inexplicable on the basis of the present state of the science»23. 
On page 195 of the present chapter I have summarized the three objectives that Bohr 
intended to achieve within his program. As examination of the first two versions of the 
theory has shown, Bohr soon found himself obliged to scale down and reformulate the 
                                                 
23
 BOHR, “On the Spectrum of Hydrogen” (cit. note 36, ch. 2), pp. 285-86. 
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objectives of his program. Indeed, by the end of 1913 the derivation of the Balmer’s 
formula was definitely jettisoned. 
This choice was stated openly just in the occasion of his speech addressed to the Danish 
Society of Physics. The reasons for this choice have a structural character in the 
framework of the new theory. As Bohr explicitly states, they regard the inadequacy of 
the ordinary theoretical conceptions with regard to a new phenomenal situation. Shortly 
afterwards, having run over the stages of the theoretical and experimental research 
leading up to black-body theory, Bohr takes the opportunity to clarify what positive 
contribution had come from the physics of Planck and Einstein. 
«We are therefore compelled to assume, that the classical electrodynamics does not agree with reality, or 
expressed more carefully, that it can not be employed in calculating the absorption and emission of 
radiation by atoms. […] Fortunately, the law of temperature radiation has also successfully indicated the 
direction in which the necessary changes in the electrodynamics are to be sought»24. 
However, after acknowledging Planck’s merits in having pointed to a fruitful idea of 
research, Bohr’s judgments becomes more critical: 
«In formal respects Planck’s theory leaves much to be desired; in certain calculations the ordinary 
electrodynamics is used, while in others assumptions distinctly at variance with it are introduced without 
any attempt being made to show that it is possible to give a consistent explanation of the procedure 
used»25. 
In the span of a few months Bohr had therefore lost his initial enthusiasm for a 
theoretical conception, which he had seen, in the introduction to the trilogy, as a way of 
solving all the difficulties of Rutherford’s model. Bohr became fully aware of the 
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logical and epistemological weakness that seemed to mark the previous quantum 
theories, which he viewed as incapable of encompassing all the consequences of the 
change in conceptual framework required by the new discoveries. Atomic physics was 
regarded as part of the theoretical mainstream stemming from Planck’s work since the 
acknowledged “fact that we can not immediately apply Planck’s theory to our problem 
is not as serious as it might seem to be”26.  
As Bohr goes on to observe:  
«In assuming Planck’s theory we have manifestly acknowledged the inadequacy of the ordinary 
electrodynamics and definitely parted with the coherent group of ideas on which the latter theory is based. 
In fact in taking such a step we can not expect that all cases of disagreement between the theoretical 
conceptions hitherto employed and experiment will be removed by the use of Planck’s assumption 
regarding the quantum of the energy momentarily present in an oscillating system»27.  
Nevertheless, “the discovery of energy quanta must be considered as one of the most 
important results arrived at in physics”28, in fact the demonstration of the constant h 
makes it possible “at least approximately to account for a great number of phenomena 
about which nothing could be said previously”29 implies much more than the validity of 
the quantitative assumption of a discontinuous transformation of energy.  
It must, that is, have a deeper theoretical significance, which cannot as yet be 
deciphered. For this reason:  
                                                 
26
 Ibid., p. 292. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., p. 289. 
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 Ibid. 
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«We stand here almost entirely on virgin ground, and upon introducing new assumptions we need only 
take care not to get into contradiction with experiment. Time, he concluded, will have to show to what 
extent this can be avoided; but the safest way is, of course to make as few assumptions as possible»30.  
As a matter of fact, by the end of 1913 Bohr paid attention to the consistency between 
theoretical assertions and experimental data. He also declared his opposition to the 
uncontrolled proliferation of hypotheses that can be regarded as a criterion guiding the 
definitive reformulation of the theory. 
On the one hand we have the renunciation of any hypothesis as to the behaviour of the 
systems responsible for emitting radiation, also in view of the fact that “we know little 
or nothing about these systems. No one has ever seen a Planck’s resonator, nor indeed 
measured its frequency of oscillation of the radiation which is emitted”31. On the other, 
Bohr showed that it is possible to obtain the laws of temperature radiation without 
making any assumptions about the systems, which emit the radiation. The amount of 
energy emitted each time shall be equal to hν, where ν is the observable frequency of 
radiation. 
The theory can be based uniquely on the two following postulates: 
1. The first states that the electron is found in a stable state, i.e. without radiating, 
on an orbit characterized by a certain quantum number both before and after 
each process of radiation. 
2. The second connects each emission and absorption of radiation with a complete 
transition of the electron from one stationary state to another. 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., p. 292. 
31
 Ibid., p. 293. 
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If the energies of these states are respectively E1 and E2, the following relation gives the 
frequency of the radiation ν emitted or absorbed: 
                                                                                     (9.16) 
Together with recognition of the validity of the empirical laws of the spectral lines and 
Bohr’s considerations regarding the limiting region, these postulates are sufficient for 
the foundation of the quantum theory of the atom. Balmer’s formula for the hydrogen 
spectrum may be written: 
                                                                                             
(9.17) 
 
where R is Rydberg’s constant. Since, as is known, frequency is given by ν = c/λ, where 
c is the velocity of light, 
    
(9.18) 
 
Comparing this with (9.16), the energy W of each stationary state is given by: 
 
(9.19) 
 
which, in turn, substituted in (9.1) gives: 
(9.20) 
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Bohr goes on to show that one may expect a connection with the ordinary 
electrodynamics; namely, that it is possible to calculate the emission of slow 
electromagnetic oscillations on the basis of the classical electrodynamics. Thus he 
shows that this assumption is supported by the result of Lorentz’s calculations. From the 
formula for ω it is seen that the ratio (ωn/ωn+1) tends towards 1 as n increases. 
According to what has been said above, the frequency of the radiation corresponding to 
the transition between two stationary states n and n+1 is given by: 
                               
(9.21) 
If n is very large this expression is approximately equal to: 
ν = 2 Rc/n3.                                                                                                                 (9.22)                  
In order to get a connection with classical electrodynamics Bohr posits this frequency 
equal to the mechanical frequency, i.e. 
ωn = 2 Rc/n3                                                                                                                (9.23) 
which, substituted in (9.20), supplies the expression of Rydberg’s constant: 
  
(9.24) 
It is worth noticing that such considerations remain confined to the limited region and 
no procedure of generalization is attempted: 
«We can not expect to obtain a corresponding explanation of the frequency values of the other stationary 
states. Certain simple formal relations apply, however, to all the stationary states. By introducing the 
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expression, which has been found for R, we get for nth state Wn = 1/2 nhωn. This equation is entirely 
analogous to Planck’s assumptions concerning the energy of a resonator»32. 
Furthermore, Bohr seems to express a sort of self-criticism with regard to the 
hypothesized possibility of establishing some analogy between the Planckian expression 
of the energy of the resonator and the energy of the state of the atom. It becomes more 
explicit when he asserts: 
«This analogy suggests another manner of presenting the theory, and it was just in this way that I was 
originally led into these considerations. When we consider how differently the equation is employed here 
and in Planck’s theory it appears to me misleading to use this analogy as a foundation, and in the account 
I have given I have tried to free myself as much as possible from it»33. 
Was the self-criticism for the use of the analogy of Planck’s resonator a repudiation of 
the conviction as regards the possibility of the incorporation of the quantum of action 
into classical mechanics? 
This question rises from the fact that within Planck’s paradigm Bohr was unable to find 
such conceptual tools as would legitimize in physical terms the mechanism seen as 
underlying the atom’s radioactive behaviour. Not even in a weak version – i.e. in the 
context of a formal analogy – can Planck’s hypothesis be used to derive the quantum 
condition making it possible to select the stationary states of the atom, i.e. the physically 
permitted electronic orbits. As Petruccioli noted, Bohr arrived at this drastic conclusion 
after his two attempts to develop an analogy between harmonic oscillator and electron 
rotating on an atomic orbit; attempts which had forced him to burden the theory 
increasingly with hypotheses that he himself recognized as largely arbitrary. 
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 Ibid., p. 296. 
220 
As I see it, the answer to the above question is in the negative, because Bohr was only 
recognizing the limits of regarding this analogy as a foundation of the theory, as if it 
was the only way to obtain the harmonization of the quantum of action within a 
classical-mechanical model as Rutherford’s. 
Consequently, it was not a disclaimer of the heuristic use he did of his personal 
judgment with regard to the continuity between quantum and ordinary physics. Indeed, 
his purpose was still to demonstrate the validity of such a conviction by searching a 
further connection with classical mechanics. 
The last statement is upheld by the use he did again of the considerations on the 
correspondence between optical and mechanical frequency, although in the limiting 
region without proceeding to any generalization. As it has been already shown in the 
previous passage, in which Bohr posited the frequency of the orbiting electron [9.22] 
equal to the mechanical frequency [9.23] in order to get the Rydberg’s constant. 
I think that such interpretation is confirmed by the quotation  on ft. 32 in which Bohr 
affirms that by introducing the expression, which has been found for R, we get for the 
nth state again the equation [9.3] that is analogous to Planck’s assumption concerning 
the energy of a resonator.  
Nevertheless, as these considerations were confined to the limited region and no 
procedure of generalization were attempted; at the end of 1913 the only proposal Bohr 
was able to make was a semi-empirical procedure for the determination of the 
physically possible states of the atom. All the information we can derive is that it 
represents a practical rule of selection for the atom’s energy levels. Moreover, it was 
capable of providing no other information, especially with regard to: 
1. How energy is emitted or absorbed by the atom. 
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2. The value of the frequency of the radiation that the atom exchanges with the 
external world.  
Unlike Planck, Bohr regarded the quantity of energy involved in each process of 
radiation as capable of determination not in relation to the state of an electron in its 
orbit, but on the basis of comparison of the initial and final states of the transition 
accompanying the radioactive process. It was therefore not the energy of a state – i.e. 
the energy possessed by an electron in a stable orbit – but rather the variation in energy 
in the passage of an electron from one state to another that was equal, minus the 
constant h, to the frequency of radiation. Bohr’s theory was hence incapable of saying 
anything about the nature of that discontinuous process in which the system passes from 
one stationary state to another. The theory was also incapable of saying what happens at 
the moment in which we disturb an atom with radiation. The concept of discontinuity 
was thus introduced into atomic theory. With regard to it and to the general theoretical 
consequences it entailed, Bohr was to repeat in all his writings subsequent to 1913 that 
until a precise idea was obtained of the process of radiation it would be quite arbitrary to 
assert the existence of an incompatibility in principle between quantum and classical 
physics.  
Conversely, he was still convinced of the possibility of ascertaining the validity of their 
compatibility. This conviction shall characterize the subsequent development of Bohr’s 
quantum theory. 
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Chapter 10  
 
Rational Generalization Thesis and Correspondence 
Rule 
 
10.1 At the Origin of the Correspondence Principle 
When Bohr was preparing the lecture to address to the Como Conference in 
commemoration of Alessandro Volta, on September 1927, he wrote some preparatory 
notes, which may throw some light on the origin of the principle of correspondence. 
This is a document of three handwritten pages contained in the folder “Como Lecture II 
(1927)”. The text is in Danish and was written by Bohr. It contains also a final addition 
of two lines probably written by Oskar Klein. 
The paper presented by Bohr at the Conference summarizes the phases of the 
development of his research program, which led to the idea of complementarity.  
Complementarity was seen as the only solution Bohr could give in quantum terms to the 
general problem of scientific knowledge based upon space-time pictures.  
In the preparatory notes Bohr presented an atomic theory in which space-time images 
were utilized, but within certain limits and with great prudence. As a consequence, Bohr 
recognized the validity of the classical theory of radiation, by reducing the hypothesis of 
light quanta to a formal device for the interpretation of certain phenomena.  
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At the same time, he also admitted the legitimacy of the mechanical description of the 
electron despite it entailed the violation of ordinary electrodynamics.  
Nevertheless such descriptions could not explain the cause of the radioactive behaviour 
of the atom. The reasons were to be found in the hypothesis of quantization that was 
incompatible with any traditional model of description.  
Bohr was able to establish only a formal analogy between the radiation field and the 
motion of the orbiting electron. 
The above relation brought to light the discontinuous nature of the process connecting 
the two phenomena involved in the formal analogy. 
As we have already shown, and the preparatory notes confirm it, from the outset of his 
atomic theory Bohr tried to connect the statistical laws with the properties of the models 
adopted: i.e. a way for ascertaining if and how classical conceptions were applicable to 
quantum phenomena.  
This is to say that Bohr was still guided by what we have termed a heuristic for the 
atomic theory’s construction: the fundamental continuity between classical and quantum 
physics. 
This is the text of the translation of the first page of the document: 
I 10-7-1926 [1927]1 
All information about atoms expressed in classical concepts. 
All classical concepts defined through space-time pictures. 
Therefore beginning of quantum [theory?] piecewise use of space-time pictures formally connected by 
relations containing Planck’s constant. and on conservation of energy and momentum. 
                                                 
1
 Rüdinger and Kalckar claim that the date (10.07.1926) is wrong in that certain references contained in 
the document show it to date from July 1927. An anastatic copy of the three pages, transcription and 
English translation are to be found in KALCKAR (ed.), NBCW, 6 (cit. note 1, ch. 1), 59-65.
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The connection of essentially discontinuous and statistical kind. The endeavours at connecting the 
statistical laws with the properties of pictures thus implied that they appeared as generalization of the 
classical theory, and in particular converge to the demands of this theory in the limit [where] in statistical 
applications one may disregard the discontinuous element. Led to the recognition of a far-reaching 
correspondence between the quantum theory and the classical theory and to the program of developing a 
[consistent?] quantitative description [by] looking for analogous features in the classical theory. 
However it proved impossible to express this quantitatively by space-time pictures. [Indeed?], the theory 
exhibited a duality when one considered on the one hand the superposition principle and on the other 
hand the conservation of energy and momentum2. 
It was in such a framework of ideas that the correspondence principle was formulated 
on the basis of the recognition that in the limiting region of high quantum numbers – 
where the element of discontinuity may be overlooked in statistical applications – 
classical predictions are in quantitative agreement with experimental data. Bohr 
assigned to this principle a central function in the construction of his theory. But I want 
to highlight that the properly said “correspondence principle” was primary a technical 
tool (i.e. properly inherent to physics) – at least by its formulation of 1918 – that 
derived from the initial conviction that later became recognition of “a far-reaching 
correspondence between the quantum theory and the classical theory”, as the italics in 
the above quotation clearly state. In addition, we cannot pass over the fact that the first 
time Bohr used the correspondence argument, although with non-negligible differences, 
was in the first article of the trilogy. 
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As we have seen in the previous chapter, authors such as Rosenfeld, Kuhn and Heilbron 
regarded considerations concerning the region of high quantum numbers as an 
anticipation of the principle of correspondence. 
This interpretation is backed by the fact that the limiting considerations, upon the 
correspondence relation is based, are already present in Bohr’s earliest work. On the 
contrary, other authors (Sandro Petruccioli, for instance) affirmed that the consistent 
formulation of the principle of correspondence rather implies a logical relation not to be 
found in the procedure followed in 19133. In fact, Petruccioli sustains that Bohr made 
an intuitive leap from the 1913’s procedure to the formulation of the correspondence 
principle that was translated into two generalizations.  
The first consists in asserting that in the limiting region the connection found did not 
regard solely the values of the frequencies since the spectrum would reflect the nature of 
the particle motion in full. In short, it was to be expected that the analogy would be 
respected in general. The second generalization extends the validity of the relation of 
correspondence also to cases in which there was no longer any numerical identity to be 
found between optical and mechanical frequencies and where it proved impossible “to 
obtain a simple quantitative direct connection between the probabilities of the various 
transitions and the motion”4. Here, Bohr was upheld only by his intuition, which helped 
him to assert that “we are led to consider the possibility of the occurrence of a transition 
between two given stationary states as conditioned by the appearance in the motion of 
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 PETRUCCIOLI, Atoms, Metaphors (cit. note 6, ch. 1), pp. 87-88. 
4
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the corresponding harmonic vibration”5. Bohr, of course, was not able to say in which 
motion of the system this harmonic should appear to influence the occurrence of a 
process of transition.  
As I see it, it is possible to find a synthesis between the above mentioned two antithetic 
positions if we recognize that Bohr was inspired by a general conviction with regard to 
the relation between quantum and ordinary physics. If we accept such interpretation we 
shall consider the correspondence principle neither as a formal analogy nor so radical a 
revision of the procedure followed in 1913. According to this interpretation, I think that 
Petruccioli is right in the sense that he regarded the correspondence principle as a 
“physical principle” (i.e. the quantitative convergence found between spectrum and 
motion but more general than 1913’s) applicable in a well-defined domain and, at the 
same time, he stressed the differences between the first formulation concerning the 
concept of correspondence of 1918, based on the analogy between classical and 
quantum mechanics, and the later formulation of 1920. 
Kuhn, Rosenfeld and Heilbron would be also right in claiming a conceptual contiguity 
between the 1913 and the later formulation of the correspondence principle if they 
considered it as a universal principle, i.e. non-applicable only in a limited domain. 
Indeed Bohr himself declared that the examination of atomic problems “has given 
unrestricted and convincing support”6 for the viewpoint that he summarized under the 
name of the principle of correspondence.  
It follows that both the 1913’s embryonic version of correspondence and the subsequent 
formulations developed by 1918 are to be considered as gradations of the same 
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universal conception of quantum theory as a rational generalization of the classical 
theory. Conception that is essential for the proper understanding of the whole quantum 
mechanics. I shall clarify this position in the next paragraphs. 
Moreover, we have to remind ourselves that correspondence is also expression of a 
heuristic or methodological precept guiding the formulation of a new theory. This 
conclusion confirms that even the 1913’s procedure has to be considered as part of the 
heuristic underpinning the construction of the new theory. 
10.2 The Twofold Formulation of the Correspondence Principle 
The first work on which Bohr used the concept of correspondence was “On the 
Quantum Theory of Line-Spectra. Part I”, published in 1918: 
«[…] in the limit where the motions in successive stationary states comparatively differ very little from 
each other, will tend to coincide with the frequencies to be expected on the ordinary theory of radiation 
from the motion of the system in the stationary states»7. 
In this statement Bohr went over and generalized the considerations regarding the 
limiting region introduced in the trilogy. In the years before Bohr adopted the 
expression “correspondence principle”, he used the considerations as regards the 
limiting region as a sort of analogy between classical and quantum mechanics. In his 
later writings Bohr explicitly rejected this view that the correspondence principle can be 
thought of as an analogy between the two theories.  
The first occasion on which Bohr used the words “correspondence principle” was in 
“On the Series Spectra of Elements” from 1920 (lecture before the German Physical 
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in NBCW, 3 (cit. note 4), 71-102, pp. 73-74. 
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Society in Berlin, April 27). The correspondence program was finally to assume 
definitive shape in the paper that, on Lorentz’s invitation, Bohr presented at the third 
Solvay Conference in April 19218. Bohr did not attend the Brussels meeting in person 
and entrusted Ehrenfest with the task of illustrating the paper’s main points and 
representing his views during the discussion, which concentrated almost exclusively on 
the meaning and the applicational consequences of the new principle9. Bohr’s absence 
was due to poor health.  
The paper dealt with two subjects: the determination of the conditions of state for the 
selection of permitted energy levels on the basis of the properties of motion possessed 
by an atomic system in a given stationary state; and the examination of the problem of 
interaction between radiation and matter from the quantum theoretical viewpoint. It was 
in the latter context that Bohr introduced the principle of correspondence. The whole 
discussion was developed within the framework of reference defined by the 
fundamental postulates, which Bohr reformulated in the following terms: 
«An atomic system which emits a spectrum consisting of sharp lines possesses a number of separate 
distinguished states, the so-called stationary states, in which the system may exist at any rate for a time 
without emission of radiation, such an emission taking place only by a process of complete transition 
between two stationary states […]. In the theory, the frequency of radiation emitted during a process of 
this kind is not directly determined by the motion of the particles within the atom in a way corresponding 
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 ID., “On the Application” (cit. note 4).  
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to the ideas of the classical theory of electromagnetism, but is simply related to the total amount of 
energy, emitted during the transition […]»10. 
At this point he introduced the general relation frequencies: 
(10.1) 
which he regarded as the formal basis of quantum theory.  
Once the existence of an irreparable break with the customary ideas of physics had been 
recognized, the general objective of the theory became for Bohr the systematic 
exploration of the possibility of successfully developing a formal analogy with those 
ideas. The first step in this direction consisted in asking how far the quantum postulates 
made it possible to describe motion in stationary states with the concepts used 
classically to describe the behaviour of a system of charged particles. In other words, 
Bohr intended to ascertain with what degrees of approximation it was still possible “to 
describe the motion of the particles in the stationary states of an atomic system as that 
of mass points moving under influence of their mutual repulsion and attraction due to 
their electric-charges”11. That this was, in any case, not permitted in examining the 
external disturbances of particle motion was a consequence of quantum problem of the 
stability of the stationary states.  
The theoretical conditions for their selection among the possible mechanical motions of 
the system referred in fact to properties dependent on the periodicity of the orbits and 
not on the velocities and configurations of the particles. In the case of an atomic system 
subjected to variable external conditions, the theory was therefore obliged to abandon 
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the approach of ordinary mechanics, which would entail the study of the effects of the 
forces acting on the particles at a given instant.  
The theory would rather be required to determine how much conditions modified the 
properties of periodicity of a state and thus to arrive at the orbital motion of particles 
that would be compatible with them. An example of the behaviour of atoms under the 
action of variable external conditions was given by the phenomena of light absorption 
and emission, which provided further confirmation that “the interaction of the atom with 
the incident electromagnetic waves can by no means be described on the basis of the 
classical electronic theory”12.  
At the time Bohr saw in the “unknown mechanism” responsible for the process of 
radiation the principal reason for the existence of an insuperable limit to the descriptive 
possibilities of the classical concepts. Although the theory provided no explanation on 
this point, the phenomena examined did make it possible to clarify why a rigorously 
classical treatment of the process of interaction was forbidden: in such phenomena the 
external forces undergo significant alterations within periods of time that cannot be 
compared with the periods characteristic of the motion of atomic particles13.  
We could say that Bohr intended to ascertain whether the mechanical analysis of 
electron motion would produce significant results even when one gave up the idea of 
regarding the atom as an isolated system, and try to determine how far a mechanical 
description of the model was still admissible. Bohr used the following rational tools to 
achieve his purpose: Ehrenfest’s adiabatic principle and Sommerfeld’s formal rules for 
the determination of stationary states. Sommerfeld was able to account for the fine 
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structure of hydrogen by incorporating relativistic considerations (the variation of the 
electron mass in its elliptical orbit) in the generalized quantum conditions.  
By doing so, the old quantum theory could be applied not only to simply periodic 
motion, but to so-called conditionally (or multiply) periodic motion as well. The third 
tool was the Epstein-Schwarzschild theory, which made it possible to extend the 
conditions of state to the so-called multi-periodic motions, i.e. to a set of system more 
complex than those considered at first, such as the hydrogen atom, by for which the 
equations of motion could still be solved with the method of separation of variables14. 
Furthermore, Bohr found that, within the range of approximation required by a rigorous 
mechanical treatment of the motion of atomic particles, the theory’s interpretative 
effectiveness was, in any case, somewhat reduced, since most of the phenomena 
examined implied the existence of physical conditions contrasting with such 
approximations. However, Bohr defended his mechanical/model-based approach, 
stressing that there was at the time no other tool capable of providing an unambiguous 
definition of the energies of the states appearing in the general relation of frequencies: 
«At the present state of the theory we do not possess any means of describing in detail the process of 
direct transition between two stationary states […]»15. 
The shortcoming that Bohr saw in the theory assumed still greater importance when one 
went on to examine the process of radiation, in which the initial assumptions made it 
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necessary to renounce any attempt to establish a direct connection between particle 
motion and radiation and to go no further than the hypothesis that the individual 
components of the spectrum were due to the occurrence of a certain number of 
independent processes within the atom. This was decidedly meagre information, 
especially if one believed, as Bohr then maintained, that the full understanding of such 
processes had to be subordinated to the construction of “a detailed picture of production 
and propagation of radiation”16. 
After over twenty years of studies and of undeniable success, the problem facing 
quantum theory was still the same: the absence of a real understanding of the interaction 
between radiation and matter. And it was with regard to this point that Bohr, called for 
the first time to take his place in the most prestigious group of physicists of the day, 
maintained that the strategy to pursue was still the search for a unified picture for the 
mechanism of emission and absorption and for the propagation of radiation through 
space. Immediately afterwards however, almost as though to tone down the pessimistic 
conclusions drawn by his analysis, he stated: 
«We shall see, however, how it is possible to trace a connection between the motion of an atomic system 
and the spectrum which, even if it must be essentially different from that which would follow from the 
classical electromagnetic theory, still preserves such features that it gives us hope of attaining a picture 
which includes the interpretation of the experimental evidence regarding atomic processes as well as the 
phenomena of interference of light waves […]»17. 
This hope was certainly not such as to make him change his drastic judgement as 
regards the break with classical theory brought about by quantum theoretical 
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conceptions. As he put it, the mechanism underlying the new picture would most 
probably entail a revision of the fundamental concepts of physics themselves. In other 
words, Bohr’s intention was not to save some fragment of theory, even if his words 
made it clear that the general viewpoint was still that of a field conception of 
electromagnetic phenomena. He was concerned rather with demonstrating the existence 
of sufficient evidence to relate quantum processes to the classical model of description. 
Once again, in the absence of suitable tools to tackle the problem of the transition 
mechanism directly, he found in the limiting region the formal condition enabling him 
to identify “a certain suggestive connection between the transitions and the motion of 
the system”18. In this region thanks to the methods of analytical mechanics, a 
quantitative convergence was found between spectrum and motion even more general 
than that discovered in 1913. It could, in fact, be demonstrated rigorously that for multi-
periodic system there exists a simple relation between the frequency of a harmonic 
component of motion in all transitions between states for which the values of the 
respective principal quantum numbers, n’ and n’’, are large with respect to their 
difference. This made it possible to connect the occurrence of a transition with the 
properties characteristic of motion even if, as Bohr again pointed out, this did not mean 
a progressive elimination of the differences between the quantum nature of the radiation 
process and classical ideas. 
Within the idea of a correspondence between processes of transition and components of 
motion lay a logical relation which Bohr regarded as capable of establishing a 
dependence between spectrum and motion similar in all respects to that whereby in 
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classical theory the intensity of the radiation emitted by a particle in the course of a 
harmonic oscillation depends upon its amplitude.  
In the course of a lecture delivered in September 1923 at the British Association 
Meeting in Liverpool, Bohr reformulated the second postulate of his theory in the light 
of his new principle and, whereas it had hitherto asserted the impossibility of deriving 
the frequencies of the radiation emitted from the motion of the particles, it now stated 
that “a process of transition between two stationary states can be accompanied by the 
emission of electromagnetic radiation, which will have the same properties as that 
which would be sent out according to the classical theory from an electrified particle 
executing a harmonic vibration with constant frequency”19. 
This was an important amendment, considering that, before the American physicist John 
Slater arrived in Copenhagen, Bohr had already matured, on the basis of the 
correspondence principle, the idea underlying the theory of virtual oscillator, the final 
attempt to save the classical model of description. 
10.3 The Theory of Virtual Oscillators 
The theory of virtual oscillator is as an example of Bohr’s peculiar conception of the 
principle of correspondence. In fact, in the article published on January 1924, “The 
Quantum Theory of Radiation”, signed together with John Slater and Hendrik A. 
Kramers, Bohr arrived to this conclusion: 
«At the present state of science it does not seem possible to avoid the formal character of the quantum 
theory which is shown by the fact that the interpretation of atomic phenomena does not involve a 
description of the mechanism of the discontinuous process […]. On the correspondence principle it seems 
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nevertheless possible to […] arrive at a consistent description of optical phenomena by connecting the 
discontinuous effects occurring in atoms with the continuous radiation field […]»20. 
This passage announced a turning point in atomic physics. On the basis of the 
researches carried on, discontinuity was not in itself considered as incompatible with the 
theory’s descriptive content, and rational solutions were provided that related a whole 
set of phenomena dependent on the radiation properties of matter to the continuous 
picture of the radiation field. 
I want to point out the divergence between the three scientists due fundamentally to the 
different weight assigned to the principle of correspondence. If it is true that Bohr and 
Kramers21 were interested in the scheme Slater proposed22, what they saw in it was not 
only quite contrary to his intentions but something he could not understand very clearly: 
«I got started a couple of days after Christmas telling about this theory and that has got them decidedly 
excited. I think, of course, they don’t agree with it all yet. But they do agree with a good deal, and have 
no particular arguments except their preconceived opinions against the rest of it, and seem prepared to 
give those up if they have to. So I think there are hopes»23. 
This was not at all the case; within a few weeks a new theory was worked out that left 
their differences of opinion unaltered, which can be gathered among other things from 
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the letter Slater sent from the Copenhagen Institute for Theoretical Physics to Nature on 
January 28. Slater did not intend to publicize his dissent, but, at the same time, he did 
not accept the critics of his colleagues: 
«The idea of the activity of the stationary states presented here suggested itself to me in the course of an 
attempt to combine the elements of the theories of electrodynamics and of light quanta by setting up a 
field to guide discrete quanta, which might move, for example, along the direction of Poynting’s vector. 
But when the idea with that interpretation was described to Dr. Kramers, he pointed out that it scarcely 
suggested the definite coupling between emission and absorption processes which light quanta provided, 
but rather indicated a much greater independence between transition processes in distant atoms than I had 
perceived. The subject has been discussed at length with Prof. Bohr and Dr. Kramers, and a joint paper 
with them will shortly be published in the Philosophical Magazine, describing the picture more fully, and 
suggesting possible applications in the development of the quantum theory of radiation»24. 
The article appeared under the signature of the three authors in spite of Slater’s 
standpoint was scarcely represented. Otherwise it would not be possible to comprehend 
the reasons, which led Slater to stress once again his original hypothesis to establish “a 
harmony between the physical pictures of the electro-dynamical theory of light and the 
theory of light quanta”25. Furthermore, why did he feel the need to write in a letter to 
Van Vleck that the article was written entirely by Bohr and Kramers? 
It is worth noticing that once Slater’s idea had been reconsidered in the light of the 
correspondence principle, there was very little left of the classical mechanism with 
which he had tried to solve the problem of the production and propagation of radiation. 
Even though Slater pointed out his colleagues’ preconceived rejection of the 
corpuscular picture of radiation, we have to remind that his scheme contained a serious 
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logical inconsistency. As Petruccioli noted, Kramers’ criticism concerned the presence 
of a theoretically unjustified asymmetry in the scheme: if the amplitudes of the fields 
associated with a stationary state determine the probabilities for the emission of a 
quantum and therefore of the transition to a different state, then something very similar 
should occur in transitions involving the absorption of a quantum. In any case, if the 
field acts on transitions solely by defining their probabilities, Kramers was right in 
pointing out to Slater that his proposal necessarily implied an independence of the 
transition processes in two distant atoms. It is in fact entirely arbitrary to affirm that the 
second atom must absorb the same quantum that the first atom emits26. 
As far as Bohr’s view is concerned, on the one hand he acknowledged Slater’s merit in 
suggesting the fundamental idea; on the other hand, he wanted to point out that it was 
thanks to the correspondence principle that a connection had been established between 
the discontinuous processes occurring inside the atom and the continuous character of 
the radiation field. 
To summarize, one of the main reasons of disagreement between Bohr, Kramers and 
Slater was not whether light quanta existed or not, but rather the incompatibility of 
Slater’s approach and Bohr’s conviction that the concept of virtual field would facilitate 
an important generalization of the correspondence principle. 
Petruccioli outlined three main points which brings evidence to such a claim: 
1. Kramers’ initial criticisms were not at all directed at the picture Slater had 
suggested for the propagation of radiation (waves drawing the light quanta 
along), but rather at the mechanism of radiation. 
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2. The use of the term “virtual” to indicate the fields emitted by the oscillators 
associated with stationary states is not indisputably Slater’s, since there is no 
trace of it in his writings prior to his arrival in Copenhagen. He spoke of “virtual 
fields” in his letter to Nature, which however was written when the article was 
practically complete. In any case, we shall see that in light of Bohr’s 
interpretation based on the correspondence principle, Slater’s fields must be 
considered entirely real. 
3. In Slater’s scheme the correspondence principle plays a marginal role and is 
taken up only to determine the amplitudes of the oscillations corresponding to 
the various emission frequencies. Its function, in any case, is certainly not that of 
linking the continuity of the field with the discontinuity of the quantum 
processes. The reference Slater makes to statistical thermodynamics shows 
rather that he considered the probabilistic nature of the transitions to be a 
temporary characteristic of the theory due to incomplete knowledge of atomic 
processes and not an intrinsic element of quantum phenomena27. 
Bohr presented the new quantum theory of radiation as a further development of the 
correspondence program, with the purpose of establishing a continuity, which was not 
just hypothetical: 
«The present paper may in various respects be considered as a supplement to the first part of a recent 
treatise by Bohr, dealing with the principles of the quantum theory, in which several of the problems dealt 
with here are treated more fully»28. 
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The importance of the new theory was due to the formation of  “a picture as regards the 
time-spatial occurrence of the various transition processes on which the observations of 
the optical phenomena ultimately depend”29. It must be recognized that the only 
progress achieved was the interpretation of observed radiation phenomena “by 
connecting these phenomena with the stationary states and the transitions between them 
in a way somewhat different from that hitherto followed”30.  
This was possible because  
«[…] The correspondence principle has led to comparing the reaction of an atom on a field of radiation 
with the reaction on such a field which, according to the classical theory of electrodynamics, should be 
expected from a set of “virtual” harmonic oscillators with frequencies equal to those for the various 
possible transitions between stationary states»31. 
Moreover, the same correspondence principle suggests two hypotheses, which define 
the modes of this comparison: 
1. A given atom in a certain stationary state will communicate continually with 
other atoms through a time-spatial mechanism which is virtually equivalent with 
the field of radiation which on the classical theory would originate from the 
virtual harmonic oscillators corresponding to the various possible transitions to 
other stationary states. 
2. The occurrence of transition processes for the given atom itself, as well as for 
other atoms with which it is in mutual communication, is connected with this 
mechanism by probability laws which are analogous to those which in Einstein’s 
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theory hold for the induced transitions between stationary states when 
illuminated by radiation32. 
This passage is fundamental in the history of atomic physics because what arises from 
the first hypothesis is a point of divergence for historical interpretation of Bohr’s work, 
and of the evolution of the Copenhagen school of thought. 
One has not to consider such a model as an extreme attempt to save a research program, 
as the hypothesis Bohr wanted to test has nothing to do with the orbit model or with 
Maxwell waves. In fact, on the basis of the correspondence principle, Bohr established a 
virtual equivalence between the description of the virtual model and the real physical 
situation of quantum systems. 
The second hypothesis referred explicitly to the probabilistic considerations Einstein 
had used in 1917 to arrive at a new derivation of Planck’s formula of heat radiation 
starting from the notion of quantum transition. According to Einstein, there were two 
distinct emission processes, one which took place spontaneously when the system was 
in an excited state, and another which was induced by the presence of a radiation field 
of the suitable frequency33. Therefore, Bohr appeared to make a simplification of 
Slater’s hypothesis by eliminating every reference to electromagnetic energy fluxes and 
light quanta, and hence took advantage of the analogy with Einstein’s theory to give it a 
more general formulation: the probability of every transition is determined by fields 
produced by virtual oscillators. As a consequence, it became evident that, following this 
interpretation, the “spontaneous emissions” were transitions induced by virtual radiation 
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fields. But the implications of such assumption undermined the rational foundations of 
the understanding of nature. 
In fact, in the virtual oscillator model, the interaction of radiation and matter is 
described on the basis of the activity of the virtual fields, which establish 
communication between one atomic system and another. One has to imagine that in the 
model the quantum stationary states are replaced, on the basis of correspondence, by a 
system of charges oscillating at the transition frequencies allowed by the state, and that 
in general every field – generated according to classical laws by oscillators – acts 
probabilistically in Einsteinian fashion on the transitions between states. It obviously 
follows that a process of transition will depend both on the virtual fields of its own 
oscillators which correspond to the initial state of the transition and on all the 
communicating fields of atoms. Furthermore, the occurrence of one transition does not 
influence the transitions taking place in the other atoms; in fact, during the entire 
process the atom does not emit any virtual fields. 
As a consequence, we are obliged to abandon “any attempt at a causal connection 
between the transitions in distant atoms, and especially a direct application of the 
principles of conservation of energy and momentum, so characteristic for the classical 
theories”34. 
In fact, if an atom A can contribute to the occurrence of a transition in an atom B 
through its own virtual fields, it means that the events do not show any causal relation 
and, above all, all the quantities of energy involved in the transitions of the atoms do not 
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satisfy the principle of the conservation of energy35. Finally, the article concluded that 
the observed validity of the conservation principle cannot be anything but the result of a 
statistical average over a great number of individual events, for which these principles 
are not rigorously satisfied. It is beyond doubt that the model provides a space-time 
description of the interaction of radiation with matter, although it violates the principle 
of the conservation of energy and the concept of causality. Nevertheless, it was “the 
only consistent way of describing the interaction between radiation and atoms by a 
theory involving probability considerations”36. However, the model could not be 
regarded as the result of an attempt to represent coherently the real physical situation of 
atomic processes. But this was not the goal Bohr intended to achieve by means of the 
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application of the principle of correspondence, as what exists between atom and model 
is a virtual equivalence and not a real correspondence37. 
Professor Petruccioli noted correctly that Slater’s position couldn’t be more distant. In 
fact, Slater held that the fields produced by oscillators are real objects that draw energy 
particles through space. On the contrary, for Bohr, the model is a purely logical tool, a 
theoretical fiction, which, though constructed within a conceptual framework 
irreducible to the quantum-theoretical, can nevertheless enable us to explore certain 
aspects of the reality of atoms. In particular, Bohr appeared to ask himself about the 
consequences deriving from the existence of a real space-time mechanism that enables 
atoms to communicate with one another. The term “communication” Bohr used entails 
once again the existence of two levels of interpretations: 
1. There is a quantum radiation theory, which tackles the problem of the 
constitution of atoms and of radiation processes with a language suggested by 
acquired empirical knowledge, whose vocabulary is, however, extremely poor 
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and still only approximate (e.g. it includes the undefined terms “stationary 
state”, “transition”, and “communication mechanisms”). 
2. There is a classical theory, which possesses a vast store of knowledge expressed 
in a rigorous and highly formalized language but which cannot account for the 
world of micro-objects. The only thing to do, according to Bohr, is to use this 
second level systematically in order to gain as much information from it as 
possible and therefore endow quantum theory with new interpretative and 
conceptual tools38. 
Walther Bothe tried to test the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory with the help of Hans 
Geiger, who had pioneered the methods of counting radioactive particles during his 
Manchester years with Rutherford. The Bothe-Geiger experiment soon yielded a result. 
On January 15, 1925 Max Born wrote to Niels Bohr: “The other day I was in Berlin. 
There everybody was talking about the result of the Bothe-Geiger experiment, which 
decided in favour of light quanta. Einstein was triumphant”39. 
They gave a report on the details of the experiment in a paper, entitled “Über das Wesen 
des Comptoneffekts; ein experimenteller Beitrag zur Theorie der Strahlung” (On the 
Nature of the Compton Effect; An Experimental Contribution to the Theory of 
Radiation) which was published on the Zeitschrift für Physik on April 25, 1925. In this 
paper Bothe and Geiger concluded: 
«The experiments described here are not in agreement with Bohr’s interpretation of the Compton effect 
[…]. However, not only in respect to the Compton effect, but also in general, the result obtained above 
seems to present very great difficulties for Bohr’s new radiation theory because the interpretation of the 
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Compton effect has been connected by Bohr, Kramers and Slater most closely with the statistical view of 
energy and momentum conservation, on which this new theory is based. One must reasonably well 
assumed that the concept of the light-quantum possesses a higher degree of reality than admitted in this 
theory»40. 
The results of the experiment were hence interpreted as a corroboration of the “photon” 
hypothesis. The reaffirmation of the validity of the conservation principles was seen as 
having crushed Bohr’s program. However, Bohr’s reaction was surprising. In a 
postscript to a letter to Ralph Fowler, dated April 21, 1925, he declared: “I was quite 
prepared to learn that our proposed point of view about the independence of the 
quantum process in separated atoms would turn out to be wrong. The whole matter was 
more an expression of an endeavour to attain the greatest possible applicability of the 
classical concepts than a completed theory”41. Bohr’s massage was that the 
correspondence program merited the greatest respect because it had already positively 
achieved its purpose in spite of the experimental evidence as, in his view, the falsifiable 
content of the theory of the virtual oscillators involved only the classical model 
description, but not the idea to endow quantum theory with the conceptual tools of 
classical mechanics, i.e. the rational generalization thesis, which requires the condition 
of continuity. To conclude, Bohr tried in the context of the correspondence principle to 
“develop a description of optical phenomena in line with the quantum theory of 
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spectra”42 and it provided a clear signposts for the future construction of quantum 
theory. 
10.4 The Universal Meaning of the Correspondence Principle 
One of the most important aspects of Bohr’s philosophy is his claim that quantum 
mechanics is a “rational generalization” of classical mechanics. As he admitted in 1929:  
«[…] Quantum mechanics may be regarded in every respect as a generalization of the classical physical 
theories»43. 
I think that the understanding of such a Bohr’s account may help to shed some light on 
the principle of correspondence, complementarity and the indispensability of classical 
concepts. 
The centrality of the rational generalization thesis to Bohr’s philosophy is evidenced by 
the fact that it is a point that he makes repeatedly in his writings throughout his career. 
This thesis appears in the context of both the old quantum theory and the new (post 
1925) quantum theory as it cut transversally the whole quantum mechanics. Bohr’s 
report to the third Solvay Congress in 1921 gave one of the first accounts with respect 
to the generalization thesis: 
«It may be useful first to examine the general features of the theory more closely and especially to 
elucidate, on the one hand, the radical departure of the quantum theory from our ordinary ideas of 
mechanics and electrodynamics as well as, on the other hand, the formal analogy with these ideas. […] 
                                                 
42
 “Addendum” of July 1925 added to the proofs of an article sent to the review Zeitschrift für Physik on 
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The analogy is of such a type that in a certain respect we are entitled in the quantum theory to see an 
attempt of a natural generalization of the classical theory of electromagnetism»44. 
The last quotation clearly states that Bohr saw the development from classical 
electrodynamics to the old quantum theory as forming one continuous development. 
Bohr regarded the correspondence principle as the linchpin of this continuity. He also 
emphasized this point in 1929 when he wrote: 
«We are dealing here with an unbroken development […] which, beginning with the fundamental works 
of Planck on black body radiation, has reached a temporary climax, in recent years, in the formulation of 
a symbolic quantum mechanics»45. 
Consequently, the last statements does uphold my claim that the correspondence 
principle was neither a formal analogy nor so radical a revision of the procedure that 
Bohr presented in the trilogy. On the one hand, Bohr himself admitted that he was 
dealing with an “analogy of such a type” that we are allowed to see in the quantum 
theory a “natural generalization” of classical theory. On the other hand, he spoke of 
“unbroken development” between the old and the new quantum mechanics. I daresay 
that we would not be obliged to embrace the 1918’s formulation of the correspondence 
principle even if we were not inclined to recognize a conceptual leap between the first 
and the definitive version of such a principle. Furthermore, in 1925 Bohr went so far as 
to say:  
«The whole apparatus of the [new] quantum mechanics can be regarded as a precise formulation of the 
tendencies embodied in the correspondence principle»46. 
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This claim is puzzling in light of the widespread belief that Bohr’s correspondence 
principle is just the requirement that, in the limit of large quantum numbers, there 
should be an agreement between the predictions of quantum and classical mechanics. 
Thanks to the efforts of historians and philosophers of science such as Rud Nielsen47, 
Batterman48, Darrigol49, Tanona50, Bokulich P. and Bokulich A.51 there was recognition 
that Bohr’s correspondence principle was not seen as some sort of requirement that 
classical mechanics be recuperated from quantum mechanics in the limit of high 
quantum numbers. The first germ of the correspondence principle, as Bohr himself 
reported52, can be found in his 1913’s trilogy, although the term does not appear in his 
writings until 1920. It does mean that the correspondence principle is not only a 
technical tool, but is an essential part of quantum theory.  
In calling quantum theory a generalization of classical mechanics, Bohr emphasized that 
there is a sense in which classical mechanics has not been replaced, but rather survives 
the quantum revolution in a new form. He explains: 
«The problem with which physicists were confronted was therefore to develop a rational generalization of 
classical physics, which would permit the harmonious incorporation of the quantum of action»53. 
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It is worth remarking that Bohr used the correspondence principle for searching a way 
to generalize classical mechanics: 
«The correspondence principle expresses the tendency to utilize in the systematic development of the 
quantum theory every feature of the classical theories in a rational transcription appropriate to the 
fundamental contrast between the postulates and the classical theories»54. 
It is evident that Bohr’s aim, here, is the reconciliation of classical and quantum theories 
by bringing them together into a rational and consistent whole, that it does not at all 
mean a merging of the two theories, but rather having found between them a connection 
of a purely qualitative nature. Bohr reiterated this view in 1939 while he emphasized the 
constant role of the correspondence argument from the old to the new quantum theory 
in generalizing the concepts of the classical physics: 
«In the search for the formulation of such a generalization, our only guide has been the so-called 
correspondence argument, which gives expression for the exigency of upholding the use of classical 
concepts to the largest extent compatible with the quantum postulates»55. 
 
On this understanding of the correspondence principle, Bohr is not simply saying that 
the quantum theory should go over to the classical theory in the appropriate limit. 
Rather, he is maintaining that quantum mechanics should be a theory that departs as 
little as possible from classical mechanics. In this sense we can affirm that Bohr’s 
emphasis on continuity was not just a heuristic for theory construction, but was also an 
essential condition of what he took to be the proper understanding and interpretation of 
quantum theory. 
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10.5 Continuity as a Condition for Objective Knowledge 
Since 1928 Bohr spoke constantly of the “failure of the forms of perception adapted to 
our ordinary sense impressions”56. Bohr included causality as well as space and time in 
the forms of perception: 
«Causality may be considered as a mode of perception by which we reduce our sense impressions to 
order»57. 
Bohr’s inappropriate use of “forms of perception” with respect to causality derives from 
Høffding, who talked of the “forms of understanding”. As is known, according to Kant, 
causality is a category, a concept of understanding, rather than a form. As I showed on 
chapter 5, paragraph 5.1, Høffding regarded continuity as an essential condition that his 
theory of knowledge requires to the forms of perception and the categories of cognition. 
Following Høffding, Bohr thought of space, time, causality as forms of perception, and 
made no mention of Kant, probably because he had no first-hand acquaintance with his 
writings. The forms of perception are thus the means by which we organize our 
perceptual experience. They express the conceptual structure of classical physics, 
through which macroscopic world can be interpreted. However, the classical forms of 
perception are not necessarily applicable to microphysical world. According to Bohr, 
the breakdown of visualizability in microphysics is due not just to the peculiar feature 
of micro objects, but to the failure of continuity in Høffding’s sense. Coherently, in 
1926-27 Bohr stated: “the definition of every word essentially presupposes the 
continuity of phenomena and becomes ambiguous as soon as this presupposition no 
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longer applies”58. On this view, ordinary language is designed for organizing our 
sensory experience and it presupposes the condition of continuity. As D. Murdoch 
noted, if this presupposition failed, ordinary language, including the models in terms of 
which we interpret physical theory, would become ambiguous59. 
 
                                                 
58
 Letter from Bohr to Schrödinger of December 2, 1926, in NBCW, 6 (cit note 1, ch. 1), p. 462. 
59
 DUGALD MURDOCH, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), p. 73. 
252 
 
Chapter 11  
Conclusion 
 
11.1 The Physical Implications of Unity and Continuity as a Heuristic 
After 1913 one of the main problems in the interpretation of quantum theory, according 
to Bohr, was the reconciliation of the idea of the discontinuous exchange of energy 
between the atom and the radiation field with the classical notion of the continuous 
transmission of radiation in vacuo. Bohr came to adopt a viewpoint for which the light-
quantum hypothesis and the wave hypothesis mutually exclude each other. In fact, he 
was not inclined to accept the light-quantum hypothesis, for he believed that only the 
wave hypothesis could provide a satisfactory explanation of interference phenomena. In 
1920 Bohr states that such phenomena “cannot possibly be understood on the basis of a 
theory such as that of Newton […] In fact, the picture provided by Einstein’s 
conceptions looks very much like Newton’s, and it can no more than that give any sort 
of explanation of the interference phenomena”1. 
In Bohr’s view, the light-quantum model simply illustrated the difficulty of reconciling 
the discontinuity inherent in atomic processes with the continuity presupposed by 
classical electrodynamics. 
«The hypothesis of light-quanta, therefore, is not suitable for giving a picture of the processes, in which 
the whole of the phenomena can be arranged […] The satisfactory manner in which the hypothesis 
reproduces certain aspects of the phenomena is rather suited for supporting the view […] that, in contrast 
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to the description of natural phenomena in classical physics in which it is always a question only of 
statistical results of a great number of individual processes, a description of atomic processes in terms of 
space and time cannot be carried through in a manner free from contradiction by the use of conception 
borrowed from classical electrodynamics […]»2. 
It was noted that Lorentz’s paper of 1910 on the light-quantum had a profound 
influence on Bohr. Oskar Klein recalled that Bohr frequently mentioned Lorentz’s 
arguments for the incompatibility between the light-quantum hypothesis and the fact 
concerning the interference of light waves3. 
Nevertheless, until 1925 Bohr was preoccupied nor by the wave-particle duality neither 
the continuity-discontinuity duality. The main problem he had hitherto faced was the 
apparent inconsistency between the quantum theory, which implies discontinuous 
emission or absorption of radiation, and the electromagnetic theory, which implies 
continuous emission and absorption. This also led to what I have termed the 
gnoseological issue of continuity. In order to reconcile the discontinuity inherent in the 
quantum theory and the continuity of the classical theory, what was required, for Bohr, 
was a radical departure from classical mechanics.  
Moreover, it was in the attempt to reconcile the continuity implicit in the classical 
theory with the discontinuity presupposed by the quantum theory that the Bohr-
Kramers-Slater theory of virtual oscillators regarded the atom in a stationary state as a 
set of virtual harmonic oscillators, whose frequencies are those of possible transitions 
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between stationary states, and that atoms communicate with one another by means of 
virtual radiation fields produced by the oscillators4. 
Some scholars noted that it was around Bohr’s concepts of stationary states and 
quantum jumps, rather than the wave-particle dilemma or indeterminism, that the new 
philosophy of physics was erected5. As is known, the idea of stationary states, and 
especially the idea of instantaneous transitions between such states, implied from the 
very beginning of Bohr’s program a radical departure from classical space-time models. 
But the wave theoretical model would allow Bohr finally to decipher the limits of the 
application of space-time to the atomic model, and above all, the wave model would 
enable him to resurrect his idea of the stationary states of an atom.  
Bohr’s program was hence characterized by the attempt to reconcile conceptually 
quantum theory and classical theory, and this resurfaced also in the central message of 
Bohr’s Come lecture: the compatibility, indeed, the “happy marriage”, between 
Schrödinger’s successful continuous wave mechanics and the quantum postulate. In 
fact, the Como lecture announced a resolution of these long-standing problems (atomic 
structure, the interaction of radiation with matter, and collisions) by harnessing the 
wave theoretical framework to the quantum postulate. This is to say that Lakatos was 
right in defining the stationary states and the quantum jumps as the starting point, or the 
irrefutable nucleus of Bohr’s research program; indeed the concept of the stationary 
states was beset with conceptual inconsistencies from the start. Moreover, as it was 
shown, the correspondence rule was a heuristic to finding a satisfactory quantum theory. 
As is known Lakatos subscribed this point, even if he took no heed of the concept of 
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continuity as an essential condition for the correspondence principle. This un-verifiable 
and un-falsifiable statement explains why, according to Bohr, quantum mechanics was a 
rational generalization of classical mechanics, even though the quantum postulate and the 
quantum jumps were taken into account. 
Bohr acknowledged, indeed, that the correspondence argument failed in those cases 
where particular non-classical concepts have to be introduced into the description of 
atoms. But he still thought that the correspondence argument was indispensable for both 
structural and semantic reasons in constructing a proper quantum theory as a generalised 
theory from classical mechanics. 
The continuity inherent in the correspondence principle was essential to Bohr’s theory 
of knowledge as it was a precondition for the acquisition of empirical knowledge. In 
fact, as is known, the quantum of action created a problem for the possibility of causal 
description of individual atomic objects, required by the ideal of causation, inasmuch as 
the causal mode of description had to be considered complementary to the spatio-
temporal mode of description. Bohr grasped the difficulty of applying the causal mode 
of description to the domain of quantum mechanics, where the subject-object distinction 
is blurred due to the character of wholeness and unity introduced by the quantum of 
action. Just like Høffding had seen the difficulties in psychology and biology as 
consequences of the application of causal and holistic descriptions respectively. Bohr 
perceived that the solutions to such difficulties lie in the use of complementary 
descriptions in quantum mechanics, as well as in psychology and biology. 
It is generally assumed that the roots of Bohr’s complementarity lie in the experimental 
refutation of the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory. As Mara Beller noted, this theory used the 
wave theoretical framework of light exclusively rather than Einstein’s theory of light 
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quanta. After the Bothe-Geiger experiments – many scholars argued – Bohr wouldn’t 
have had no choice but to assimilate light-quanta, which he had rejected vigorously 
beforehand. However, Bohr did not adopt the idea of point-like light-quanta even after 
the Bothe-Geiger experiments. Bohr’s complementarity principle implied further 
rejection, not acceptance, of the idea of point-like material particles.  
It is worth remarking once again the conceptual symmetry between the correspondence 
principle and the use Bohr made of the wave concepts. Bohr’s argument for the 
superiority of wave concepts does not mean that waves represented a literal picture of 
reality, but rather the wave model was heuristically more useful. Mara Beller sustained 
that the fruitfulness of the concept of wave packets is especially evident in the case of 
interactions. We will never observe either an isolated particle or a monochromatic wave, 
but only cases of superposition of light or matter waves. Last but no the least, the idea 
of a wave packet is particularly suitable for demonstrating the harmony between the 
possibilities of wave theoretical definition and those of observation6.  
I would add in addition to Bohr’s account that the concept of continuity correlated to the 
idea of wave packet represents the condition to get that asymptotic unity or harmony 
between observation and definition of concepts, i.e. reality and theory, which I have 
referred to on chapter 3. The whole Bohr’s program appears to be informed by such 
interaction between theory and reality. Returning to the heuristic value of the idea of 
wave packets, characterized by the condition of continuity, we can now show how step-
by-step the physical fruitfulness of this idea rose.  
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We now need to heed the idea of stationary states and the quantum jumps, i.e. the 
starting point of Bohr’s program. We have to remind that the whole Bohr’s program 
was an attempt to make such idea compatible with the new physics in order to re-
establish the condition of continuity. Indeed, the stationary states imply the idea of 
discontinuity. As it was rightly said, Bohr’s aim was not to save a program, rather to 
carry through its hard core in spite of the internal inconsistencies by means of a 
departure by classical models. Even in the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory the idea of 
stationary states and quantum jumps necessitated such major departures as non 
conservation of energy and momentum, as well as the introduction of the strange 
“virtual field” that an atom in a definite stationary state emitted.  
Moreover, the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory implied further departures from ordinary 
space-time visualization, for example, in the explanation of the Compton effect. 
Similarly, the analysis of the phenomenon of collisions, when a fast-moving particle 
collides with an atom in a certain stationary state, demanded resignation from strict 
conservation of energy and momentum7. When Bohr learned of the results of the Bothe-
Geiger experiments, confirming strict conservation, he did not question the formulas of 
the wave theory of light or the adequacy of the description of atoms in terms of 
stationary states. It was rather regarded by Bohr as a further departure from classical 
space-time models for the interior of the atom. Bohr was supported in this direction by 
the wave theoretical ideas of de Broglie and Einstein. The paper Bohr wrote on these 
matters was published in 1925, just before Heisenberg’s reinterpretation paper 
(“Quantentheoretische Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer Beziehungen”, 
Zeitschrift für Physik, 1925, 33: 879-93, in English “Quantum-theoretical 
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Reinterpretation of Kinematical and Mechanical Relations”). Heisenberg’s solution, 
however, was too radical. Matrix mechanics could not theoretically describe the states 
of atomic systems and the evolution of phenomena. Schrödinger indeed perceived the 
matrix mechanical formalism as eliminating Bohr’s concept of separate stationary 
states. Schrödinger himself attempted a continuous wave description that would further 
eliminate the concept of stationary states with definite energies, and discontinuous 
transitions between these states, by suggesting instead a resonance model in terms of 
frequencies. As Mara Beller has argued, the Göttingen and Copenhagen physicists 
joined forces in response to the perceived threat from Schrödinger – his attempt to 
reduce Bohr’s concepts to the status of Ptolemaic epicycles.  
It was around the adequacy of Bohr’s concepts of stationary states and quantum jumps 
that the crucial interpretative attempts resolved8. Bohr, who accepted the great 
usefulness of Schrödinger’s formalism, could not see initially how solutions to 
Schrödinger’s wave equation, in terms of the superposition of different proper 
vibrations, could be reconciled with the idea of separate stationary states. After 
Schrödinger’s visit in Copenhagen in 1926, the direction of Bohr’s efforts became clear: 
to achieve compatibility between wave theoretical ideas and the quantum postulate. As 
Heisenberg put it: 
«Bohr realized at once that it was here we would find the solution to those fundamental problems with 
which he had struggled incessantly since 1913 and in the light of the newly won knowledge he 
concentrated all his thought on a critical test of those arguments which had led him to ideas such as 
stationary states and quantum transitions»9. 
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Bohr’s Como lecture was the culmination and resolution of these efforts. Bohr’s 
criticized Schrödinger’s attempts to replace “the discontinuous exchange of energy […] 
by simple resonance phenomena“10. Schrödinger’s theory must necessarily be 
interpreted by an explicit use of the quantum postulate, and in direct connection with the 
correspondence principle.  
Furthermore, if according to Schrödinger’s equation, an atom exists in a superposition 
of proper vibrations, consequently it appeared difficult to reconcile the idea of 
stationary states with Schrödinger’s wave function. In fact, according to the quantum 
postulate, an atom should be always in some definite stationary state. Bohr’s ingenious 
resolution of this difficulty was guided by the search for the compatibility of the 
possibilities of definition and observation: the superposition of proper vibration stands 
for a definition (that is the “theory”; as it is expression of the continuity inherent in 
Schrödinger’s equation) of the interactions (observations)11. But an atom in a definite 
stationary state with precise energy is not accessible to observation, therefore it can 
correctly be described as a single proper vibration. It means that the idea of a stationary 
state becomes an abstraction, both because it is represented by a single wave and 
because a system not accessible to observation constitutes in a certain sense an 
abstraction, just as an idea of an isolated particle. However, the concept of stationary 
state was essential in Bohr’s view for the interpretation of phenomena in spite of its 
abstract meaning because “the conception of a stationary state involves, strictly 
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speaking, the exclusion of all interactions”12, the constant energy value associated with 
such states “may be considered as an immediate expression for the claim of causality 
contained in the theorem of conservation of energy”13.  
Beller reminds that Bohr devoted all of paragraph 5 of the Como lecture to arguing for 
the consistency of the concept of a stationary state. Bohr’s strategy was to demonstrate 
that complementarity between stationary states and corpuscular space-time descriptions 
– or between causality and space-time, for the interior of an atom – accords fully with 
the possibilities of observation. Nevertheless, the concept of complementarity between 
stationary states and corpuscular space-time descriptions presented a serious problem in 
the case of large quantum numbers, where, according to Bohr’s correspondence 
principle, the concept of stationary states would approach the classical space-time orbits 
along which intra-atomic particles revolve14. Schrödinger arose a legitimate objection: 
how to regard the concept of stationary states in the case of an electron moving along an 
orbit with a large quantum number, which must be represented by a wave packet, i.e. a 
superposition of many vibrations? This is to say: how can complementarity, or the 
mutual exclusion of the concept of stationary states and individual particles, possibly be 
maintained in the case of large quantum numbers? 
Once again it is worth noting that the harmony between the possibilities of observation 
and definition, that is, between reality and theory, played a guiding role in searching for 
a solution. 
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When we identify the exact value of the energy of a stationary state by means of 
collisions or radiation reaction, we inevitably imply “a gap in the time description, 
which is at least of the order of magnitude of the periods associated with transitions 
between stationary states. In the limit of high quantum numbers these periods, however, 
may be interpreted as periods of revolution”15.  
The possibility of describing stationary states by means of Schrödinger’s wave function 
indicated to Bohr the physical significance of wave mechanics and the possibility of 
resurrecting classical mechanics. The fact that such a definition of a stationary state is 
theoretically adequate was demonstrated, according to Bohr, by Born’s work, which 
provided “a complete description of the collision phenomena of Frank and Hertz, which 
may be said to exhibit the stability of stationary states”16. On purpose Bohr stated: 
«Notwithstanding its remarkable adaptations to the requirements of quantum theory, Schrödinger’s wave 
equation theory will appear to constitute a transcription of classical mechanics which for the time being 
can be interpreted only by the explicit use of the quantum postulate and the concepts of material particles. 
This had been emphasized especially by Born, who in connection with his important investigation of 
collision problems has suggested a simple statistical interpretation of Schrödinger’s wave functions»17. 
Furthermore, the year before, Bohr had written to Ralph Fowler: “just in the wave 
mechanics we possesses now the means of picturing a single stationary state which suits 
all purposes consistent with the postulates of the quantum theory. In fact, this is the very 
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reason for the advantage which the wave-mechanics in certain respects exhibits when 
compared with the matrix method”18. 
Schrödinger’s version of quantum mechanics, in Bohr’s view, introduced a model that 
resurrected both the stationary states and the idea of quantization. It also allowed the 
physical interpretation of quantization, i.e. the visualization, which was possible thanks 
to the condition of continuity re-established by the wave-theoretical model along the 
line of the classical physics:  
«[…] Schrödinger has expressed the hope that the development of the wave theory will eventually 
remove the irrational element expressed by the quantum postulate and open the way for a complete 
description of atomic phenomena along the line of the classical theories»19.  
Moreover, the crucial point was that matrix mechanics defied any physical 
interpretation, while Schrödinger’s wave mechanics allowed an understanding of the 
electric and magnetic properties of the atoms:  
«Furthermore, the number of nodes in the various characteristic vibrations gives a simple interpretation to 
the concept of quantum number which was already known from the older methods but at first did not 
seem to appear in the matrix formulation»20. 
Nevertheless, the main difficulty arises in the case of intra-atomic particles, which 
cannot be visualized in terms of ordinary space-time picture even though they are 
represented by a wave theoretical framework. As Bohr himself noted, it is here that the 
most striking difference between classical and quantum mechanics lies: while in the 
former “particles are endowed with an immediate ‘reality’, independently of their being 
                                                 
18
 Bohr to Fowler, October 26, 1926, AHQP. 
19
 BOHR, “The Quantum Postulate” (cit. note 10), p. 154. 
20
 Ibidem. 
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free or bound”, in quantum mechanics intra-atomic, bound particles are not 
visualizable21. For this reason Bohr found both Schrödinger and Heisenberg’s 
approaches inadequate. Bohr agreed with Heisenberg that Schrödinger’s waves in 
multidimensional space could hardly be considered immediately intuitive. But neither 
was Heisenberg’s approach satisfactory: the intra-atomic reality was not a particle-
kinematic one. Moreover, Schrödinger saw Bohr’s argument in the Como lecture as a 
defence of the concept of stationary states. Then Schrödinger argued that the 
combination of uncertainty relations and the idea of stationary states destroys 
compatibility between definition and observation. The controversy was not resolved and 
Schrödinger still in the 1950s continued to criticize Bohr’s idea of stationary states and 
quantum jumps. 
Returning to Lakatos’ evaluation of Bohr’s research program, we may say that he 
correctly put emphasis on the fundamental aspect of Bohr’s atomic theory: the hard 
core, i.e. the starting point of his program, and he regarded such a program as 
progressive at least until 1925. However Lakatos failed to understand the essential 
requirement of continuity underlying Bohr’s program. It was for the condition of 
continuity that Bohr himself did not consider the transition from classical to quantum 
physics as a revolution. In fact, Bohr’s methodological prescriptions in terms of 
correspondence rule were very different, for instance, from a Kuhnian prospective. 
Where Kuhn saw revolutions and incommensurability, Bohr looked for rational 
generalizations and commensurability. Furthermore, what Lakatos did not accept as 
regards Bohr’s program was the concept of complementarity that represented for him a 
kind of religion or philosophy introduced in order to save the program. According to 
                                                 
21
 Ibidem, p. 155. 
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Lakatos, after 1925 Bohr was responsible for an unprecedented lowering of critical 
standards for scientific theories. Einstein defined the Heisenberg-Bohr new quantum 
mechanics as a sort of tranquillizing philosophy, or religion, which provided “a gentle 
pillow for true believer”22. In my view, as I have shown, complementarity was the 
culmination of Bohr’s research program. For this reason Bohr could be characterized more 
as an evolutionary theorist than a revolutionary one, as I wrote in the introduction to this 
dissertation. Following Michael Friedman and Jan Faye, I will claim that Planck’s 
discovery of the discontinuity of the black body spectrum was considered by Bohr as a 
well-established empirical fact, which was elevated to a constitutive (a priori) principle in 
his model of the atom. This semi-classical model was applied to the hydrogen atom. From 
then on, a continuous struggle began of enlarging the model to deal with atoms with higher 
numbers and to reach a proper theory, which could explain the dynamics of elementary 
particles. One may therefore argue that the period between 1913 and 1925 was one long 
process of conceptual adaptations, which involved a collection of the most brilliant 
physicists at that time. This process only partly ended in 1925 when Heisenberg 
established a proper theory of quantum mechanics in which the quantum of action still 
formed the constitutive a priori principle. However, it is worth remarking that still in 1927 
Bohr saw in Schrödinger’s version of quantum mechanics a way of removing the 
irrational element introduced by the quantum of action by developing the wave theory. In 
this sense, the thematic concept of unity or harmony between description and observation, 
and the condition of continuity, i.e. the essential aspect for communicating any kind of 
                                                 
22
 Letter from Einstein to Schrödinger, May 31, 1928, in KARL PRZIBRAM (ed.), Briefe Zur 
Wellenmechanik (Vienna: Springer, 1963). 
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concepts by means of the classical theory (the ordinary language), would represent the real 
philosophy of Niels Bohr.  
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